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CANNABIS LEGALIZATION IN STATE
LEGISLATURES: PUBLIC HEALTH
OPPORTUNITY AND RISK
DANIEL G. ORENSTEIN* & STANTON A. GLANTZ**
Cannabis is widely used in the United States and internationally despite its
illicit status, but that illicit status is changing. In the United States, thirty-three
states and the District of Columbia have legalized medical cannabis, and eleven
states and D.C. have legalized adult use cannabis. A majority of state medical
cannabis laws and all but two state adult use laws are the result of citizen ballot
initiatives, but state legislatures are beginning to seriously consider adult use
legislation. From a public health perspective, cannabis legalization presents a
mix of potential risks and benefits, but a legislative approach offers an
opportunity to improve on existing legalization models passed using the
initiative process that strongly favor business interests over public health. To
assess whether state legislatures are acting on this opportunity, this Article
examines provisions of proposed adult use cannabis legalization bills active in
state legislatures as of February 2019 to evaluate the inclusion of key public
health best practices based on successful tobacco and alcohol control public
health policy frameworks. Given public support for legalization, further
adoption of state adult use cannabis laws is likely, but legalization should not
be viewed as a binary choice between total prohibition and laissez faire
commercialization. The extent to which adult use cannabis laws incorporate
or reject public health best practices will strongly affect their impact, and
health advocates should work to influence the construction of such laws to
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prioritize public health and learn from past successes and failures in regulating
other substances.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1

Cannabis is the most widely used psychoactive substance in the world that
is under international control, with an estimated 181.8 million global users
annually as of 2013.2 In the United States, cannabis is by far the most
1. The terms “cannabis” and “marijuana” (and occasionally “marihuana”) all appear in state law.
In some states, the terms are interchangeable. See, e.g., S.B. 94, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017)
(replacing statutory references to “marijuana” with “cannabis”). In others, the terms have critically
different legal meanings. See, e.g., State v. Medina, 836 P.2d 997, 999 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing
to apply felony murder rule in a case involving drug possession because possession of “cannabis,”
defined under state law as extracted resin and various preparations thereof, was classified as a felony,
but possession of “marijuana,” defined as the plant itself, was not). Scientifically, “Cannabis” refers
to the entire plant genus, including the genetic variants (or possibly distinct species) Cannabis indica
and Cannabis sativa. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF CANNABIS
AND CANNABINOIDS 44 (2017), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24625/the-health-effects-of-cannabisand-cannabinoids-the-current-state [https://perma.cc/2FKS-7RDR]. “Marijuana” historically referred
to the dried leaves and flowers of the plant, as distinguished from “hashish,” made from the resin or
resin glands. MARTIN BOOTH, CANNABIS: A HISTORY 7–8 (2015). The word “marijuana” may derive
from Mexican military slang for a prostitute or brothel, Maria y Juana (translating as Mary and Jane,
and thus also the likely source for the American cannabis slang term “Mary Jane”), and there is a nearlimitless litany of jargon and slang terms for the plant (e.g., pot, weed, ganja, dope, grass) owing to the
need for clandestine reference to an illegal product. Id. at 158. This Article generally uses “cannabis”
(rather than “marijuana”) to acknowledge the rise of concentrates and extracts (including their use in
edibles) as a significant and growing product area, in addition to consideration of the historical use of
“marijuana” in the United States as a pejorative with racist and xenophobic overtones, though there is
by no means consensus on terminology. See Alex Halperin, Marijuana: Is It Time to Stop Using a
Word
with
Racist
Roots?,
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
29,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jan/29/marijuana-name-cannabis-racism
[https://perma.cc/Q78P-B86F] (discussing racial history of the terminology). But cf. Angela Chen,
Why It Can Be Okay to Call It ‘Marijuana’ Instead of ‘Cannabis’, VERGE (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/19/17253446/marijuana-cannabis-drugs-racist-language-history
[https://perma.cc/AM7M-B2TP] (arguing that “cannabis” is insufficiently specific because it is the
name of the entire plant genus, which includes hemp, and that avoiding the term “marijuana” may erase
the complicated and problematic racial history of criminalization of the substance).
2. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE HEALTH AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF NONMEDICAL CANNABIS USE
1
(2016),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/251056/9789241510240eng.pdf;jsessionid=67409FE8532C91491480A01A51878075?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/ME66AN4E] [hereinafter WHO, EFFECTS OF NONMEDICAL CANNABIS USE].
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commonly used illicit substance, with an estimated 24 million people age 12 or
older reporting use in the past thirty days (8.9% of that population) as of 2016.3
Use is highest among those 18–25 years old (20.8%).4 While overall prevalence
is far outpaced by licit substances tobacco (63.4 million users age 12 or older;
23.5% of population) and alcohol (136.7 million users age 12 or older; 50.7%
of population),5 cannabis use is remarkably6 and consistently7 high given the
drug’s illicit status.8
The illicit status of cannabis, however, is in a state of flux. Despite
continued illegality under federal law,9 between 1996 and June 2019, thirtythree U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and the territories of Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands legalized use of cannabis for medical purposes,
and eleven states, D.C., Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands legalized
recreational or “adult use” of the drug.10 In these jurisdictions, a lucrative new

3. REBECCA AHRNSBRAK, JONAKI BOSE, SARRA L. HEDDEN, RACHEL N. LIPARI, & EUNICE
PARK-LEE, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND
MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2016 NATIONAL SURVEY
ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 14 (2017), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHFFR1-2016/NSDUH-FFR1-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/K74R-DGLD].
4. Id. at 15.
5. Id. at 7, 11.
6. Among illicit drugs, cannabis use far exceeds all others in terms of use prevalence. In 2016,
an estimated 28.6 million persons age 12 and older used illicit drug in the past month. Id. at 14. Among
these, 24.0 million used cannabis, but the second highest category was misuse of prescription pain
killers at just 3.3 million users. Id.
7. Id. at 15. Past-month cannabis use among all persons age 12 and older remained between
6.0% and 8.9% from 2002–2016. Id. While overall prevalence increased over this timeframe, the
increase is largely attributable to an increase in use by those over age 26 and to a lesser extent those
18–25; use among adolescents 12–17 actually decreased. Id.
8. In fact, cannabis use rates peaked in the 1970s, despite tight federal control under the
Controlled Substances Act. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 62.
9. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012).
10. State
Policy,
MARIJUANA
POLICY
PROJECT,
https://www.mpp.org/states/
[https://perma.cc/7CKZ-GJSX]; U.S. Territory Policy, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT,
https://www.mpp.org/policy/us-territories/ [https://perma.cc/PH5N-GV98]; Marijuana Deep Dive,
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/bookstore/state-legislaturesmagazine/marijuana-deep-dive.aspx [https://perma.cc/KZ4U-7GSZ] [hereinafter Marijuana Deep
Dive]; Guam Legalizes Recreational Use of Marijuana, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://apnews.com/90e16396f1f14e08aee3e1c9d2a8d493 [https://perma.cc/9LYW-6L6B]. The most
recent adult use legalization state, Illinois, did so legislatively in June 2019. John O’Connor, Illinois
Becomes 11th State to Allow Recreational Marijuana, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 25, 2019),
https://www.apnews.com/7b793d88f3c84417b83db0f770854960 [https://perma.cc/Y6PK-PN78].
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business sector is rising, complete with professional marketing firms,11
industry-specific conferences and events,12 and industry groups actively
lobbying for favorable legal changes.13
Estimates for the near-term future size of the global legal cannabis market
vary and depend heavily on assumptions of future legal changes, but some
analysts expect the industry could grow to $75 billion in sales by 2030,
surpassing soda, among other industries.14 The cannabis market has already
attracted the attention and investment of major corporate entities in Canada
(which legalized adult use in 2018), including Altria (parent company of Philip
Morris USA, maker of Marlboro® and other cigarette labels), Constellation
Brands (owner of Corona® and other beer labels), and Molson Coors (owner
of Molson®, Coors®, and other beer labels), while a number of other large
corporations, including Coca-Cola®, are reportedly also considering entry.15
Tobacco companies in particular have contemplated entering the cannabis
market in the event of legalization since the late 1960s.16 Public health
advocates are justifiably concerned about such corporate entities, especially
tobacco, entering the cannabis market, but even an independently developing
cannabis industry poses substantial risks if it follows the path of industries like
tobacco. As Richter and Levy explain, “The tobacco industry has provided a
detailed road map for marijuana: deny addiction potential, downplay known
adverse health effects, create as large a market as possible as quickly as

11. See,
e.g.,
Marijuana
Advertising
Agencies,
GANJAPRENEUR,
https://www.ganjapreneur.com/marijuana-advertising-agencies/
[https://perma.cc/8F9T-MSJQ]
(listing multiple cannabis-specific advertising agencies).
12. Events Calendar, NAT’L CANNABIS INDUS. ASS’N, https://thecannabisindustry.org/nciaevents/ [https://perma.cc/H253-TD2Y].
13. NAT’L CANNABIS INDUS. ASS’N, https://thecannabisindustry.org/ [https://perma.cc/UE6HZUPD].
14. Jeremy Berke, Coca-Cola Is Reportedly Eyeing the Legal Marijuana Industry, and It Could
Soon Be a Bigger Market Than Soda, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/marijuana-bigger-than-soda-according-to-analyst-2018-4
[https://perma.cc/S7LJ-YDMS].
15. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16 (Can.) (legalizing adult use cannabis in Canada); David Gelles,
When the Makers of Marlboro and Corona Get Into Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/business/cannabis-business-altria-canopy-constellationcronos.html [https://perma.cc/2DAB-TWZ3] (detailing large corporate investments in Canadian
cannabis companies).
16. See generally Rachel Ann Barry, Heikki Hiilamo, & Stanton A. Glantz, Waiting for the
Opportune Moment: The Tobacco Industry and Marijuana Legalization, 92 MILBANK Q. 207 (2014).
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possible, and protect that market through lobbying, campaign contributions,
and other advocacy efforts.”17
Cannabis legalization carries ostensible social benefits, including medical
utility for some conditions18 and the promise of ending discriminatory
enforcement practices that have disproportionately affected vulnerable
populations, particularly communities of color, throughout the history of
cannabis criminalization in the United States.19 American voters have been
receptive to these arguments and have been increasingly willing to approve
medical and adult use legalization ballot initiatives over the past two decades.20
Particularly for adult use cannabis, ballot initiatives have been advocates’ legal
vehicle of choice. Only Illinois (2019), Vermont (2018), the Northern Mariana
Islands (2018), and Guam (2019) have enacted adult use laws legislatively; the
other nine states and D.C. have all enacted their adult use laws via ballot
initiative.21
The increasing success of legalization ballot initiatives over time22 and the
current state of U.S. public opinion on the appropriate legal status of cannabis
(67% support nationally for legalization as of 201923) make further legalization
17. Kimber P. Richter & Sharon Levy, Big Marijuana – Lessons from Big Tobacco, 371 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 399, 401 (2014).
18. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 13–14 (summarizing conclusions
regarding therapeutic effects of cannabis and cannabinoids).
19. See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, The Colors Of Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, 50 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 689, 690–702 (2016). Notably, there continue to be troubling disparities in cannabis-related
arrests in adult use states, which legalization opponents cite as evidence that legalization is failing to
achieve a key outcome advanced by advocates. Kevin Sabet, Marijuana and Legalization Impacts, 23
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 84, 92–93 (2018). Among other factors, disparate enforcement of prohibitions
remaining following legalization, including public consumption, youth possession, and driving under
the influence, can contribute to continued disparities, reflecting broader inequities tied to racial
profiling, “broken window” policing, and law enforcement saturation in neighborhoods of color.
Bender, supra, at 701–03.
20. Daniel G. Orenstein & Stanton A. Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass: Cannabis Legalization
Ballot Initiative Campaign Contributions and Outcomes, 2004–2016, 45 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L.
73, 87–88 (2020) [hereinafter Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass].
21. O’Connor, supra note 10; Tom Angell, Governor Signs Marijuana Legalization Bill, Making
History
In
US
Territory,
FORBES
(Sept.
21,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2018/09/21/governor-signs-marijuana-legalization-billmaking-history-in-us-territory/#676fe0827ea3 [https://perma.cc/BXA9-6L8H]; Marijuana Overview,
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/marijuana-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZT7Q-LMZL] [hereinafter Marijuana Overview].
22. Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass, supra note 20, at 76–77, 87–88.
23. Andrew Daniller, Two-Thirds of Americans Support Marijuana Legalization, PEW RES. CTR.
(Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/14/americans-support-marijuanalegalization/ [https://perma.cc/5S89-98VF].
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highly likely in additional states. From a legal and public health perspective,
cannabis legalization has likely become more a question of “how,” rather than
“if” in the United States.24 As additional states25 contemplate adult use
legalization, the public health implications of this policy evolution will depend
in part on the content of legalization laws and how well they govern the new
legal market.
On one side, legalization represents the potential to better regulate a
substance that has remained commonly used despite strict federal prohibition
and to improve public awareness of the health effects (both adverse and
therapeutic) of use. On the other, legalization may also increase use prevalence
and frequency, encourage youth initiation, reproduce existing inequities for
vulnerable populations, and lead to other social harms. The influence of
corporatization may exacerbate such negative effects, replicating the ills of
tobacco and alcohol markets. Legislative approaches to cannabis legalization
thus present both opportunities and risks for public health.
Public health best practice frameworks provide critical guidance on how to
regulate cannabis effectively and minimize negative health impacts. A public
health approach to legalization prioritizes public health over other goals,
including industry profits, state tax revenues, and business development, that,
while valid bases for government action generally, may lead to detrimental
outcomes in regulating potentially harmful substances. A public health
approach draws on the successes and failures of domestic and international
regulatory frameworks for other substances, most notably tobacco and alcohol.
However, these substantive concerns do not exist within a vacuum, but rather
intersect with the procedural question of how a state legalizes adult use
cannabis—i.e., ballot initiative or legislation. To further understand this
intersection, this Article assesses the adoption or absence of public health best
practices in proposed legislative adult use cannabis laws.
Part II provides background information on the history and current status
of cannabis under U.S. federal and state law. This Part also introduces the

24. But see William A. Galston & E.J. Dionne Jr., The New Politics of Marijuana Legalization:
Why Opinion Is Changing, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (May 29, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Dionne-Galston_NewPoliticsofMJLeg_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5LUTC59] (assessing support for legalization and concluding that while opposition is unlikely to return to
prior levels, consistent trajectory of opinions should not be assumed and will depend in part on the
effects of ongoing legalization measures).
25. The unique complexities of cannabis legalization in tribal jurisdictions are beyond the scope
of this Article. See Brad A. Bartlett & Garrett L. Davey, Tribes and Cannabis: Seeking Parity with
States and Consultation and Agreement from the U.S. Government, 64 FED. LAW. 54, 55–56 (2017);
Katherine Florey, Budding Conflicts: Marijuana’s Impact on Unsettled Questions of Tribal–State
Relations, 58 B.C. L. REV. 991, 991–94 (2017).
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foundations of a public health approach to cannabis legalization based on best
practices from tobacco and alcohol control. Part III defines a rubric for
evaluating proposed legislative legalization and applies this rubric to proposed
bills from 2018–19, finding that elements of a public health approach have
gained traction in at least some proposals. Part IV discusses the implications
of these findings, concluding that proactive adoption of adult use cannabis
legalization via state legislatures could benefit public health by obviating proindustry, advocate-driven initiatives and preserving legislative and regulatory
flexibility to address developing evidence and implementation challenges in the
future.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Brief History of Cannabis Legalization in the United States
1. The Path to Prohibition and Back Again
Cannabis cultivation has a long and complex history in human
civilization.26 Cannabis was one of the earliest cultivated plants, and its
potential medicinal properties have been documented in Western medicine
since the 19th century (and much longer in other traditions).27 Cannabis
appeared in the Pharmacopeia of the United States from 1851 until 1942 with
reference to use as an analgesic, hypnotic, and anticonvulsant.28 Despite this,
most states banned cannabis in the early 20th century, and the federal
government followed suit in 1937.29 Much of this push toward criminalization
in the early 1900s was rooted in racial animus toward Mexican immigrants and
Various international drug control treaties also
African-Americans.30
developed in the early- and mid-20th century, ultimately consolidated in the
1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.31 The Single Convention and
26. See, e.g., Brian M. Blumenfeld, State Legalization of Marijuana and Our American System
of Federalism: A Historio-Constitutional Primer, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 77, 81 (2017) (discussing
cultivation and use dating back to fifth-century Greece and Rome).
27. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 43.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Tamar Todd, The Benefits of Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM.
L. 99, 104–06 (2018). While not technically a prohibition on cannabis, this was the practical effect of
the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. MARK K. OSBECK & HOWARD BROMBERG, MARIJUANA LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 44–45 (2017).
31. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 151
[hereinafter Single Convention]; see also DAVID BEWLEY-TAYLOR & MARTIN JELSMA, FIFTY YEARS
OF THE 1961 SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS: A REINTERPRETATION 1–5 (2011),
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subsequent amendments created a scheduling system for controlled substances
and obligated treaty parties to criminalize possession of such drugs.32 The
United States played a pivotal role in shaping the treaty, led by Harry J.
Anslinger, the nation’s first commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
(the precursor to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)) who had
spearheaded cannabis criminalization in the United States.33
Under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) of 1970,34 cannabis became
one of the most highly restricted drugs under U.S. law.35 The CSA placed
cannabis (“marihuana” in the statutory language) on Schedule I, meaning it was
found to have: (1) high potential for abuse; (2) no currently accepted medical
use in treatment in the United States; and (3) a lack of accepted safety for use
under medical supervision.36 Other Schedule I drugs include a variety of
powerful opiates and opium derivatives (e.g., heroin), hallucinogens (e.g.,
LSD), and, as of 2012, several newer synthetic street drugs, including synthetic
cannabinoids (sometimes called “K2” or “spice”).37 Either Congress or the U.S.
Attorney General (via the DEA and with recommendation from the Secretary
of Health and Human Services) has authority to revise this approach; however,
petitions for rescheduling cannabis have failed as recently as 2016,38 despite
https://www.tni.org/files/download/dlr12.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZP2-F6LJ].
Potential conflicts
between state cannabis legalization and U.S. obligations under this treaty are beyond the scope of this
Article. See Michael Tackeff, Note, Constructing a “Creative Reading”: Will US State Cannabis
Legislation Threaten the Fate of the International Drug Control Treaties?, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 247, 258–59 (2018).
32. Id. The Single Convention also charges the World Health Organization (WHO) to assess the
dangers posed by illicit drugs. Single Convention, supra note 31, at art. 3–4. WHO published a report
on cannabis in 2016, its first in 20 years. See WHO, EFFECTS OF NONMEDICAL CANNABIS USE, supra
note 2, at v, 1.
33. BEWLEY-TAYLOR & JELSMA, supra note 31, at 7–8.
34. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012).
35. Notably, the CSA’s approach to cannabis was in some respects actually less punitive than
the prior Boggs Act of 1951, which applied mandatory minimum sentencing for simple possession.
OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 30, at 52.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 52, 79–80; Deadly Synthetic Drugs: The Need to Stay Ahead of the Poison Peddlers:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 8 (2016) (statement of Douglas C.
Throckmorton, Deputy Director, Regulatory Programs, U.S. Food and Drug Admin.),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-07-16%20Throckmorton%20Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R9PM-6MMF].
38. Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg. 53,767
(Aug. 12, 2016); see also Diane Hoffman, Francis B. Palumbo, & Y. Tony Yang, Will the FDA’s
Approval Of Epidiolex Lead To Rescheduling Marijuana?, HEALTH AFF. (July 12, 2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180709.904289/full/
[https://perma.cc/4Z7GJ35W?type=image]; John Hudak & Grace Wallack, How to Reschedule Marijuana, and Why It’s
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growing evidence that cannabis has some therapeutic utility.39 Congress did
legalize hemp production under the 2018 Farm Bill;40 however, hemp includes
only cannabis with minimal concentration of ∆9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC,
responsible for the “high” associated with cannabis intoxication, among other
effects).41
Despite the Schedule I status of cannabis, the FDA has licensed three
medications based on cannabinoid compounds responsible for the drug’s
effects. Among over one hundred identified cannabinoids, two receive by far
the most attention from both the medical community and from regulators: THC
The first two FDA-approved cannabinoid
and cannabidiol (CBD).42
medications used synthetic THC: dronabinol (trade name Marinol®) and
nabilone (trade name Cesamet®), both used for chemotherapy-associated
nausea and vomiting.43 In 2013, FDA granted investigational new drug status
to the first medication using non-synthetic cannabinoids derived from the
cannabis plant, a concentrated CBD oil under the trade name Epidiolex® for
the treatment of epilepsy-related seizures.44 Because Epidiolex® is derived
from cannabis itself, some observers see its approval as potentially triggering
reclassification of cannabis under federal law based on FDA’s formal
recognition of medical utility, one of the core elements of drug scheduling
under the CSA.45
Shortly after enactment of the CSA, several states reduced their own
criminal penalties for cannabis possession, with eleven states enacting such
laws in the 1970s, though this policy development then stalled until the mid-

Unlikely
Anytime
Soon,
BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION
(Feb.
13,
2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/02/13/how-to-reschedule-marijuana-and-why-itsunlikely-anytime-soon/ [https://perma.cc/7EFC-Y9YR]. The DEA previously rejected petitions for
rescheduling cannabis in 1989 (responding to a petition originally filed in 1972) and 2011 (responding
to a petition filed in 2002). See All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 15 F.3d 1131,
1133–34 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding DEA’s 1989 denial); Ams. for Safe Access v. Drug Enf’t Admin.,
706 F.3d 438, 439–42 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding DEA’s 2011 denial).
39. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 85–129.
40. Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–334, 132 Stat. 4490, 4908–09.
41. Id.; NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 51.
42. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1 at 38 n.4, 53–55.
43. Id. at 53–54.
44. Id. at 54–55.
45. See Y. Tony Yang & Jerzy P. Szaflarski, The US Food and Drug Administration’s
Authorization of the First Cannabis-Derived Pharmaceutical: Are We Out of the Haze?, 76 JAMA
NEUROLOGY 135, 135 (2018).
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1990s.46 In 1996, California became the first state to legalize cannabis for
medical use under state law, and seven other states and D.C. followed suit by
2000.47 The next two decades saw even more sweeping changes. By the end
of 2018, twenty states and D.C. had decriminalized possession of small
amounts of cannabis, fifteen states had legalized limited forms of medical
cannabis (e.g., high-CBD, low-THC products), thirty-three states and D.C. had
fully legalized medical cannabis, and ten states and D.C. had legalized adult
use cannabis.48 As of July 2019, there were only four states (Idaho, Kansas,
Nebraska, and South Dakota) with total prohibitions on cannabis under state
law.49
2. Initiatives and Industry
Most state medical and recreational cannabis laws originated as ballot
initiatives, rather than legislation. Of the eleven state recreational laws, all but
Vermont’s and Illinois’s were initiatives, as were eighteen of the thirty-three
state medical laws.50 The ballot initiative process arose from late 19th century
Populist and early 20th century Progressive movements to circumvent the
perceived dominance of special interests in state legislatures.51 Tobacco control
efforts in the United States are a modern example of the overall anti-special
interest character of initiatives. Beginning in the 1970s, tobacco control
advocates began using state ballot initiatives and local-level equivalents to
adopt smoking restrictions and tobacco taxes, sidestepping the tobacco
industry’s considerable legislative influence.52 In response, the tobacco
industry (in partnership with other “ballot-prone” industries) monitored

46. Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Jamie F. Chriqui, & Joanna King, Marijuana Decriminalization:
What Does it Mean in the United States? 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9690,
2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9690.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD9V-TXW9].
47. Marijuana Deep Dive, supra note 10.
48. Id.
49. See Marijuana Overview, supra note 21; State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medicalmarijuana-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/53NU-GJEW] [hereinafter State Medical Marijuana Laws].
The implications of the 2018 Farm Bill’s legalization of hemp (and thus CBD derived from hemp)
under federal law, and the myriad resulting questions about how such products are to be regulated, are
beyond the scope of this Article.
50. See Marijuana Overview, supra note 21.
51. John G. Matsusaka, Special Interest Influence Under Direct Versus Representative
Democracy
1–2
(USC
Law
Legal
Studies
Paper
No.
18-16,
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3185260 [https://perma.cc/P288-ABAQ].
52. Elizabeth Laposata, Allison P. Kennedy, & Stanton A. Glantz, When Tobacco Targets Direct
Democracy, 39 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 537, 541–46 (2014).
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initiative activity and advocated for reforms that would make the process more
challenging, such as increasing signature requirements, reducing signature
gathering periods, and increasing vote requirements for tax increases.53
Some critics of direct democracy (including ballot initiatives and
referendums) argue that the susceptibility of electorates to campaign
advertising allows wealthy interests to dominate the process, enabling exactly
the type of special interest advantage the process was designed to counter.54
The tobacco industry, for example, has adopted a tactic of attempting to defeat
tobacco control initiatives by introducing competing “look-alike” initiatives on
the same subject that contain fewer or weaker regulations and often incorporate
preemption of stronger local laws.55 Overall, however, an empirical analysis of
initiatives relating to three major industries (energy, finance, and tobacco)
found that enacted initiatives much more often resulted in laws contrary to
industry interests than beneficial to them.56
Critics of cannabis legalization have also raised the claim that the initiative
process allows outsized influence of moneyed legalization advocates, often
based outside of the state in which the initiative is proposed, who are able to
commit levels of funding that are difficult for opponents to counter.57 However,
analysis of funding for legalization ballot initiatives from 2004–2016 found that
industry funding involvement was low in most states (with some exceptions).58
While the money raised by advocates is substantial and typically considerably
higher than that raised by opponents,59 changing public opinion over time may
better explain the increasing success of initiatives, though the two are likely
related.60 At the same time, there has been an increase in cannabis industry
contributions to initiatives, particularly in the 2015–2016 election cycles, which
53. Id. at 541–42, 545–46.
54. See Matsusaka, supra note 51, at 2–3 (discussing competing views).
55. See Gregory J. Tung, Yogi H. Hendlin, & Stanton A. Glantz, Competing Initiatives: A New
Tobacco Industry Strategy to Oppose Statewide Clean Indoor Air Ballot Measures, 99 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 430, 430–32 (2009).
56. Matsusaka, supra note 51, at 11–17.
57. See SUE RUSCHE, NAT’L FAMILIES IN ACTION, TRACKING THE MONEY THAT’S LEGALIZING
MARIJUANA
AND
WHY
IT
MATTERS
passim
(2017),
https://www.nationalfamilies.org/assets/pdfs/Tracking_the_Money_Thats_Legalizing_Marijuana_an
d_Why_It_Matters_FINAL-R_3.15.2017-R.pdf [https://perma.cc/G37H-S4KF].
58. Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass, supra note 20, at 82, 87–90, 104.
59. Id. at 78 (reporting mean advocate contributions of $4.3 million compared to $1.2 million
for opponents and median $1.7 million for advocates compared to $300,000 for opponents). Total
advocate contributions from 2004–2016 exceeded opponent contributions by over $100 million ($139
million to $37.3 million). Id. at 77–78.
60. Id. at 87–89.
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could indicate an emerging trend toward increased industry involvement in the
process.61 Overall, the current relationship between the cannabis industry and
the ballot box appears to differ from that of other industries, insomuch as the
cannabis industry is primarily a beneficiary rather than a target of initiatives
and has in many cases played only an indirect role in the process.
3. Existing State Frameworks
As of July 2019, successful recreational cannabis initiatives had developed
exclusively in the context of existing medical legalization frameworks. All
eleven recreational cannabis states had previously adopted medical laws, most
by ballot initiative.62 Kilmer and MacCoun argue that medical legalization
eases later passage of recreational laws by: (1) demonstrating the efficacy of
voter initiatives in this policy area; (2) enabling changes in public perception
that destabilize the War on Drugs; (3) increasing the evidence base to counter
concerns regarding the effects of legalization; (4) creating “a visible and active
marijuana industry”; and (5) showing that the federal government will not
prevent state and local jurisdictions from collecting cannabis tax revenues.63
Legalization opponents agree that medical cannabis laws facilitate later
recreational laws, sometimes claiming that medical laws are mere pretext for
recreational use or legalization.64
In 2012, Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize adult
use cannabis, followed by Alaska and Oregon in 2014, California, Maine,
Massachusetts, and Maine in 2016, Michigan and Vermont in 2018, and Illinois
in 2019.65
Vermont’s law is unique among this group in two respects. First, it was the
first to pass legalization legislatively.66 Second, while Vermont’s law made
cannabis possession legal as of its effective date (July 1, 2018), it left
legalization and oversight of legal sales for a later date.67 As of July 2019, the
legislature had not passed a sales measure,68 and multiple Vermont bills are
included in this analysis. Vermont’s current law is more an extension of

61. Id. at 89–90.
62. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 49.
63. Beau Kilmer & Robert J. MacCoun, How Medical Marijuana Smoothed the Transition to
Marijuana Legalization in the United States, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 181, 192–97 (2017).
64. RUSCHE, supra note 57.
65. Marijuana Deep Dive, supra note 10.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 49.
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decriminalization (eliminating not only criminal, but also civil penalties), rather
than full legalization as more commonly understood.69
Implementation delays and political conflicts between industry, local
government, and state government have been common in several states that
have legalized adult use.70 Due to these delays and the recentness of most of
the initiatives, there are limited comprehensive analyses of these laws. The
most in-depth of these assesses the legal frameworks in Colorado, Washington,
Oregon, and Alaska, ultimately concluding that these states incorporated
approximately one-third to one-half of identified public health best practices
into their cannabis regulatory structures.71
The lack of public health-oriented approaches in these laws likely reflects
their origins. Advocates who advanced these initiatives consciously adopted
the framing of alcohol policy as an effective political tool, “urging voters to
‘regulate marijuana like alcohol.’”72 This framing was an evolution in approach
69. The legalization law in effect in D.C. similarly allows for possession, but not sales, in part
due to restrictions imposed by Congress. Petula Dvorak, Monuments, Museums, Marijuana: Take a
Whiff of D.C.’s New Pot-Infused Tourism, WASH. POST (April 22, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/monuments-museums-marijuana-take-a-whiff-of-dcs-newpot-infused-tourism/2019/04/22/df7376e0-6500-11e9-a1b6-b29b90efa879_story.html
[https://perma.cc/5R5X-J6SQ]. A popular work-around to the law in D.C. sees cannabis provided as
a “gift” with the purchase of some other item at a wildly inflated price (e.g., artwork, baked goods).
Id.
70. This is particularly true of Maine, which only lifted a moratorium on implementation of key
portions of its 2016 law in 2018 (and then only by overriding a gubernatorial veto). Recreational
Marijuana
in
Maine,
MAINE
STATE
LEGISLATURE
https://legislature.maine.gov/lawlibrary/recreational_marijuana_in_maine/9419
[https://perma.cc/QTB7-U9KC]; see also Patrick McGreevy, California’s Black Market for Pot Is
Stifling Legal Sales. Now the Governor Wants to Step Up Enforcement, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2019),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-gavin-newsom-crackdown-pot-black-market-20190219story.html [https://perma.cc/R5FQ-KP3Q] (discussing conflicts in California); Michael R. Blood, 25
Local Governments Sue over California Marijuana Delivery, ASSOCIATED PRESS (April 5, 2019),
https://apnews.com/503266a7da114efa8e3cfc4437c8f1d7
[https://perma.cc/8WDH-9ZST]
(discussing local governments’ legal challenge to a state regulation that would prevent them from
prohibiting cannabis delivery within their borders).
71. Rachel A. Barry & Stanton A. Glantz, Marijuana Regulatory Frameworks in Four US States:
An Analysis Against a Public Health Standard, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 914, 914–15 (2018)
[hereinafter Barry & Glantz, Four US States]; see also infra note 154–158 and accompanying text
(discussing specific standards in the analysis more fully).
72. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Marijuana Push in Colorado Likens It to Alcohol, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
26, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/us/a-ballot-push-to-legalize-marijuana-with-alcoholas-the-role-model.html [https://perma.cc/GQC9-BL6Z]; Matt Ferner, Why Marijuana Should Be
Legalized: "Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol" Campaign Discusses Why Pot Prohibition Has Been A
Failure, HUFFPOST (Aug. 28, 2012), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-marijuana-should-belegalized_n_1833751 [https://perma.cc/ET3X-QY8X].
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by advocates, who moved away from arguments based primarily on personal
freedom to also include those emphasizing tax revenue, social justice, and the
differences in legal treatment of alcohol (an intoxicating substance that is
widely available and lightly regulated) and cannabis (an intoxicating substance
that is criminalized).73 This line of argument appears to have resonated with
voters, as these newly-branded legalization initiatives were substantially more
successful than earlier efforts.74 Given this framing, it is not surprising that the
statutes enacted by the initiatives and the regulations that followed generally
accord with alcohol policy.75 Unfortunately, U.S. alcohol control laws
frequently fail to reflect public health best practices, particularly with regard to
preventing underage use and heavy consumption.76 As a result, “regulating
marijuana like alcohol” has meant a pro-business approach that is not designed
to reduce use.
Based on electoral results and public opinion surveys, momentum currently
appears to favor legalization generally.77 The exact parameters of a new legal
framework for cannabis, however, may not yet be established. One of the most
pressing questions in the coming years will be whether legislatures can better
incorporate public health goals into legalization laws compared to the
approaches offered to date by advocates via the initiative process.
B. The Public Health Approach
A public health approach to cannabis legalization prioritizes public health
over other policy goals. This Article leverages the successes and failures of
domestic and international approaches to other substances, most notably
tobacco and alcohol, to outline a rubric for evaluation of public health best
practices for cannabis regulation. To do so, it draws on several key resources,
including reports and policy statements by governmental entities and nongovernmental health organizations, international agreements, and health policy
scholarship, to define the public health approach.
73. Ferner, supra note 72; Molly Ball, Will Colorado Legalize Pot?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/will-colorado-legalize-pot/263355/
[https://perma.cc/E7GC-2XKK].
74. See Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass, supra note 20, at 76–77 (detailing results
of legalization initiatives over time).
75. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at 915.
76. John T. Carnevale, Raanan Kagan, Patrick J. Murphy, & Josh Esrick, A Practical Framework
for Regulating For-Profit Recreational Marijuana in US States: Lessons from Colorado and
Washington, 42 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 71, 80 (2017); see also Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra
note 71, at 919.
77. See Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass, supra note 20, at 91–93.
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1. Existing Models: Health Policy Organizations and International
Agreements
a. American Public Health Association
The American Public Health Association (APHA) released a policy
statement in 2014 focused on prioritization of public health in the regulation of
commercial cannabis.78 APHA has similar policy statements relating to
alcohol, tobacco, and substance use, as well as a prior statement on cannabis
(but not legalization specifically).79 Drawing from both tobacco and alcohol
control, APHA lists five broad areas of concern to public health in cannabis
legalization: (1) increased availability; (2) passive exposures; (3) quality
control and consumer protection; (4) motor vehicle safety; and (5) health
effects.80
APHA proposes general strategies and action steps, for the most part
without suggesting a specific standard. Based on alcohol control policy, APHA
calls for: (1) retailer liability for injuries to others (i.e., dram shop liability for
overservice); (2) impaired driving enforcement; and (3) high minimum
purchase age standards (generally supporting a minimum age of 21).81 Based
on tobacco control policy, APHA recommends: (4) warning labels; (5)
secondhand exposure measures (e.g., public location bans, restrictions on use
in multi-unit housing); and (6) cultivation worker protections. Drawing from
both alcohol and tobacco control, APHA recommends: (7) taxation at levels
sufficient to price minors out of the market and reduce access; (8) limits on the
days and times of retail operation; (9) restrictions on outlet locations and
geographic density; (10) constraints on advertising aimed at adolescents,
children, communities of color, and groups of low socioeconomic status; and
(11) continuing monitoring of regulatory interventions. APHA also calls for
support and funding for health effects research; use of cannabis tax revenue to
cover regulatory costs and to fund prevention, treatment, and research; and
“development and availability of linguistically competent educational and
informational materials for individuals with limited English proficiency.”82

78. AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, REGULATING COMMERCIALLY LEGALIZED MARIJUANA AS A
PUBLIC HEALTH PRIORITY (2014), https://www.apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/public-health-policystatements/policy-database/2015/01/23/10/17/regulating-commercially-legalized-marijuana-as-apublic-health-priority [https://perma.cc/TY9T-QCE4].
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.

ORENSTEIN_GLANTZ_03JUN20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

CANNABIS LEGALIZATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES

6/3/2020 9:24 AM

1329

b. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
The World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC)83 and its implementing guidelines,84 while not
designed specifically for cannabis regulation, are a key touchstone for the
modern evidence-based public health approach to product regulation and thus
carry significant weight as a model for regulating cannabis. The FCTC is a
widely adopted health treaty with 181 parties that sets the global standard for
tobacco control, combining price and tax measures to reduce product demand,
non-price strategies to reduce demand, and supply reduction interventions.85
FCTC Article 8 targets protection from secondhand/environmental tobacco
smoke,86 adopting as a fundamental principle that “[a]ll people should be
protected from exposure to tobacco smoke[, and a]ll indoor workplaces and
indoor public places should be [smokefree].”87 The Implementing Guidelines
clarify that any measures short of total elimination of smoking in a space or
environment (e.g., ventilation, filtration) are ineffective and insufficient.88
Given the similarities between tobacco smoke and cannabis smoke,89 this
approach strongly resonates for cannabis regulation.90
83. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL
[hereinafter
WHO
FCTC]
(2005),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/42811/1/9241591013.pdf?ua=1
[https://perma.cc/C9465UJC].
84. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL:
GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION [hereinafter WHO FCTC GUIDELINES] (2013),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/80510/9789241505185_eng.pdf?sequence=1
[https://perma.cc/D6K9-T2PX].
85. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Feb. 27, 2005, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166.
While the United States is not a Party to the FCTC, U.S. law has incorporated several elements of the
treaty, primarily via the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111–31,
123 Stat. 1776 (2009).
86. WHO FCTC, supra note 83, at 8.
87. WHO FCTC GUIDELINES, supra note 84, at 21.
88. Id. at 20.
89. See David Moir, William S. Rickert, Genevieve Levasseur, Yolande Larose, Rebecca
Maertens, Paul White, & Suzanne Desjardins, A Comparison of Mainstream and Sidestream
Marijuana and Tobacco Cigarette Smoke Produced under Two Machine Smoking Conditions, 21
CHEMICAL RES. TOXICOLOGY 494, 494 (2008).
90. Additionally, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning
Engineers (ASHRAE), which publishes a highly influential set of ventilation standards for indoor air
quality, revised its definition of “environmental tobacco smoke” in 2016 to include both electronic
smoking devices and cannabis smoke. STANDARDS FOR VENTILATION FOR ACCEPTABLE INDOOR AIR
QUALITY 62.1 (amended 2019) (AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST. & AM. SOC'Y OF HEATING,
REFRIGERATING, & AIR-CONDITIONING ENG'RS 2016), https://www.ashrae.org/technicalresources/bookstore/standards-62-1-62-2 [https://perma.cc/6G7F-TFR3]; see also S. Aguinaga
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Article 9 deals with regulation of product contents.91 The Implementing
Guidelines specifically note that “[f]rom the perspective of public health, there
is no justification for permitting the use of ingredients, such as flavouring
agents, which help make tobacco products attractive.”92 The same can be said
for additives in cannabis products intended to stimulate use or to attract youth
or vulnerable populations.
Article 11 addresses packaging and labeling and obligates Parties to ensure
that these elements are not “false, misleading, deceptive or likely to create an
erroneous impression” about a product or its health effects.93 Article 11 also
requires health warnings for all products to be rotating, large, and clearly
visible, to cover at least 30% (ideally at least 50%) of the product’s principal
display area, and to include pictorial elements.94 The Implementing Guidelines
further encourage plain packaging requirements, which prohibit all branding
elements other than brand and product names in a standardized color and font
specified by the government that apply to all covered tobacco products.95
Article 13 calls for a “comprehensive ban on advertising, promotion and
sponsorship,” as consistent with applicable constitutional principles.96 To the
extent a comprehensive ban is not possible, Article 13 obligates Parties to
prohibit marketing that is false or misleading, require warnings on all
advertisements, restrict the use of incentives, require disclosure of advertising
expenditures, restrict or ban advertising using mass media, and restrict or
prohibit industry sponsorship of event and activities.97
Article 16 addresses sales to and by minors (age 18 or as set by relevant
law) by requiring age verification, banning self-service product displays,
prohibiting other products (e.g., sweets) in the form of tobacco products,
Bialous & Stanton A. Glantz, ASHRAE Standard 62: Tobacco Industry’s Influence over National
Ventilation Standards, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL 315, 316 (2002) (describing the importance of
ASHRAE standards and the tobacco industry’s efforts to influence them).
91. WHO FCTC, supra note 83, at 9.
92. WHO FCTC GUIDELINES, supra note 84, at 33.
93. WHO FCTC, supra note 83, at 9–10.
94. Id.
95. WHO FCTC GUIDELINES, supra note 84, at 63.
96. WHO FCTC, supra note 83, at 11. The Guidelines’ major caveat for constitutional
commercial speech protections was the result of U.S. demands, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 681, 689–90 (2003), though the United States
remains one of the few WHO members that is not a Party to the treaty, WHO Member States (by
Regions) that Are NOT Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
[hereinafter
WHO
Member
States
Not
Party
to
FCTC]
https://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/non_parties/en/ [https://perma.cc/PH74-ER2V].
97. WHO FCTC, supra note 83, at 11–12.
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limiting vending machine access to age-restricted areas, prohibiting free
product giveaways, and prohibiting sale of small-quantity products that
increase affordability.98
Other FCTC provisions call for price and tax measures to reduce
consumption,99 effective public education campaigns,100 demand-reduction
measures focused on treatment and cessation,101 reduction of illicit trade,102
support for alternative commercial activities for industry-dependent workers,103
and protection of the environment and the health of cultivation workers,104 all
of which have relevance to cannabis regulation.
c. CDC Task Force on Community Preventive Services
Using an evidence-based approach that considers both efficacy and costeffectiveness, the CDC Task Force on Community Preventive Services
recommends interventions to improve health across various policy areas,
including both tobacco and alcohol.105 To reduce tobacco initiation, use, and
secondhand exposure, the Task Force recommends: (1) comprehensive tobacco
control programs; (2) increasing unit price; (3) implementing mass-reach health
communication interventions; (4) adopting smokefree policies; and (5)
mobilizing the community with additional interventions. 106
To reduce and prevent excess alcohol consumption, the Task Force
recommends: (1) dram shop liability; (2) electronic screening and brief
interventions; (3) increasing taxes; (4) limits on days and hours of sale; (5)
regulation of outlet density; and (6) enhanced enforcement of laws prohibiting
sales to minors.107 The Task Force also recommends against privatization of
retail sales.108

98. Id. at 15–16.
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id. at 10–11.
101. Id. at 13.
102. Id. at 13–15.
103. Id. at 16.
104. Id.
105. CPSTF
Findings
for
Tobacco,
CMTY.
GUIDE,
https://www.thecommunityguide.org/content/task-force-findings-tobacco [https://perma.cc/MH6AMHVE].
106. Id.
107. CPSTF
Findings
for
Excessive
Alcohol Consumption, CMTY. GUIDE,
https://www.thecommunityguide.org/content/task-force-findings-excessive-alcohol-consumption
[https://perma.cc/HHL3-TJJ7].
108. Id.
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d. Healthy People 2020
Managed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Healthy
People is a collaborative initiative that sets national 10-year goals and
measurable objectives to improve health and well-being of people and
communities.109 The Healthy People 2020 leading health indicators for
substance abuse and tobacco are, collectively: adolescent use in past thirty days,
adult cigarette smoking, and adult binge drinking in the past month.110 The
same issues—adolescent use, use of inhaled or smoked products, and excessive
or binge use—are among the most critical regulatory targets for cannabis.
While framed as goals rather than specific policy prescriptions, the Healthy
People 2020 objectives are highly relevant in assessing the design of cannabis
laws and include several implicit policy recommendations. For example, the
goal of eliminating laws that preempt local control111 implies a recommendation
to include non-preemption in newly created laws.
Relevant Healthy People 2020 substance use objectives include: (1)
reducing youth use; (2) increasing youth disapproval of use and perception of
risk; (3) reducing binge use; and (4) decreasing impaired driving fatalities.112
Similarly, objectives for tobacco use include: (1) reducing use by adults and
adolescents; (2) reducing initiation among children, adolescents, and young
adults; (3) reducing the proportion of nonsmokers exposed to secondhand
smoke; (4) increasing proportion of persons covered by indoor worksite
policies that prohibit smoking; (5) establishing smokefree laws that prohibit
smoking in public places and worksites; (6) eliminating state laws that preempt
stronger local tobacco control laws; (7) increasing product taxes; (8) reducing
proportion of adolescents and young adults exposed to product marketing; and
(9) reducing illegal sales to minors by enforcing prohibitions on such sales.113

109. About
Healthy
People,
HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV,
https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/About-Healthy-People [https://perma.cc/QZZ2-UZGH].
110. 2020
Topics
&
Objectives:
Substance
Use,
HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV,
https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/substance-abuse/objectives
[https://perma.cc/6ZRB-XCFB] [hereinafter HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, Substance Use]; 2020 Topics &
Objectives: Tobacco Use, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topicsobjectives/topic/tobacco-use/objectives
[https://perma.cc/4EMT-5GVF]
[hereinafter
HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, Tobacco Use].
111. HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, Tobacco Use, supra note 110.
112. HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, Substance Use, supra note 110.
113. HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, Tobacco Use, supra note 110.
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2. Existing Models: Health Policy Scholarship
While there has been meaningful scholarship about cannabis
criminalization and the potential for other regulatory alternatives for some
time,114 health policy scholarship focused on how to regulate legal cannabis
from a public health perspective developed in earnest after passage of Colorado
and Washington’s 2012 initiatives to legalize adult use.115
In particular, much of the substantive scholarship in this area has been
produced by researchers in the RAND Corporation’s Drug Policy Research
Center.116 In a 2014 analysis, a group of RAND scholars proposed a cannabisspecific policy framework based on tobacco and alcohol control that centers on
five policy objectives designed to minimize youth access and use, drugged
driving, dependency and addiction, consumption of products with unwanted
contaminants or uncertain potency, and concurrent use of cannabis and alcohol
(particularly in public).117 Toward this end, they recommend: (1) artificially
high prices via taxation and enforcement; (2) a state monopoly on production,
distribution, and/or sale; (3) restriction of licenses and monitoring of licensees;
(4) limiting types of products sold, including additives, flavorings, and
cannabinoid content; (5) restrictions on marketing to the extent possible under
US law, including plain packaging requirements; (6) limiting public

114. See, e.g., ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING FROM
OTHER VICES, TIMES, & PLACES 1–14 (2001).
115. See e.g., Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 71–73; AM. PUB. HEALTH
ASS’N, supra note 78; Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Beau Kilmer, Alexander C. Wagenaar, Frank J.
Chaloupka, & Jonathan P. Caulkins, Developing Public Health Regulations for Marijuana: Lessons
from Alcohol and Tobacco, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1021, 1021 (2014); Beau Kilmer, Policy Designs
for Cannabis Legalization: Starting with the Eight Ps, 40 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 259, 259–
61 (2014) [hereinafter Kilmer, Eight P’s]; Rachel Ann Barry & Stanton Glantz, A Public Health
Framework for Legalized Retail Marijuana Based on the US Experience: Avoiding a New Tobacco
Industry, 13 PLOS MED. 1, 1 (2016) [hereinafter Barry & Glantz, Avoiding a New Tobacco Industry].
116. See, e.g., MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 114, at xv–xvi; JONATHAN P. CAULKINS, BEAU
KILMER, MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, ROBERT J. MACCOUN, GREGORY MIDGETTE, PAT OGLESBY,
ROSALIE LICCARDO PACULA, & PETER H. REUTER, RAND CORP., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA
LEGALIZATION: INSIGHTS FOR VERMONT AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS iii (2015),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR864.readonline.html
[https://perma.cc/UX8HMDJQ]; Pacula, Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, supra note 115, at 1021, 1027; Kilmer,
Eight Ps, supra note 115, at 259; Beau Kilmer, The “10 P’s” of Marijuana Legalization, BERKELEY
REV. LATIN AM. STUD., Spring 2015, at 52, 52 [hereinafter Kilmer, 10 P's]; Jonathan P. Caulkins,
Carolyn C. Coulson, Christina Farber, & Joseph V. Vesely, Marijuana Legalization: Certainty,
Impossibility, Both, or Neither?, 5 J. DRUG POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2012); see also RAND Drug Policy
Research Center: Center Staff, RAND CORP., https://www.rand.org/well-being/justicepolicy/centers/dprc/about/staff.html [https://perma.cc/E3PB-FSAC] (listing RAND affiliates).
117. Pacula, Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, supra note 115, at 1022.
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consumption; (7) measuring and preventing impaired driving, and (8) a
comprehensive product tracking system.118
Two other RAND-affiliated papers present slates of key policy choices for
state legalization without making specific recommendations. In one, Kilmer
emphasizes that “legalization is not a binary choice”119 and suggests a set of ten
policy choices (stylized as the “10 Ps”):
• Production: the number of producers and amount of
production to be allowed, locations where production will
be allowed, and types of products to be allowed on the
market;
• Profit motive: whether to allow profit-maximizing firms to
enter the market or to restrict the market to nonprofit
organizations, “for-benefit corporations,” or a state-run
monopoly;
• Promotion: whether to allow advertising;
• Prevention: whether to devote resources to prevention
efforts, including youth prevention, and how to fund such
efforts;
• Policing and enforcement: how much time and effort to
devote to enforcement of remaining prohibitions (e.g., on
public consumption) and how to address remain black
market cannabis producers and distributors;
• Penalties: how to sanction noncompliance, including
license revocation, civil penalties, and criminal penalties;
• Potency: whether to limit THC content or other
cannabinoids;
• Purity: whether and how to regulate mold, pesticides, and
other contaminants, and whether to allow alcohol- or
nicotine-infused cannabis products on the market;
• Price: how to shape cannabis price, including through
license fees, regulations, and taxes; and
• Permanency: how much regulatory flexibility to
incorporate into legal frameworks, such as creating
independent commissions or including sunset provisions,
to address changing evidence and new products.120
In the other, a RAND report generated in connection with Vermont’s
consideration of legalization policy options, the authors similarly provide a

118. Id. at 1022–26.
119. Kilmer, 10 P’s, supra note 116, at 53.
120. Id. at 53–57.
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“regulatory checklist” in eight categories: (1) types of products allowed; (2)
cannabinoid content; (3) retail outlets and delivery; (4) sales to nonresidents;
(5) pricing controls; (6) prevention and countermarketing; (7) vertical
integration; and (8) local autonomy.121 The authors emphasize the importance
of careful consideration of policy alternatives in cannabis regulation and the
necessity of thinking beyond alcohol control models:
A jurisdiction considering something other than marijuana
prohibition needs to encourage serious conversations about
each of these choices. Marijuana is a very different commodity
from other regulated goods (even alcohol) and early-adopting
states simply cannot use cookie–cutter regulations for alcohol
to cover all of the important choices.122
Writing in an international context on behalf of the Transform Drug Policy
Foundation for a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on
the World Drug Problem, Rolles and Murkin make recommendations across
production, price, tax, consumption methods, potency, packaging, retailer
regulation, consumer regulation, retail outlets, and marketing.123 The authors
make several of the same recommendations and also add several specific
elements, including: separation of ownership between production and retail
entities;124 restriction of home growth based on age and production capacity;125
price controls;126 taxation at both production and sales tiers based on THC
content by weight;127 mandatory opaque, resealable, and child-resistant plastic
containers;128 on-package messaging modelled on pharmaceuticals and tobacco
products;129 escalating penalties for noncompliance, including license
revocation;130 restrictions on retailer locations near age-sensitive areas and

121. CAULKINS, KILMER, KLEIMAN, MACCOUN, MIDGETTE, OGLESBY, PACULA, & REUTER,
supra note 116, at 106–12.
122. Id. at 112–13.
123. STEVE ROLLES & GEORGE MURKIN, TRANSFORM DRUG POLICY FOUND., HOW TO
REGULATE
CANNABIS:
A
PRACTICAL
GUIDE
passim
(2014),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016/Contributions/Civil/Transform-Drug-PolicyFoundation/How-to-Regulate-Cannabis-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/5247-94J5].
124. See id. at 50; Pacula, Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, supra note 115, at 1022–
26.
125. ROLLES & MURKIN, supra note 123, at 51.
126. Id. at 72–74.
127. Id. at 84.
128. Id. at 118.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 126.
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prohibition of sales of non-cannabis products;131 and a total ban on all forms of
advertising, promotion and sponsorship based on WHO FCTC Article 13.132
The authors also make several policy recommendations that less frequently
appear in (or even contradict) other sources, including: promoting small-scale
social clubs; 133 avoiding directing revenue on a sales basis to drug treatment,
prevention, or other social programs to prevent dependence on cannabis sales
revenue;134 and encouraging non-smoked consumption methods, including
vaporized products (contingent on additional research).135
Based explicitly on alcohol control policy lessons, Mosher recommends
policies targeting social availability, commercial availability, taxation and
price, driving under the influence, advertising, and market structure.136 Among
the specific proposals that stand out from other frameworks are application of
civil liability to social hosts who provide cannabis to minors at home and to
commercial sellers/retailers (i.e., dram shop liability); mandatory training for
servers and sellers; restrictions on outlet density; restrictions on home delivery;
a prohibition on price promotions; zero tolerance laws for youth driving under
the influence; permitting advertising in electronic media only when less than
15% of the audience is under 21; a government-controlled or non-profit market
structure; limits on the number of licenses in each license tier and restrictions
on production or volume per license; restrictions on vertical integration;
prohibition of volume discounts between license tiers; and minimum price
markups at the wholesale and retail levels.137
Leveraging lessons learned from the specific experiences of Colorado and
Washington, the first two states to legalize adult use, Carnevale, Kagan,
Murphy, and Esrick offer policy proposals in five areas: “cultivation,
production, and processing; sales, consumption, and possession; taxes and
finance; public health and safety; and governance.”138 Notably, the authors

131. Id. at 142–43.
132. Id. at 150.
133. Id. at 50.
134. Id. at 85. The authors instead recommend funding such programs should be funded based
on need.
135. Id. at 91–93.
136. JAMES F. MOSHER, VENTURA CTY. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, THE 2016 CALIFORNIA
MARIJUANA INITIATIVE AND YOUTH: LESSONS FROM ALCOHOL POLICY 4 (2016),
http://venturacountylimits.org/resource_documents/VC-MJ-AUMA-FNL-REV2-web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PBS5-ZL6Y].
137. Id. at 15–21.
138. Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 74.
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explicitly adopt “practicality”139 as their primary touchstone, rather than
theoretically ideal policy.140 As a result, there are several public health-oriented
policies they note would be desirable, but do not recommend because they
judge them to be impractical,141 including plain packaging,142 minimum unit
pricing,143 and non-commercial or not-for-profit market structure.144
Owing to the emphasis on practicality and likelihood of adoption,
Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, and Esrick recommend a more limited, but still
important, suite of policies.145 Those that add to previously cited proposals
include:
• Restricting use to those 21 years and older with significant
penalties for sales to minors;146
• Maximum limit on sales quantity per person or
transaction;147
• Unitary recreational and medical regulatory system;148
• Taxes designed to keep prices artificially high without
fueling the illicit market;149
• Robust data collection and performance monitoring;150 and
• Restrictions on industry involvement in the regulatory
process based on alcohol and tobacco control.151
The authors supplement these specific recommendations within an
overarching emphasis on regulatory flexibility, viewing as paramount the
ability of government to adjust to new data, new products, and other

139. The authors’ approach to practicality relies on a judgment of “what [the authors] believe
are the practically viable legalization regimes likely to occur in US states under current circumstances
and law. . . . begin[ning] with the approach that [they] judge most likely to be implemented.” Id. at
72. As part of this judgment, the authors include “US culture, the parties at work in the legalization
movement, existing federal law and federal guidance . . . and the experience of states that have
legalized.” Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 72, 78.
142. Id. at 78.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 72.
145. Id. at 74.
146. Id. at 77.
147. Id. The authors do not recommend a specific limit, but do note a 1-ounce limit in multiple
states. Id.
148. Id. at 82.
149. Id. at 78.
150. Id. at 83.
151. Id. at 81.
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developments.152 They also aptly describe a key difference between existing
regulatory approaches to tobacco and alcohol that is especially relevant to
cannabis policy decisions:
[E]ven a brief examination of the US alcohol and tobacco
industries illustrates how regulatory goals can affect markets,
even within commercialized, for-profit models that share much
in common. US alcohol and tobacco systems look quite similar
at first blush; yet, alcohol regulations seek to limit use in
specific circumstances (e.g., by youth or by adults at work, in
public, or while driving) but do not seek to discourage use—
that is, they do not attempt to reduce the size of the market. In
contrast, current US tobacco regulations actively seek to
reduce the size of the industry . . . .153
Barry and Glantz provide a detailed framework for assessing adult use
cannabis laws based on a survey of public health best practices from tobacco
control, arguing that alcohol control models are typically inadequate to protect
public health.154 They offer a 30-point assessment across eleven policy areas,155
expanded in a subsequent paper to a 67-point framework across sixteen policy
areas.156 Some of the included policy prescriptions are quite detailed and thus
better suited to evaluating regulations than legislation,157 but the most critical
elements they recommend that have not already been discussed include:
• State health department as lead regulatory agency;
• Creation of advisory groups that have expertise in cannabis
prevention and control with strict conflict of interest
prohibitions and a prohibition on industry participation;
• Licensure fees that cover costs of administration and
enforcement;
• Frequent, routine, and unannounced compliance checks
with dedicated revenue;
• Prohibition on point-of-sale displays, with all products
sold behind the counter;
• Prohibition on electronic commerce (e.g., sales via text
message or social media);
• Prohibition on use of cartoon characters or imagery
encouraging use or consumption;
152. Id. at 71, 75–76, 81, 83.
153. Id. at 74.
154. Barry & Glantz, Avoiding a New Tobacco Industry, supra note 115, at 2–3.
155. Id. at 4.
156. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at 914; id. at tbl. A (Supp. 2018).
157. The authors created the framework to apply to the collective body of state law regulating
cannabis, including initiatives, bills, executive orders, and administrative rules. Id. at 914–15.

ORENSTEIN_GLANTZ_03JUN20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

CANNABIS LEGALIZATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES

6/3/2020 9:24 AM

1339

Prohibition on brand stretching or sharing;
Prohibition on product placements or paid popular media
promotions;
• Dedicated revenue for enforcement, prevention and
control, and research;
• Smokefree laws that prohibit cannabis use where tobacco
use is prohibited;
• Non-preemption of local smoking restrictions, licensing,
and retail sales environment control;
• Prohibition on additives that are toxic or injurious (e.g.,
nicotine), enhance color or palatability (e.g., menthol),
imply a health benefit (e.g., vitamins), or are associated
with energy and vitality (e.g., caffeine); and
• Government approval of all packaging and labeling.158
Cannabis regulation is a complex and multifaceted area that intersects with
numerous areas of law (e.g., land use, insurance, professional regulation), but
this Article concerns itself exclusively with measures directly relating to
protecting public health. Even with multiple public health frameworks to draw
from, there remain several important health issues beyond the scope of this
Article. These include, among others, equity and social justice programs to
ameliorate impacts of the War on Drugs,159 restrictions on pesticide use and
other elements of cultivation,160 comprehensive product testing requirements,161
cannabis worker protections,162 constraints on actual or apparent conflicts of
interest among state and local government employees and law enforcement
personnel,163 and protections for employees and renters against discrimination
•
•

158. Id. at 914; id. at tbl.A (Supp. 2018).
159. Such provisions include those addressing, among other issues, expungement of prior
criminal convictions for cannabis possession, limitation of criminal consequences for cannabis
possession by minors, and provision of targeted funding to community reinvestment for populations
disproportionately affected by cannabis criminalization. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 19, at 702, 705–
06.
160. See, e.g., Nate Seltenrich, Into the Weeds: Regulating Pesticides in Cannabis, ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSPECTIVES, Apr. 2019, at 1, 1–3.
161. See, e.g., Todd Subritzky, Simone Pettigrew, & Simon Lenton, Issues in the Implementation
and Evolution of the Commercial Recreational Cannabis Market in Colorado, 27 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y
1, 6–7 (2016).
162. See generally Kevin M. Walters, Gwenith G. Fisher, & Liliana Tenney, An Overview of
Health and Safety in the Colorado Cannabis Industry, 61 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 451 (2018).
163. See generally Candice M. Bowling & Stanton A. Glantz, Conflict of Interest Provisions in
State Laws Governing Medical and Adult Use Cannabis, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 423 (2019).
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for cannabis use.164 While this Article focuses on specific provisions common
across multiple public health best practice models for tobacco, alcohol, and
cannabis regulation, such other legal elements also have clear ties to health and
should receive due consideration and analysis.
This Article also focuses on state law. As such, it does not address cannabis
regulation at the federal level or the interaction of cannabis regulation and
federalism. Should the federal government alter its approach to cannabis, this
would certainly have substantial implications for state laws; however, the
public health approach outlined here (and advanced by others) would also apply
to a potential federal legalization framework. Cannabis regulation on sovereign
tribal lands and conflict with international treaty obligations are also beyond
the scope of this Article, though emerging cannabis legalization frameworks in
Canada165 and Uruguay166 are likely to establish a path forward in one or both
of these areas.
III. PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH RUBRIC FOR LEGISLATIVE ADULT USE
CANNABIS LEGALIZATION
Based on the foundational frameworks discussed in Part II, this Part applies
a consolidated set of sixteen core public health elements common across
existing recommendations and best practice compilations that are suitable for

164. See, e.g., Connor P. Burns, Note, I Was Gonna Get a Job, But Then I Got High: An
Examination of Cannabis and Employment in the Post-Barbuto Regime, 99 B.U. L. REV. 643 (2019);
Jinouth Vasquez Santos, Pot-Protective Employment Laws Loom in 2019, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2018, at
12, 12; Bender, supra note 19, at 703–04; Bruce D. Stout & Bennett A. Barlyn, The Human and Fiscal
Toll of America’s Drug War: One State’s Experience, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 525, 534, 557, 560 (2013)
(noting public housing exclusion for drug offenders).
165. HEALTH CANADA, A FRAMEWORK FOR THE LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION OF
CANNABIS IN CANADA 9 n.1, 10–11, 71 (2016), https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/hc-sc/healthycanadians/migration/task-force-marijuana-groupe-etude/framework-cadre/alt/framework-cadreeng.pdf [https://perma.cc/2348-X8RW] (indicating that legalization of marijuana violates international
agreements Canada is party to but overall concluding legalization better fits within the goals of the
international agreements).
166. See Nick Miroff, In Uruguay’s Marijuana Experiment, the Government is Your Pot Dealer,
WASH. POST (July 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-uruguaysmarijuana-experiment-the-government-is-your-pot-dealer/2017/07/07/6212360c-5a88-11e7-aa693964a7d55207_story.html [https://perma.cc/H73B-TQQ3]; see also HOWARD BROMBERG, MARK K.
OSBECK, & MICHAEL VITIELLO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MARIJUANA LAW 201 (2019) (“Uruguay
formally legalized adult use cannabis in 2013, arguing that cannabis use is a human right which
overrides specific treaty terms. Although Uruguay has not been sanctioned by the [International
Narcotics Control Board], U.S. [b]anks, citing the Patriot Act, which prohibits U.S. financial
institutions from doing business with illicit distributors of controlled substances, cut ties with
Uruguayan banks.”).
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inclusion at the statutory level in proposed adult use legislation.167 These
elements are situated in three broad categories: (1) market and regulatory
structures; (2) consumer-facing product and retailer regulation; and (3) youth,
environmental exposure, and denormalization. We apply these principles to a
set of bills representing all active state legislation as of February 2019, as
detailed in the Appendix.
A. Market and Regulatory Structures
1. Health Department Authority
The priorities and approaches of regulatory agencies will shape the effects
of legalization nearly as much as initial enabling legislation. One of the most
critical aspects of legalization legislation is therefore the government agency or
agencies charged with developing and enforcing subsequent regulations.
Legislatures may grant this authority to a variety of existing entities or create
entirely new ones; however, from a public health perspective, the ideal
approach is to designate the applicable health authority (i.e., state health
department or equivalent) as the lead agency for this purpose.168
Other authorities (e.g., tax boards) are capable of such regulation and may
play supporting roles, but placing public health in the lead role fosters a
regulatory approach that prioritizes public health over private industry profit
when the two are in conflict, as is often the case.169 Legislatures can
appropriately charge the health authority with a mandate to limit or discourage
use for the benefit of public health. Health authorities often operate with such
goals in regulating tobacco, for example,170 and are well-positioned to do so for
cannabis. However, to date, legalizing states have instead typically created new
cannabis-specific agencies or given regulatory authority to existing alcohol

167. There are a number of other critical elements in existing adult use cannabis laws and
proposed laws that have important public health effects. We have not included, for example, provisions
that remain the subject of unsettled debate within the public health community, such as specific limits
on the potency of cannabis and cannabis products. We have also not included elements more likely to
be addressed through regulatory action than in statute, such as the content of public education
campaigns.
168. See, e.g., Barry, Hiilamo, & Glantz, supra note 16, at 209.
169. See id. This is not to say that a for-profit market is a given. See supra Section II.A.2. (a
state-controlled or not-for-profit market is preferable from a public health perspective). However, even
in such systems, there may be a role for private companies and, as such, potential for conflict between
private and public interests. See Pacula, Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, supra note 115,
at 1022.
170. Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 74.
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control boards or departments of tax/revenue.171 Such bodies are more likely
to have mandates to encourage business development or manage revenue.
While, as of July 2019, several existing adult use states included their health
department or equivalent among the administrative agencies tasked with
implementation of adult use legalization,172 none have made their health
department the lead or primary agency, often vesting authority in liquor control
boards or state commerce departments.173 However, some proposed bills would
establish the state health department as the lead regulatory authority, including
in Hawaii174 and Minnesota,175 the latter of which also includes explicit
reference to “public health standards and practices” as guiding principles for
implementation.176 A West Virginia bill would place adult use cannabis under
the regulatory authority of the Bureau for Public Health,177 which also regulates
the state’s medical cannabis program.178 A Missouri bill would vest primary
authority for regulation in the Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Control, within
the state’s Department of Public Safety.179

171. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at 171 (assessing Alaska, Colorado,
Oregon, and Washington); A.B. 64, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016) (Sections 26001(b) and
26010 create the Bureau of Marijuana Control within Department of Consumer Affairs); Nevada State
Question 2 (2016) §§ 3(4), 5 (Department of Taxation); Massachusetts Question 4 (2016) § 76 (creating
Cannabis Control Commission); Michigan Question 1 (2018) §§ 3, 7.1 (Department of Licensing and
Regulatory Affairs). See also Maine Question 1 (2016) § 2444 (granting authority to Department of
Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry).
172. For example, the California Department of Public Health oversees standards for cannabis
manufacturing, including production, packaging, and labeling of all cannabis products. CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE §§ 26012(3), 26106 (2017).
173. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.325(1) (2017) (authority of the Washington State
Liquor and Cannabis Board); OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.025 (2017) (powers of Oregon Liquor Control
Commission); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26012(1) (2017) (authority of Bureau of Cannabis Control
within Department of Consumer Affairs); ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.080 (2019) (powers of Marijuana
Control Board within Department of Commerce, Community and Economic Development). Illinois’s
new law similarly vests most authority in the Department of Agriculture and Department of Financial
and Professional Regulation, with the Department of Public Health in a supporting and advisory role.
H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 5-10, 5-15, 5-25(a) (Ill. 2019).
174. H.B. 1581, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 2-1, 11 (Haw. 2019).
175. H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, §§ 3–4 (Minn. 2019); S.F. 619, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess.
art. 1, §§ 3–4 (Minn. 2019).
176. Minn. H.F. 420, art. 1, § 1, subdiv. 18; Minn. S.F. 619 art. 1, § 1, subdiv. 18. Another less
comprehensive Minnesota bill also includes a provision making the state health department the primary
agency. H.F. 4541, 2018 Leg., 90th Sess. art. 1, § 3, subdiv. 1 (Minn. 2018).
177. H.B. 2331, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. 1 § 16A-17-6(a) (W. Va. 2019).
178. W. VA. CODE §§ 16A-2-1(3), 16A-3-1(a) (2020).
179. H.B. 551, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. §§ 195.2150 (1)(2), 195.2159 (1) (Mo. 2019).
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Several other proposed bills would give the state health department
authority over some aspects of the adult use regulatory program, such as
regulating testing and manufacturing,180 designing safety inserts,181
administering community reinvestment grants and cannabis health and safety
funds,182 or collecting and analyzing data.183 Others would place the health
department in a more limited or advisory role, such as providing assistance on
labeling rules184 or consulting on development of a public health campaign
regarding adult use cannabis.185
2. State Monopoly or Non-Profit Requirement
State control of one or more aspects of the cannabis market is likely to help
mitigate negative public health impacts of legalization. In alcohol policy,
government monopolies allow control of price, location, advertising, and other
elements that affect behavior, particularly excessive consumption.186
Transitioning from state-run to privatized alcohol markets is associated with
increased alcohol sales,187 including increased purchase frequency by younger
drinkers.188 CDC’s Community Preventive Services Task Force specifically
180. H.B. 2376, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11-16A-15(d), (f) (W. Va. 2019).
181. H.B. 3129, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5B-8-12 (W. Va. 2019).
182. H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 42, 43 (N.M. 2019).
183. H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (318-F:22) (N.H. 2019).
184. E.g., H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5-25(a) (Ill. 2019); A.B. 1617, 2019–20
Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 31 (art. 11, § 181) (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. § 177 (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 31 (art. 11, § 181) (N.Y. 2019); S.B.
3040, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 31 (art. 11, § 180) (N.Y. 2017).
185. E.g., S.B. 1509, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. art. 2, § 19 (N.Y. 2019); H.B. 1438, 101st Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5-30 (Ill. 2019).
186. Pacula, Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, supra note 115, at 1023. We
acknowledge that, in the United States, state alcohol monopolies are the target of both ideological and
economic criticism and face numerous political and practical challenges despite their demonstrated
public health utility. See generally Robin Room, Alcohol Monopolies in the U.S.: Challenges and
Opportunities, 8 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 509 (1987) (surveying the history of state alcohol monopolies
and assessing challenges). Despite these challenges, we include market structure in our assessment of
a public health approach to cannabis based on its demonstrated public health benefits in alcohol control.
Contra Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 72–73 (noting that state cannabis
monopolies and other non-commercial market structures might be beneficial but declining to include
this element in proposed framework because it would not be practically feasible).
187. Alexander C. Wagenaar & Harold D. Holder, Changes in Alcohol Consumption Resulting
from the Elimination of Retail Wine Monopolies: Results from Five U.S. States, 56 J. STUD. ALCOHOL
566, 570, 572 (1995) (examining wine sales in five U.S. states following privatization of wine sales in
those jurisdictions).
188. William C. Kerr, Yu Ye, & Thomas Greenfield, Changes in Spirits Purchasing Behaviours
after Privatisation of Government-Controlled Sales in Washington, USA, 38 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV.
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recommends against privatization of alcohol markets.189 While no U.S. states
have yet adopted a state-run cannabis market (likely due in part to federal
illegality), Uruguay has adopted this approach in their national legalization
framework.190
As in states that adopted legalization via initiative, most legislative
proposals also adopt a for-profit, commercial structure.191 One notable
exception, however, is New Mexico’s S.B. 577, which would create a state
monopoly on sales.192
3. Unitary Regulatory System
Merging the regulatory structures for medical and adult use cannabis seeks
to reduce regulatory complexity because complexity benefits larger business
entities that have more extensive financial resources.193 A unitary system is
also more transparent and more consistent with regulation of other products,
few of which are regulated under bifurcated systems depending on how they
are used.194 While tax rates and other aspects may differ between medical and
adult use cannabis operations within a unitary market, entirely separate
regulatory systems may encourage misuse of the medical system by either
consumers or suppliers.195 The added complexity also makes enforcement of
regulations more difficult, a particular problem in resource-limited states.
Some existing adult use states have merged their medical and adult use
regulatory systems.196 Proposed bills in New Jersey,197 New Mexico,198 Rhode
294, 298 tbl.2 (2019) (finding increased purchase frequency among drinkers 18–29 following market
privatization in Washington State).
189. CPSTF Findings for Excessive Alcohol Consumption, supra note 107.
190. Miroff, supra note 166.
191. See generally 2020 Marijuana Policy Reform Legislation, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT,
https://www.mpp.org/issues/legislation/key-marijuana-policy-reform/
[https://perma.cc/FLM9GSY9].
192. S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 3(H) (N.M. 2019).
193. See Barry, Hiilamo, & Glantz, supra note 16, at 209.
194. Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 82.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., S.B. 94, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (Section 1(g) states the purposes
of law, including single regulatory structure.); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.375 (2018) (medical
marijuana endorsement process for retail licensees); see also OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475B.010, 475B.025
(2017) (stating powers of Oregon Liquor Control Commission, including authority pursuant to statutes
governing both adult use and medical cannabis); but see OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.949 (2017) (giving
rulemaking authority over medical cannabis program to the Oregon Health Authority).
197. A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 7–8 (N.J. 2018) (Cannabis Regulatory Commission);
S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 7 (N.J. 2018) (Cannabis Regulatory Commission).
198. H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 3(B) (N.M. 2019) (Cannabis Control Division).
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Island,199 Vermont,200 and West Virginia201 would similarly create unitary
systems overseeing both medical and adult use cannabis regulation.
In contrast, bills in Maryland,202 Minnesota,203 and West Virginia,204 among
others, would create new adult use regulatory frameworks without altering
existing oversight of medical cannabis programs. By example, a New Jersey
bill would create a new Division of Marijuana Enforcement in the Department
of Law and Public Safety to oversee adult use cannabis regulation while leaving
the state’s Department of Health in charge of regulating medical cannabis.205
Illinois’s enacted bill similarly leaves the state’s medical cannabis program
intact, with conflicts between the new adult use law and the medical program
as related to medical cannabis patients to be resolved in favor of the medical
program’s provisions.206
4. Exclusion of Industry from Formal Regulatory Roles
As stated in the Implementing Guidelines to Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC,
“[t]here is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco
industry’s interests and public health policy interests.”207 The WHO recognizes
that the industry “sees itself as a legitimate stakeholder in tobacco control and
attempts to position itself as a legitimate partner,” but unequivocally concludes
that the industry “is not and cannot be a partner in effective tobacco control.”208
Tobacco industry interference precipitates policies that are scientifically
199. S.B. 2895, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(21-28.11-3) (R.I. 2018).
200. H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (tit. 7, § 841(b)(4)) (Vt. 2019); S.B. 54, 2019 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. § 9 (tit.7, § 841(b)(4) (Vt. 2019).
201. H.B. 2331, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 16A-17-6(a) (W.Va. 2019) (authorizing Bureau of
Public Health to adopt implementing rules). The Bureau of Public Health oversees the state’s existing
medical cannabis program. W. VA. CODE § 16A-3-1(a) (2020).
202. H.B. 632, 2019 Leg, Reg. Sess. § 1 (art. XX § 2(B)(2)(IV)) (Md. 2019) (prohibiting
regulations issued under new law from limiting licensure of businesses dealing only in medical
cannabis).
203. H.F. 465, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. §§ 2 (subdiv. 1), 26 (Minn. 2019) (creating Bureau of
Cannabis Oversight without altering authority of Commissioner of Health to regulate medical
cannabis).
204. H.B. 2376, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11-16A-2 (W. Va. 2019) (defining “regulatory
agency”); W. VA. CODE § 16A-3-1(a).
205. A.B. 3819, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 6, 22 (N.J. 2018).
206. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 55-85(a) (Ill. 2019).
207. WHO FCTC GUIDELINES, supra note 84, at 5.
208. WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOBACCO INDUSTRY INTERFERENCE WITH TOBACCO CONTROL 5,
22
(2008),
https://www.who.int/tobacco/resources/publications/Tobacco%20Industry%20InterferenceFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LKL-V7H9].
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inaccurate and do not adequately protect public health,209 and the industry
routinely presents misleading scientific evidence.210
The cannabis industry is not the tobacco industry (at least not yet211), but
the innate conflict between the cannabis industry’s interests and those of public
health are no less concerning. Notwithstanding the potential medical
applications of cannabis, which are not the focus of this analysis, adult use
cannabis is a product with harmful health effects that can result in use disorders
and dependence.212 Even in the absence of objectively bad corporate behavior
like that of the tobacco industry, the cannabis industry’s profit-seeking
orientation213 will ultimately lead to business strategies that increase demand
and ensure continuing initiation of young consumers to replace those that stop
using (whether by cessation or expiration).214 These interests are unalterably
opposed to those of public health.
Consequently, relations between the cannabis industry and regulatory
agencies, advisory boards, and other entities should be limited to transparent,
arms-length interactions. Among existing adult use states, Oregon has
prohibited industry representatives from having formal policymaking roles,
while Colorado and Alaska have allowed industry members to serve on

209. See, e.g., Stella A. Bialous & Derek Yach, Whose Standard Is It, Anyway? How the Tobacco
Industry Determines the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Standards for Tobacco
and Tobacco Products, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 96, 101 (2001) (discussing industry interference in
setting international standards for tobacco products in the ISO).
210. See, e.g., Selda Ulucanlar, Gary J. Fooks, Jenny L. Hatchard, & Anna B. Gilmore,
Representation and Misrepresentation of Scientific Evidence in Contemporary Tobacco Regulation: A
Review of Tobacco Industry Submissions to the UK Government Consultation on Standardised
Packaging, 11 PLOS MED. 1, 11 (2014) (discussing industry scientific evidence presented on
standardized packaging in the United Kingdom).
211. See Barry, Hiilamo, & Glantz, supra note 16, at 209.
212. See Alan J. Budney, Michael J. Sofis, & Jacob T. Brodovsky, An Update on Cannabis Use
Disorder with Comment on the Impact of Policy Related to Therapeutic and Recreational Cannabis
Use, 269 EUR. ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRY CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 73, 81 (2019); Marijuana: Is
INST.
ON
DRUG
ABUSE,
Marijuana
Addictive?,
NAT'L
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/marijuana/marijuana-addictive
[https://perma.cc/65Q3-RCA6]; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5 DIAGNOSES AND NEW ICD-10-CM
CODES
1,
2
(2017),
http://www.acbhcs.org/providers/qa/docs/training/DSM-IV_DSM5_SUD_DX.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQ3X-S42G].
213. An exception would be a government-controlled monopoly or a not-for-profit restriction.
See supra Section II.A.2.
214. As the tobacco industry well understands, and explicitly stated in a confidential internal
memorandum in the 1980s, “[y]ounger adults are the only source of replacement smokers.”
Memorandum from R.J. Reynolds, The Importance of Younger Adults 2 (Undated),
https://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/jzyl0056 [https://perma.cc/2KAQ-2AE3].
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advisory boards, and Alaska has even allowed two industry members to serve
on a five-person committee to design the state’s regulatory system.215
Most state proposals do not explicitly address industry participation in
official regulatory bodies.216 Those that do take positions at both extremes.
Three Minnesota bills would bar cannabis industry members from serving on
the advisory council created under the bill.217 In stark contrast, a New Mexico
bill would require a comparable advisory committee to include an industry
representative.218 A New Hampshire bill would create an eleven-member
advisory board with up to six positions potentially open to industry members,
based on the description of expertise required.219 Illinois’s enacted 2019
legislation reserves one of twenty-four positions on the newly created Adult
Use Cannabis Health Advisory Committee for a representative of cannabis
business licensees.220
5. Local Control and Non-Preemption
A well-crafted cannabis legal framework preserves the authority of local
jurisdictions to regulate business operations within their borders in keeping
with community needs and values. Local regulation is a cornerstone of public
health law. While the federal government’s authority is supreme, state and
local governments are closer to the people and typically better able to respond
to the health needs of the community because of their “local knowledge, civic
engagement, and direct political accountability.”221 Local government has
more limited authority, and its authority is dependent largely on delegations of
power under state law, but public health issues often place local officials on the
“front line.”222
Local jurisdictions have historically been leaders in advancing public health
approaches to health hazards. This is particularly evident in the history of

215. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at 915.
216. This does not include provisions addressing direct conflicts of interest for regulators. See,
e.g., Bowling & Glantz, supra note 163, at 425 tbl.1; see also Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra
note 71, at 919–20.
217. H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 4, subdiv. 3(a) (Minn. 2019); H.F. 4541, 2018 Leg.,
90th Sess. art. 1, § 3, subdiv. 2(a) (Minn. 2018); S.F. 619, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, §4, subdiv. 3
(Minn. 2019).
218. H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 3(E)(1) (N.M. 2019).
219. See H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (318-F:8(II)) (N.H. 2019).
220. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5-25(b)(23) (Ill. 2019).
221. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 81 (2nd ed.
2008).
222. JAMES G. HODGE, JR., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW IN A NUTSHELL 59–60 (3d. ed. 2018).
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tobacco control. Local jurisdictions were the first to adopt smoking restrictions
for workplaces and public places, building critical mass and political will for
states to follow suit.223 Advancing state laws that include preemption of local
regulatory action is a favored tactic of the tobacco industry for precisely this
reason and creates a significant obstacle for tobacco control.224 Eliminating
preemption of local tobacco control measures in state law remains a goal of
health advocates,225 and nascent cannabis laws should avoid creating similar
obstacles to local regulation. Preemption (specifically ceiling preemption) of
local regulation can hinder beneficial public health action in situations where
cross-jurisdictional uniformity is not necessary.226
Existing legalizing states have generally preserved local authority to
regulate cannabis businesses. Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington all
authorize local jurisdictions to restrict or prohibit commercial cannabis
operations within their borders (with Oregon requiring a general election
referendum to do so).227 California also vests local governments with such
control,228 though the boundaries of this authority remain in question to some
extent and subject to litigation and political maneuvering.229
Proposed bills generally would give localities authority to limit or prohibit
operation of cannabis business within their jurisdiction. As presented in Table
1, bills that explicitly address this issue preserve local authority to prohibit at
least some classes of cannabis business entities within their borders, and the
majority allow localities to completely prohibit cannabis operations.

223. See generally Michael Siegel, Julia Carol, Jerie Jordan, Robin Hobart, Susan
Schoenmarklin, Fran DuMelle, & Peter Fisher, Preemption in Tobacco Control. Review of an
Emerging Public Health Problem, 278 JAMA 858 (1997).
224. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, State Preemption of Local Tobacco Control
Policies Restricting Smoking, Advertising, and Youth Access—United States, 2000–2010, 60
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1124 (2011); Siegel, Carol, Jordan, Hobart, Schoenmarklin,
DuMelle, & Fisher, supra note 223, at 862.
225. HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, Tobacco Use, supra note 110.
226. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: REVITALIZING LAW AND POLICY TO
MEET NEW CHALLENGES 48–52 (2011).
227. Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 77.
228. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26200(a) (2020).
229. Ongoing litigation addresses whether localities have the authority to prohibit cannabis
deliveries within their borders. Blood, supra note 70. A 2019 state legislative proposal would also
require localities that voted in favor of the state’s 2016 legalization initiative to issue a number retail
cannabis licenses equal to at least one-sixth of active alcoholic beverage sales licenses in the
jurisdiction. A.B. 1356, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
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TABLE 1: LOCAL CONTROL AND NON-PREEMPTION PROVISIONS IN PROPOSED
BILLS230
Type

Total local
prohibition
authorized

State
Arizona

Bills
S.C. Res. 1022 § 1 (4-410)231

Connecticut

H.B. 5458 § 11
S.B. 487 § 17

Kentucky

S.B. 80 § 16

Maryland

H.B. 632 § 1, art. XX (2)(C)

Minnesota

H.F. 420 art. 1, § 16
H.F. 4541 art. 1, § 4

Missouri
New Hampshire

H.B. 551 § A (195.2156)
H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:11)

New Jersey

A.B. 3581 § 12(b)
A.B. 3819 §11(c)
S.B. 2702 § 12(b)
S.B. 2703 § 20(b)

230. S.C. Res. 1022, 54th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 1 (4-410) (Ariz. 2019); H.B. 5458, 2018 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. § 11 (Conn. 2018); S.B. 487, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 17 (Conn. 2018); S.B. 80, 2019 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. § 16 (Ky. 2019); H.B. 632, 2019 Leg, Reg. Sess. § 1 (art. XX (2)(C)) (Md. 2019); H.F. 420,
2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 16 (Minn. 2019); H.F. 4541, 2018 Leg., 90th Sess. art. 1, § 4 (Minn.
2018); H.B. 551, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § A (195.2156) (Mo. 2019); H.B. 481, 166th
Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (318-F:11) (N.H. 2019); A.B. 3581, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 12(b) (N.J. 2018); A.B.
3819, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11(c) (N.J. 2018); S.B. 2702, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 12(b) (N.J. 2018);
S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 20(b) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 1617, 2019–20 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess.
§ 31 (art. 11, § 167(3)(b)) (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.§ 31 (art. 11, §
167(3)(b)) (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 31 (art. 11, § 167(3)(b)) (N.Y. 2019);
S.B. 3040, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 15 (221.05-a) (N.Y. 2017); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess.§ 9
(tit. 7, § 863) (Vt. 2019); S.B. 54, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 7 (tit. 7, § 863) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 2371, 2019
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 3 § 3.2-4145 (Va. 2019); H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art.
3 § 3.2-4150 (Va. 2019); H.B. 2331, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 16A-17-4, -6(c) (W. Va. 2019); H.B.
1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 55-25 (Ill. 2019); S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 7–8 (N.M.
2019); S.B. 2895, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (21-28.11-10) (R.I. 2018); H.B. 722, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess.
§ 7 (N.H. 2019); H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 11(A)(3) (N.M. 2019).
231. The Arizona proposal is a legislative concurrent resolution calling for a citizen referendum.
Ariz. S.C. Res. 1022 § 1. While referenda and initiatives are often grouped together because they both
subject policymaking to popular vote, a key difference is that referenda originate in the legislature
before submission to voters. As a result, we treat this referendum as a legislative form of legalization
for purposes of this Article.
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Type

Total Local
Prohibition
Authorized Cont.

State

Bills

New York

A.B. 1617 § 31 (art. 11, § 167(3)(b))
A.B. 3506 § 31 (art. 11, § 167(3)(b))
S.B. 1527 § 31 (art. 11, § 167(3)(b))
S.B. 3040 § 15 (221.05-a)232

Vermont

H.B. 196 § 9 (tit. 7, § 863)
S.B. 54 § 7 (tit. 7, § 863)

Virginia

H.B. 2371 art. 3 § 3.2-4145
H.B. 2373 art. 3 § 3.2-4150

West Virginia
Total Local
Prohibition
Authorized, with
Restrictions

Partial Local
Prohibition
Authorized

Illinois [enacted]
New Mexico
Rhode Island
New Hampshire
New Mexico

H.B. 2331 §§ 16A-17-4, -6(c)233
H.B. 1438 § 55-25 (may prohibit, but may
not regulate more restrictively than state law)
S.B. 577 §§ 7–8 (may not allow and then
later prohibit)234
S.B. 2895 § 1 (21-28.11-10) (must pass
individual referendum for each class of
establishment)
H.B. 722 § 7 (does not include
growing/harvesting)
H.B. 356 § 11(A)(3) (may prohibit retail
cannabis product sales, but not personal
production or medical-only sellers)

6. Revenue Allocation
It is essential that revenues from cannabis regulation and taxation fully
cover, at minimum, the costs of administering and enforcing regulatory
structures established to oversee the new market. Ideally, revenues should also
cover reasonably anticipated economic externalities, including future health
costs, though these are difficult to quantify in advance, particularly given the
current state of scientific evidence regarding the effects of cannabis use. An
appropriate model for estimating these costs may be to base the estimates on
the effects of comparable levels of tobacco use (which are presently higher than
cannabis use). Tobacco represents a historic failure to address such
232. The bill would allow localities to prohibit commercial operations but not to prohibit
personal cultivation. N.Y. S.B. 3040 § 15(2).
233. This bill provides for a county-level election to allow cannabis production and sales, with
additional municipal-level regulation of the operation, location, and number of cannabis
establishments.
234. This bill creates a state-operated sales monopoly. N.M. S.B. 577 § 3(H).
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externalities. Tobacco use imposes massive costs on healthcare systems, but it
was not until the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that states began
to recover some of the costs to their public health systems from smoking-related
illnesses and death.235 Despite large influxes of revenue from the MSA, states
have continued to direct less than 1% of these funds to tobacco prevention
programs and to fund such efforts at levels far below those recommended by
the CDC, stymying their effectiveness.236
The health effects of cannabis use are not yet well understood, making
projections of future health costs challenging. Analogies to other substances,
such as tobacco, are useful but incomplete because cannabis use patterns differ
and appear to be in flux. For example, as of 2017, dried flower remained the
most commonly used cannabis product and had the most direct parallels to
tobacco use, but cannabis edibles and other consumption methods were
growing in popularity.237 Given the uncertainty of other costs, cannabis
revenues should fund continuing research efforts to better understand the
impact of legalization, including health effects, to avoid the accumulation of
substantial unfunded costs as has occurred for tobacco.238 Cannabis revenue
allocation (and underlying taxation levels) should adapt to this new evidence as
it develops.
However, using cannabis revenues for other purposes is politically
attractive. For example, Colorado legalization advocates made education
funding via cannabis revenues a centerpiece of campaign advertisements in
2012.239 State budgets also tend to absorb funds that are not earmarked for
specific purposes, as has often been the case for tobacco revenues.240 However,
there is also some risk in directing cannabis revenues exclusively to cannabis235. PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR., THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW 1–2
(2018),
https://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/MSA-Overview-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5E2J-RBAL].
236. Id. at 8; CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, ACTUAL ANNUAL TOBACCO SETTLEMENT
PAYMENTS
RECEIVED
BY
THE
STATES,
1998–2010,
at
1
(2019),
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0365.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q39A-N6Y5].
237. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 52.
238. Barry & Glantz, Avoiding a New Tobacco Industry, supra note 115, at 3–6.
239. Matt Ferner, Marijuana Legalization TV Ad Says: ‘Let’s Have Marijuana Tax Money Go
To
Our
Schools
Rather
Than
Criminals’,
HUFFPOST
(Oct.
4,
2012),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/marijuana-legalization-tv_n_1936723
[https://perma.cc/HC7JXQPJ].
240. KERRY CORK, PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR., TOKING, SMOKING, AND PUBLIC HEALTH:
LESSONS FROM TOBACCO CONTROL FOR MARIJUANA REGULATION 25 (2018),
http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/Toking-Smoking-Public-Health2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8NN-MZSB].
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related programs if regulatory agencies become dependent on the sales of the
substance they regulate.241
Of the first four legalizing states, only Washington dedicated a portion of
revenue to funding a continuous research program,242 though health
departments in the other three states subsequently acted to support such efforts
with existing funding sources or sought to obtain new funds.243 Later legalizing
states, for example California, earmarked some annual funding for research,
enforcement, and youth prevention, among other purposes.244
As described in Table 2, state proposals take dramatically different
approaches to revenue allocation. Many appropriately set aside funds first to
cover administration and enforcement. Some bills direct remaining funds
primarily to cannabis-related programs, including public education, drug
treatment, intoxicated driving prevention, mental health services, and cannabis
research. However, other bills dedicate substantial revenues to other purposes,
including infrastructure, business development, and state general funds.
Legislatures are at times plain in their intention to generate significant
revenue from cannabis. For example, a Hawaii bill includes a provision stating,
“The legislature finds that it is high time Hawaii begins to reap the revenue
benefits from taxing adult cannabis use.”245 Similarly, several New York bills
would explicitly require the responsible agency to regularly review tax rates
and recommend changes to further three purposes: “maximizing net revenue,”
minimizing illegal industry, and discouraging underage use.246

241. ROLLES & MURKIN, supra note 123, at 85.
242. CORK, supra note 240, at 26.
243. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at 916.
244. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 34019(b)–(h) (2019). However, as of July 2019, cannabis
revenues have been far lower than initial projections and consumed by enforcement costs. As a result,
no earmarked state funds for other programs have yet been distributed, though some localities have
used local cannabis revenues for a variety of programs. See Lisa M. Krieger, Where Does California’s
Cannabis Tax Money Go? You Might Be Surprised., MERCURY NEWS (May 25, 2019),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/05/25/where-does-californias-cannabis-tax-money-go/
[https://perma.cc/7TEQ-APL7].
245. H.B. 1581, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Haw. 2019).
246. A.B. 1617, 2019–20 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 33 (art. 18-A § 447(3)) (N.Y. 2019); A.B.
3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 33 (art. 18-A § 447(3)) (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527, 2019–20
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 33 (art. 18-A § 447(3)) (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 3040, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 33 (art.
18-A § 447(3)) (N.Y. 2017).
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TABLE 2: REVENUE ALLOCATION IN PROPOSED BILLS247
State

Bill

Arizona

S.C. Res. 1022 § 2 (art. 10,
§ 42-5453(C))

Hawaii

H.B. 1581 § 2 (19)

Illinois

H.B. 902 § 85

Illinois
[enacted]

H.B. 1438 § 900-15
(adding § 6z-107(c)(3))

Selected Revenue Allocation Provisions
40% to general fund, 40% to public
education grants, 20% to drug treatment
and rehabilitation
Revenues first to implementation and
enforcement, with excess to county
infrastructure projects (50%) and local
farm development grants (50%)
After implementation and enforcement
costs: 50% to general fund; 30% to State
Board of Education; 5% to voluntary
alcohol, tobacco, and cannabis abuse
treatment programs; 5% to Department of
Public Health for public education
campaign targeting youth and adults; 2.5%
to state employee retirement system; 2.5%
to teachers’ retirement system; 2.%% to
state university retirement system; 2.5% to
state police for drug recognition experts
Revenues first to administrative and
enforcement costs, with remainder
allocated 35% to general fund, 25% to
criminal justice reform program, 20% for
substance abuse and prevention and
mental health, 10% for budget
stabilization, 8% to local crime prevention
programs relating to illicit cannabis and
driving under the influence, and 2% to
public education campaign

247. S.C. Res. 1022, 54th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (art. 10, § 42-5453(C)) (Ariz. 2019); H.B.
1581, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2-19 (Haw. 2019); H.B. 902, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 85 (Ill.
2019); H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 900-15 (Ill. 2019) (adding § 6z-107(c)(3)); S.B.
80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 18(4), 19, 20(3) (Ky. 2019); H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 18
(Minn. 2019); S.F. 619, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 18 (Minn. 2019); H.F. 465, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess.
§ 25 (Minn. 2019); H.B. 551, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § A (195.2162(2)) (Mo. 2019); H.B.
356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 54 (N.M. 2019); N.Y. A.B. 1617 § 32; N.Y. A.B. 3506 § 32; N.Y. S.B. 1527
§ 32; N.Y. S.B. 3040 § 32; H.B. 2371, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 6 § 3.2-4155(C) (Va. 2019);
H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 5 § 3.2-4158(D) (Va. 2019); H.B. 3129, 2019 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. § 5B-8-13 (W. Va. 2019).
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Kentucky

S.B. 80 §§ 18(4), 19, 20(3)

Minnesota

H.F. 420 art. 1, § 18; S.F.
619 art. 1, § 18

Minnesota

H.F. 465 § 25

Missouri

H.B. 551 § A
(195.2162(2))

New Mexico

New York

Virginia

H.B. 356 § 54

A.B. 1617 § 32;
A.B. 3506 § 32;
S.B. 1527 § 32;
S.B. 3040 § 32

H.B. 2371, art. 6 § 3.24155(C)

[103:1313

Selected Revenue Allocation Provisions
80% to statewide fund distributed 95% to
offset costs of program administration and
enforcement, with remainder to substance
abuse treatment programs (1%), public
education (1%), and law enforcement
training (3%); 20% to local funds in
jurisdictions with cannabis businesses
$10 million annually to small businesses
as part of a social justice program;
remaining revenues 60% to the state’s
general fund, 10% to mental health, 10%
to police training, 10% to department of
health research, 10% to education and
public health programs
Revenues first to administration, then 40%
mental health services, 40% early
childhood education, and 20% to health
department for education and public health
program
Revenues primarily to the state’s general
fund
Revenues support cannabis regulation
fund, community grants reinvestment
fund, cannabis health and safety fund,
cannabis research fund, and local DWI
grant program
$1 million to revolving loan fund for
licensees and microbusinesses; $1 million
to state university to research and evaluate
implementation and effects of law,
including public health impacts; $750,000
for license tracking and reporting;
$750,000 to track and report violations of
remaining cannabis laws; remaining funds
to state lottery fund (25%), drug treatment
education fund 25%), and community
grants reinvestment fund (50%)
67% to general fund; 33% to retail
marijuana education support fund to be
used exclusively for public education
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Virginia

H.B. 2373, art. 5 § 3.24158(D)

West Virginia

H.B. 3129 § 5B-8-13
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Selected Revenue Allocation Provisions
$20 million to Veterans Treatment Fund;
remainder 30% to localities with cannabis
businesses, 35% to general fund for
Standards of Quality basic aid payments,
35% to highway maintenance and
operation fund
Revenues in excess of operating costs to
teacher compensation and public
employee insurance (25%), infrastructure
(35%), law enforcement and community
fund (15%), small business fund for
grants/loans (15%), and public employee
retirement system (10%, up to $2 million
with excess to general fund)

7. Enforcement and Liability
Unannounced compliance checks, including those using underage decoy
buyers, are a key component of effectively enforcing retailer compliance
regarding sales to minors.248 Existing evidence from tobacco and alcohol
control indicates that active, frequent enforcement utilizing escalating
penalties, up to and including license revocation, is appropriate and effective to
influence retailer behavior and reduce sales to minors.249 In contrast, the
absence of compliance testing and penalties for violation limits the
effectiveness of state laws prohibiting sales to minors.250 To counter the
potential for adult use markets to increase youth access and the appeal of
cannabis to youth, maintaining high retailer compliance is crucial.251
Among the first four adult use states, Washington provides for an
unannounced compliance check program, but Alaska, Colorado, and Oregon do

248. Lindsay F. Stead & Tim Lancaster, A Systematic Review of Interventions for Preventing
Tobacco Sales to Minors, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL 169, 171, 175 (2000).
249. See, e.g., id.; Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Enhanced Enforcement of Laws to
Prevent Alcohol Sales to Underage Persons—New Hampshire, 1999–2004, 53 MORBIDITY
MORTALITY WKLY REP. 452, 453 (2004) (regarding alcohol).
250. J. R. DiFranza & G. F. Dussault, The Federal Initiative to Halt the Sale of Tobacco to
Children—the Synar Amendment, 1992–2000: Lessons Learned, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 93, 97
(2005).
251. See, e.g., Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 80; Barry & Glantz, Four
US States, supra note 71, at 914–15.
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not.252 Compliance reviews in Washington and Colorado in the early stages of
legalization found overall high levels of compliance by retailers (88% and 91%,
respectively).253
Several proposed bills do not specifically provide for license revocation for
sales to minors but leave establishment of grounds and procedures for license
revocation to future regulations.254 Some bills do provide for specific penalties
for sales to minors. For example, multiple New Jersey bills would penalize
employees or agents of a licensee with increasing civil penalties up to $1,000
per violation and potentially result in revocation of the licensee’s license
following a hearing.255 Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation authorizes random
and unannounced inspections by regulators and state and local law
enforcement,256 and provides for broad license suspension and revocation
powers for violations generally,257 but does not explicitly apply these penalties
to sales to minors.258
Civil liability for retailers provides additional, indirect regulation on the
behavior of commercial actors. Borrowed from alcohol service, commercial
host or “dram shop” liability (sometimes called “gram shop liability” for
cannabis259) is retailer liability for injuries resulting from overservice or
underage service and is a well-established but non-universal principle of state
statutory tort law that relies primarily on deterrence effects.260 Thirty states
have statutes imposing civil liability on establishments that sell or serve alcohol
to individuals whose intoxication results in harms; twenty-two restrict liability
to service of obviously intoxicated persons or persons under the legal drinking

252. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at 915.
253. Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 80.
254. E.g., H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 4, subdiv. 2 (Minn. 2019); H.B. 3129 § 5B-811(c)(1) (W. Va. 2019); S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 3(G)(1) (N.M. 2019); H.B. 250, 2019 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. § 7 (tit. 7, § 882) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 9 (tit. 7, § 882) (Vt. 2019);
H.B. 902, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 45(a)(1) (Ill. 2019).
255. S.B. 2702, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § (6)(b) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 3819, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §
5(b) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 3581, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6(b) (N.J. 2018).
256. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 15-135 (Ill. 2019).
257. Id. § 45-5.
258. See id. § 10-20 (regarding identification).
259. Jessica Berch, Reefer Madness: How Non-Legalizing States Can Revamp Dram Shop Laws
to Protect Themselves from Marijuana Spillover from Their Legalizing Neighbors, 58 B.C. L. REV.
863, 880–81 (2017); Hayley Dean, Through the Haze: Fashioning a Workable Model for Imposing
Civil Liability on Marijuana Vendors, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 611, 613 (2013).
260. Berch, supra note 259, at 884–85; Frank A. Sloan, Lan Liang, Emily M. Stout, & Kathryn
Whetten-Goldstein, Liability, Risk Perceptions, and Precautions at Bars, 43 J. L. & ECON. 473, 498–
99 (2000).

ORENSTEIN_GLANTZ_03JUN20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

6/3/2020 9:24 AM

CANNABIS LEGALIZATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES

1357

age.261 Dram shop liability laws are associated with reductions in alcohol
consumption and fatal crash ratios.262
Despite the prevalence of dram shop liability laws nationally, none of the
reviewed bills included provisions explicitly detailing retailer liability for
cannabis. However, other state statutory or case law may impose such
liability.263
B. Consumer-Facing Product and Retailer Regulation
1. Packaging and Labeling
A comprehensive public health approach to warning labels for cannabis and
cannabis products should include evidence-based, effective measures from
global tobacco control, such as plain packaging, graphic warning labels, and
rotating health messaging.264 However, states may ultimately address these
elements by rule rather than statute.
a. Packaging
Packaging is fundamentally a marketing tool, one that other industries,
including tobacco and alcohol, have used to great effect. As with these
products, branding on cannabis products offers the industry a secondary
marketing opportunity to make up for other venues that may be legally
restricted.265
Plain packaging, devoid of all branding elements other than the brand name
and product variant in plain text and specified font produced in a standard color
(independent of product) as specified by the government, is one of the most
261. Dram Shop Civil Liability and Criminal Penalty State Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/dram-shop-liabilitystate-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/X698-S4BB].
262. Michael Scherer, James C. Fell, Sue Thomas, & Robert B. Voas, Effects of Dram Shop,
Responsible Beverage Service Training, and State Alcohol Control Laws on Underage Drinking Driver
Fatal Crash Ratios, 16 TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION S59, S59 (2015). Some scholars, notably Berch,
propose gram shop laws not only for legalizing states, but also non-legalizing states that border them,
with the aim of holding cannabis sellers accountable for injuries caused by consumers who travel or
return to the non-legalizing neighbor state, a proposition beyond the scope of this Article. Jessica
Berch, Weed Wars: Winning the Fight Against Marijuana Spillover from Neighboring States, 19 NEV.
L.J. 1, 6, 6 n.24 (2018); Berch, supra note 259, at 885.
263. See Berch, supra note 259, at 884–88.
264. DANIEL G. ORENSTEIN & STANTON A. GLANTZ, UCSF CTR. FOR TOBACCO CONTROL RES.
AND EDUC., PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE FOR RECREATIONAL CANNABIS LAWS 2–4 (2018)
&
GLANTZ,
PUBLIC
HEALTH
LANGUAGE],
[hereinafter
ORENSTEIN
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/05d5g5db [https://perma.cc/23SR-NWE9].
265. See, e.g., id. at 7–8.
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important and effective advances in tobacco control. Plain packaging improves
the effectiveness of warnings, reduces product appeal to adolescents and young
adults, and increases attention and perception of harm, among other benefits.266
While existing adult use states have not adopted plain packaging
requirements,267 Oregon allows producers and manufacturers to bypass labeling
and packaging approval if they use pre-approved, generic labels and
packaging,268 effectively creating an opt-in plain packaging approach. Outside
the United States, Canada269 and Uruguay270 have adopted plain packaging
provisions as part of their national adult use cannabis legalization frameworks.
Two Minnesota bills would require minimalist packaging that includes
most elements of a plain packaging standard, prohibiting product depiction,
cartoons, and any images other than the company logo or name.271 (The
allowance for a logo is the only departure from a comprehensive plain
packaging standard.) Like many other states’ proposed or enacted laws, these
bills would also require the packaging to be opaque and child-resistant.272
266. Melanie Wakefield, Kerri Coomber, Meghan Zacher, Sarah Durkin, Emily Brennan, &
Michelle Soto, Australian Adult Smokers’ Responses to Plain Packaging with Larger Graphic Health
Warnings 1 Year After Implementation: Results from a National Cross-sectional Tracking Survey, 24
TOBACCO CONTROL ii17, ii17, ii24 (2015); P. Beede & R. Lawson, The Effect of Plain Packages on
the Perception of Cigarette Health Warnings, 106 PUB. HEALTH 315, 321 (1992); Victoria White,
Tahlia Williams, & Melanie Wakefield, Has the Introduction of Plain Packaging with Larger Graphic
Health Warnings Changed Adolescents’ Perceptions of Cigarette Packs and Brands?, 24 TOBACCO
CONTROL ii42, ii48 (2015); Daniella Germain, Melanie A. Wakefield, & Sarah J. Durkin, Adolescents’
Perceptions of Cigarette Brand Image: Does Plain Packaging Make a Difference?, 46 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 385, 388–90 (2010); Ingeborg Lund & Janne Scheffels, Young Smokers and Non-smokers
Perceptions of Typical Users of Plain vs. Branded Cigarette Packs: A Between-subjects Experimental
Survey, 13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1005, 1010–11 (2013); Crawford Moodie, Anne Marie Mackintosh,
Gerard Hastings, & Allison Ford, Young Adult Smokers’ Perceptions of Plain Packaging: A Pilot
Naturalistic Study, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL 367, 367 (2011); Emily Brennan, Sarah J. Durkin, Trish
Cotter, & Melanie A Wakefield, Mass Media Campaigns Designed to Support New Pictorial Health
Warnings on Cigarette Packets: Evidence of a Complementary Relationship, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL
412, 416–17 (2011); Judith McCool, Lisa Webb, Linda D. Cameron, & Janet Hoek, Graphic Warning
Labels on Plain Cigarette Packs: Will They Make a Difference to Adolescents?, 74 SOC. SCI. & MED.
1269, 1269–70 (2012).
267. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at tbl.A (Supp. 2018).
268. OR. ADMIN. R. 845-025-7060 (2018).
269. Cannabis Regulations, SOR/2018-144 §§ 111–121 (Can).
270. See Miroff, supra note 166.
271. H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 13 (Minn. 2019); S.F. 619, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess.
art. 1, § 13 (Minn. 2019).
272. Minn. H.F. 420 art. 1, § 13; Minn. S.F. 619 art. 1, § 13. The same provisions would also
require packaging to be recyclable or reusable if such materials are available, Minn. H.F. 420 art. 1, §
13; Minn. S.F. 619 art. 1, § 13, an important environmental public health consideration, particularly in
light of serious environmental pollution harms from tobacco products. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH
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Several bills have packaging restrictions that target attempts to appeal to
youth, but they often use broad, vague language. Two Vermont bills would
prohibit packaging that makes a cannabis product more appealing to children.273
Two New Mexico bills would prohibit packaging that is “designed to be
appealing to a child.”274 A Hawaii bill would require future regulations to
prohibit “the use of any images designed or likely to appeal to minors, such as
cartoons, toys, animals, or children; and any other likeness of images,
characters, or phrases that are popularly used to advertise to children.”275
Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation contains a nearly identical provision, but
adds a prohibition on “any packaging or labeling that bears reasonable
resemblance to any product available for consumption as a commercially
available candy.”276
A Virginia bill uses particularly weak language with respect to packaging,
prohibiting products labeled or packaged “in a manner that is specifically
designed to appeal particularly to persons under 21.”277 Manufacturers could
easily escape culpability under such a standard by arguing that they design their
packaging to appeal to lawful young adult consumers (i.e., 21 and over) and
that any appeal to underage consumers is unintentional. One need look no
further than the online marketing tactics of e-cigarette maker JUUL Labs Inc.
(now partially owned by Philip Morris USA parent company Altria) and the
company’s subsequent statements to see how an industry may deploy such a
defense to parry accusations of inappropriately targeting youth.278
ORG., TOBACCO AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: AN OVERVIEW 24–28 (2017) [hereinafter
TOBACCO
AND
ITS
ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT],
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/255574/9789241512497eng.pdf;jsessionid=A3D1E3A7AB57F0836E0E64DBF2B1CD2B?sequence=1
[https://perma.cc/P8AG-FZ9Q].
273. H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess.§ 7 (tit. 7, § 881(a)(3)(F)) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. § 9 (tit. 7, § 881(a)(3)(F) (Vt. 2019).
274. S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 12(B) (N.M. 2019); H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 17(B)
(N.M. 2019).
275. H.B. 1581, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2-11(a)(16) (Haw. 2019).
276. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 55-21(f)(5) (Ill. 2019).
277. H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 4 § 3.2-4155(C)(2) (Va. 2019) (emphasis
added).
278. See Press Release, Kevin Burns, CEO, JUUL Labs, JUUL Labs Action Plan (Nov. 13,
2018), https://newsroom.juul.com/juul-labs-action-plan/ [https://perma.cc/2UVB-HLB5] (defending
the company and arguing that their “intent was never to have youth use JUUL products”); but see
ROBERT K. JACKLER, CINDY CHAU, BROOK D. GETACHEW, MACKENZIE M. WHITCOMB, JEFFREY
LEE-HEIDENREICH, ALEXANDER M. BHATT, SOPHIA H.S. KIM-O’SULLIVAN, ZACHARY A. HOFFMAN,
LAURIE M. JACKLER, & DIVYA RAMAMURTHI, STAN. U. SCH. OF MED., JUUL ADVERTISING OVER
ITS FIRST THREE YEARS ON THE MARKET: STANFORD RESEARCH INTO THE IMPACT OF TOBACCO
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b. Warning Labels
Warning labels have demonstrated efficacy in tobacco control, influencing
risk perceptions, health knowledge, motivation to quit, and appeal to youth.
Warnings are most effective when they are large, prominently positioned,
clearly worded, periodically changed to reduce familiarity, and designed to
include pictorial content in addition to text.279
As of July 2019, none of the existing adult use states required a warning
label with pictorial content like that of tobacco graphic warning labels, though
some do require a small (likely ineffective) warning symbol for cannabis
products.280 Similarly, none of the proposed bills include specific requirements
for rotating health warnings or pictorial content. However, many bills would
vest decision-making authority for package warnings in one or more regulatory
bodies,281 meaning these entities could potentially adopt such requirements.
For example, four New Jersey bills would require a warning label to
“adequately inform consumers about safe marijuana use and warn of the
consequences of misuse or overuse.”282 A New Mexico bill would require
labels that warn of potential adverse effects.283 Six New York bills would
ADVERTISING
1,
1
(2019),
http://tobacco.stanford.edu/tobacco_main/publications/JUUL_Marketing_Stanford.pdf
[https://perma.cc/92XX-8YD4] (concluding based on content analysis that “JUUL’s advertising
imagery in its first 6 months on the market was patently youth oriented. For the next 2 ½ years it was
more muted, but the company’s advertising was widely distributed on social media channels frequented
by youth, was amplified by hashtag extensions, and catalyzed by compensated influencers and
affiliates.”).
279. See ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE, supra note 264, at 12–16
(summarizing existing evidence from tobacco control and application to cannabis).
280. See, e.g., CA. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 40412 (2018); OR. ADMIN. R. 333-007-0050, 333-0070200 (2018); 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-3-1010 (2018); Marijuana Enforcement Division adopts a
Single Universal Symbol and Streamlines Packaging and Labeling Requirements, ST. OF COLO.,
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/IB%201804%20Universal%20Symbol%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC5B-SWZ9]; Cannabis Universal
HEALTH
AUTH.,
Symbol,
OREGON
https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PreventionWellness/marijuana/Pages/symbol.aspx
[https://perma.cc/QGG5-P664]; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55-106 (2020).
281. S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11(3)(f) (Ky. 2019); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 9
(tit. 7, § 907(D)) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 7 (tit. 7, § 907(D)) (Vt. 2019); S.B. 54,
2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 7 (tit. 7, § 907(c)(1)(D)) (Vt. 2019); A.B. 3581, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 9(a)(7)
(N.J. 2018); A.B. 3819, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8(a)(7) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess.
§ 16(a)(7) (N.J. 2018); S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 3(E) (N.M. 2019); A.B. 1617, 2019–20 Gen.
Assemb., Reg Sess. § 181 (N.Y. 2019).
282. N.J. A.B. 3819 § 8(a)(7)(c); N.J. A.B. 4497 § 16(a)(7)(c); S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess.
§ 16(a)(7)(c) (N.J. 2018).
283. H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 17(C)(6) (N.M. 2019).
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authorize the responsible agency to seek the assistance of the state health
department in developing regulations for warning labels including “any
potential impact on human health resulting from the consumption of marihuana
products . . . if such labels are deemed warranted . . . .”284
Bills that do specify warning content tend to include minimal warnings
similar to existing alcohol warning labels, which are the product of a voluntary
code and do not appear to be particularly effective.285 These types of warning
labels address only specific populations (e.g., children, pregnant women), use
by minors, or driving while intoxicated.286 Some are even more basic, such as
a West Virginia bill that would simply require a warning that the product is
intoxicating and to keep it away from children.287
Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation charges the state’s Department of Public
Health with defining and updating health warnings for cannabis but also
includes specific warning language to be used unless modified by rule.288
Among other label content, the bill requires all cannabis products to include a
statement that “use can impair cognition and may be habit forming” and
requires cannabis that may be smoked to include the statement, “Smoking is
hazardous to your health.”289 While there are no requirements for pictorial or
rotating elements in the legislation and some of the specified language does not
reflect best practices, these are nonetheless a rare example of health-specific
cannabis warnings.
2. Product Taxes
Taxes on products like tobacco and alcohol are an effective means of
decreasing consumption, particularly among adolescents, who are generally
more price-sensitive.290 However, the existence of a robust illicit market for
284. N.Y. A.B. 1617 § 31 (art. 11 § 181(4)); A.B. 2009, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. art. 4 § 78(3)
(N.Y. 2019), A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 181(4) (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1509, 2009
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 78(3) (N.Y. 2019), S.B. 1527, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 31 (art. 11 § 181(4) (N.Y.
2019); S.B. 3040, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 33 (art. 11 § 177(4)) (N.Y. 2017).
285. Barry & Glantz, Four US States, supra note 71, at 919.
286. See, e.g., S.B. 2895, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (21-28.11-8(d)(4)) (R.I. 2018); H.B. 2371,
2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 4 § 3.2-4149(A)(9) (Va. 2019); H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. art. 4 § 3.2-4155(A)(9) (Va. 2019); S.B. 2702, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § (9)(a)(7)(d)(viii)
(N.J. 2018).
287. H.B. 3129, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5B-8-12(b) (W. Va. 2019).
288. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5-25(a) (Ill. 2019).
289. Id. §§ 55-21(i)–(j).
290. See, e.g., Summer Sherburne Hawkins, Nicoline Bach, & Christopher F. Baum, Impact of
Tobacco Control Policies on Adolescent Smoking, 58 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 679, 681 (2016)
(finding most price sensitivity among youngest adolescents with respect to cigarettes); Michael F.
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cannabis is distinguishing and requires a balanced approach in which taxes are
high enough to discourage abuse and youth use, but low enough to establish a
stable legal market.291 While the public health approach distinctly prioritizes
health interests over commercial interests, the legal market does have public
health benefits over the illicit market with respect to age restriction, labeling,
Experimentation among
and product testing, among other areas.292
implementing jurisdictions will likely be necessary to identify characteristics
of the supply and demand curves for legal cannabis and establish an ideal level
of tax, which may also change as the legal market takes hold.
As shown in Table 3, state proposals would take a variety of approaches to
taxation. Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation is notable not only because it was
the only proposed bill to pass as of July 2019 but also because of its unique
taxation approach.293 The legislation differentiates among cannabis products
by THC content, taxing more potent products at a rate more than double that of
lower-potency products (25% sales tax on products over 35% THC compared
to 10% tax on products at or below that threshold) and also distinguishes
between infused products and other product categories.294

Pesko, Jidong Huang, Lloyd D. Johnston, & Frank J. Chaloupka, E-cigarette Price Sensitivity Among
Middle- and High-school Students: Evidence from Monitoring the Future, 113 ADDICTION 896, 902,
905 (2017) (finding price sensitivity among adolescents for e-cigarettes); Xin Xu & Frank J.
Chaloupka, The Effects of Prices on Alcohol Use and Its Consequences, 34 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH
236, 239–40 (2011) (discussing studies that consistently demonstrate inverse relationship between
price and alcohol consumption among adolescents and youth).
291. See, e.g., Mark A.R. Kleiman, We’re Legalizing Weed Wrong, SLATE (Nov. 7, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2016/11/america_is_legalizing_marijuana_wrong.
html [https://perma.cc/N4BW-G6JF].
292. See ROLLES & MURKIN, supra note 123, passim.
293. See generally Ill. H.B. 1438.
294. Id. § 65-10(a).
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TABLE 3: TAX RATES IN PROPOSED BILLS295
State

Bill(s)

Selected Provisions

Escalating sales/excise tax with defined increase
New Jersey

A.B. 3581 § 11(a)

7% sales tax, escalating over 5 years to 15%

New Jersey

A.B. 3819 § 10(a)

New Jersey

S.B. 2702 § 11

7% sales tax, escalating over 5 years to 25%
10% excise tax, escalating to 25% in 4 years;
includes prevailing sales tax

Escalating sales/excise tax with undefined adjustment
Illinois

H.B. 902 § 80

New Hampshire

H.B. 481 § 8 (77H:2(I–III))

New York

A.B. 1617 § 33; A.B.
3506 § 33; S.B. 1527
§ 33; S.B. 3040 § 33

10% excise tax to be adjusted annually for
inflation
$30 per ounce of flower; $10 per ounce of
other plant material; $15 per immature plant;
adjusted for inflation
$0.62 per gram of flower and $0.10 per gram
of leaves cultivation tax; $1.35 per immature
plant nursery tax; 15% excise tax on all
nonmedical purchases; rates to be adjusted
every 2 years according to cost-of-living
adjustment and to be regularly reviewed; local
tax up to 2%

Sales/excise tax > 10%
Hawaii

S.B. 686 § 2(329-I)

Illinois [enacted]

H.B. 1438 § 65-10

15% excise tax
25% excise tax on cannabis over 35% THC;
10% tax on cannabis at or below 35% THC;
20% tax on cannabis-infused products

295. A.B. 3581, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11(a) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 3819, 218th Leg., Reg.
Sess. § 10(a) (N.J. 2018); S.B. 2702, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11 (N.J. 2018); H.B. 902, 101st Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 80 (Ill. 2019); H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. § 8 (77-H:2(I)) (N.H. 2019); A.B.
1617, 2019–20 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 33 (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. § 33 (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 33 (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 3040, 2017–18
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 33 (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 686, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(329-I) (Haw. 2019); Ill. H.B.
1438 § 65-10; H.F. 465, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. §§ 1 (subdiv. 2), 3, 12 (Minn. 2019); H.B. 551, 100th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § A (195.2162) (Mo. 2019); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 16 (tit.
32, §§ 7901–02) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 2331, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 16A-17-7(a), 16A-17-4 (W. Va.
2019); H.B. 3129, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5B-8-13 (W. Va. 2019); S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. §
20(2) (Ky. 2019); H.B. 722, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.H. 2019); A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess.
§§ 18(a), 19(a) (N.J. 2018); S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 18(a), 19(a) (N.J. 2018); H.B. 356,
54th Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 48–50 (N.M. 2019); S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 33–34 (N.M. 2019); S.B.
54, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 14 (tit. 32, § 7901–02) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 14
(tit. 32, § 7901–02) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 5 §§ 3.2-4158–59 (Va.
2019); H.B. 2371, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 3.2-4155(A), 3.2-4156(A) (Va. 2019).
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Selected Provisions

Sales/excise tax > 10% cont.
Minnesota

H.F. 465 §§ 1
(subdiv. 2), 3, 12

Missouri

H.B. 551 § A
(195.2162)

Vermont
West Virginia
West Virginia

H.B. 196 § 16 (tit.
32, §§ 7901–02)
H.B. 2331 §§ 16A17-7(a), 16A-17-4
H.B. 3129 § 5B-8-13

15% gross revenues of processor; 12% gross
receipts from retail sales and lounge
admission; optional 3% local tax
20% at transfer from cultivator; additional
local taxes allowed
11% excise tax; optional 3% local tax
15% excise tax; optional 5% local tax
17.5% excise tax; optional 6% local tax

Sales/excise tax ≤ 10%
Kentucky

S.B. 80 § 20(2)

New Hampshire

H.B. 722 § 2

New Jersey

A.B. 4497 §§ 18(a),
19(a)

New Jersey

S.B. 2703 §§ 18(a),
19(a)

New Mexico

H.B. 356 §§ 48–50

New Mexico

S.B. 577 §§ 33–34

Vermont

Virginia
Virginia

S.B. 54 § 14 (tit. 32,
§ 7901–02); H.B. 250
§ 14 (tit. 32, § 7901–
02)
H.B. 2373 art. 5 §§
3.2-4158–59
H.B. 2371
§§ 3.2-4155(A),
3.2-4156(A)

Excise tax 10% on flower, 5% on other plant
parts, 8% on immature plants; additional sales
tax permitted but not specified
8% sales tax
5.375% on receipts from retail sale in addition
to existing sales tax; additional local tax up to
2%
5.375% in addition to state sales and use tax;
optional 2% local tax
9% excise tax (none on medial); up to 3%
municipal tax; up to 3% county tax
4% state excise tax; optional 4% municipal
tax; optional 4% county tax
10% excise tax; 1% optional local tax

10% sales tax; optional 5% local tax
9.7%; optional 5% local tax
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3. Product Access
Unlike tobacco (and in many states alcohol), adult use cannabis is (so far)
sold only in age-restricted venues.296 Provided this restriction remains in place
and subject to active and comprehensive enforcement, it alleviates some
product access concerns. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act of 2009 prohibited tobacco vending machines and self-service
displays outside of adult-only facilities.297 However, access restrictions address
more than youth use. Total prohibitions on tobacco vending machines in all
locations are associated with reduced smoking propensity, with those who live
in an area with a total prohibition less likely to smoke.298
Three Vermont bills would prohibit any direct customer access to cannabis
products in a retail shop and require all products to be stored behind a counter
or similar barrier.299 Two Virginia bills would prohibit vending machines,
drive-through windows, and internet-based sales platforms, among other
restrictions.300 Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation similarly prohibits drivethrough windows and vending machines.301 In contrast, two bills in Hawaii
would explicitly allow operation of vending machines.302
There is some debate as to public health best practices with respect to
allowing product delivery. Deliveries are difficult to regulate303 and increase
the risk of illegal youth access, particularly given the inadequacy of most age
verification approaches.304 However, Health Canada acknowledged an
advantage to some cannabis delivery models in that their discretion (compared
to more visible brick-and-mortar retail outlets) may not encourage increased
usage.305 The Canadian Public Health Association also expressed concern that
296. See, e.g., ROLLES, supra note 123, at 158.
297. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111–31, 123 Stat.
1776, 1799 (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 1140.16(c) (2016).
298. Mike Vuolo, Brian C. Kelly, & Joy Kadowaki, Impact of Total Vending Machine
Restrictions on US Young Adult Smoking, 18 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 2092, 2097–98 (2016).
299. Vt. H.B. 250 § 2 (881)(4)(B); Vt. H.B. 196 § 9 (tit. 7, § 881(a)(4)(B)); Vt. S.B. 54 § 7 (tit.
7, § (881)(4)(B)).
300. Va. H.B. 2371 art. 3 § 3.2-4142(B)(2)(a); Va. H.B. 2373 art. 2 § 3.2-4146(B)(2)(a).
301. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 15-70(n)(7)–(8) (Ill. 2019).
302. H.B. 1515, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(712)(3) (Haw. 2019); S.B. 779, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess.
§ 2(712)(3) (Haw. 2019).
303. Barry & Glantz, Avoiding a New Tobacco Industry, supra note 115, at 5.
304. See Rebecca S. Williams & Kurt M. Ribisl, Internet Alcohol Sales to Minors, 166
ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 808, 810 tbl.2, 811 (2012) (finding that age verification
by internet alcohol vendors failed to prevent sales to minors in 45% of study cases and that 59% of
vendors used weak or no age verification).
305. HEALTH CANADA, supra note 165, at 47, 76.
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storefront retailers could stimulate increased product variety and noted that a
delivery-only system (as Canada operated for its medical cannabis program)
“eliminates the likelihood of placement of shops near areas where children
congregate, and concerns regarding signage and advertising for such shops.”306
Combined with the risk that storefront retailer concentration may normalize
and increase use (based on evidence from tobacco and alcohol control307),
cannabis delivery may offer both benefits and risks for public health, and a total
prohibition on delivery may not ultimately be ideal. However, age verification
processes would require substantial improvement in order to realize potential
benefits while mitigating risks. As with many other open questions regarding
cannabis regulation, as evidence develops it will be far easier to liberalize an
overly restrictive policy than to attempt to eliminate an established facet of the
market.
Of those bills that explicitly address delivery, seven bills in four states
would prohibit it, while sixteen bills in nine states would permit it, as noted in
Table 4, below.

306. A Public Health Approach to the Legalization, Regulation and Restriction of Access to
Cannabis, CAN. PUB. HEALTH ASS'N (Nov. 6 2017), https://www.cpha.ca/public-health-approachlegalization-regulation-and-restriction-access-cannabis [https://perma.cc/BV4Y-JV4X].
307. Pacula, Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, supra note 115, at 1023.
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TABLE 4: CANNABIS DELIVERY IN PROPOSED BILLS308
Type

Delivery
Prohibited

Delivery
Permitted

State

Bills

Illinois [enacted]

H.B.1438 §§ 15-70(n)(9)-(10)

Minnesota

H.F. 420 art. 1, § 6, subdiv. 9;
S.F. 619 § 6(9)

Vermont

H.B. 250 § 907(e);
S.B. 54 § 7 (tit. 7, § 907(e))

Virginia

H.B. 2371 § 3.2-4142(B)(2)(d);
H.B. 2373 art. 2 § 3.2-4146(B)(2)(d)

Connecticut

S.B. 487 § 18(5)

Hawaii

H.B. 1581 § 2(11)(a)(6)

Illinois

H.B. 902 § 935(3.5)

Kentucky

S.B. 80 § 2(3)(e)

New Hampshire

H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:9(I)(g))

New Jersey

S.B. 2703 § (27)(h);
A.B. 4497 § (27)(h)

New York

S.B. 1509 § 130(7);
A.B. 2009 § 130(7);
A.B. 1617 § 11(165)(5);
S.B. 1527 § 11(165)(5);
A.B. 3506 § 11(165)(5);
S.B. 3040 § 11(165)(5)

308. H.B.1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 15-70(n)(9)–(10) (Ill. 2019); H.F. 420, 2019
Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 6, subdiv. 9 (Minn. 2019); S.F. 619, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1, § 6, subdiv.
9 (Minn. 2019); H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 907(e) (Vt. 2019); S.B. 54, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. §
7 (tit. 7, § 907(e)) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 2371, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3.2-4142(B)(2)(d) (Va.
2019); H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 2 § 3.2-4146(B)(2)(d) (Va. 2019); S.B. 487,
2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 18(5) (Conn. 2018); H.B. 1581, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2-11(a)(6) (Haw.
2019); H.B. 902, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 935(3.5) (Ill. 2019); S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess.
§ 2(3)(e) (Ky. 2019); H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (318-F:9(I)(g)) (N.H. 2019); S.B. 2703, 218th
Leg., Reg. Sess. § (27)(h) (N.J. 2018); A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § (27)(h) (N.J. 2018); S.B.
1509, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess.§ 130(7) (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 2009, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 130(7) (N.Y.
2019); A.B. 1617, 2019–20 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 11(165)(5) (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 1527, 2019–20
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11(165)(5) (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 11(165)(5)
(N.Y. 2017); S.B. 3040, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11(165)(5) (N.Y. 2017); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. § 9 (tit. 7, § 907(c)) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 3129, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5B-8-8(1) (W. Va.
2019); H.B. 2376, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11-16A-8(1) (W. Va. 2019).
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Type

Delivery
Permitted Cont.

State

Bills

Vermont

H.B. 196 § 9 (tit. 7, § 907(c))

West Virginia

H.B. 3129 § 5B-8-8(1);
H.B. 2376 § 11-16A-8(1)

4. Outlet Density Restrictions
Alcohol outlet density, the number of locations within a specific geographic
area where alcohol is available for sale, is positively associated with excessive
consumption and related harms.309 Because this finding applies to both on- and
off-premises outlets (i.e., both bars and liquor stores), there are parallels to
cannabis regulation whether or not a jurisdiction permits on-site consumption.
Higher tobacco outlet density is also associated with increased youth smoking
rates,310 and outlet density also affects adult smoking via interaction between
price sensitivity and access costs, including travel time.311 While the economics
of cannabis markets and their impact on youth and adult use are less wellestablished than those of alcohol and tobacco, broadly similar effects are likely
and a reasonable basis for limiting cannabis retail outlet density to protect
public health.
A New Jersey bill would set a statewide maximum of 218 licenses,
including 98 medical licenses, with each legislative district receiving at least 2

309. E.g., Carla Alexia Campbell, Robert A. Hahn, Randy Elder, Robert Brewer, Sajal
Chattopadhyay, Jonathan Fielding, Timothy S. Naimi, Traci Toomey, Briana Lawrence, & Jennifer
Cook Middleton, The Effectiveness of Limiting Alcohol Outlet Density as a Means of Reducing
Excessive Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol-related Harms, 37 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 556, 560
(2009); see also Task Force on Community Preventive Services, Recommendations for Reducing
Excessive Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol-related Harms by Limiting Alcohol Outlet Density, 37
AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 570, 570 (2009); Pacula, Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, supra
note 115, at 1023–24 (summarizing evidence and recommending limitations on outlet density to reduce
harms).
310. Lisa Henriksen, Ellen C. Feighery, Nina C. Schleicher, David W. Cowling, Randolph S.
Kline, & Stephen P. Fortmann, Is Adolescent Smoking Related to the Density and Proximity of Tobacco
Outlets and Retail Cigarette Advertising Near Schools?, 47 PREVENTIVE MED. 210, 211 (2008); Scott
P. Novak, Sean F. Reardon, Stephen W. Raudenbush, & Stephen L. Buka, Retail Tobacco Outlet
Density and Youth Cigarette Smoking: A Propensity-modeling Approach, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 670,
673 (2006); Laura J. Finan, Sharon Lipperman-Kreda, Melissa Abadi, Joel W. Grube, Emily Kaner,
Anna Balassone, & Andrew Gaidus, Tobacco Outlet Density and Adolescents’ Cigarette Smoking: A
Meta-analysis, 28 TOBACCO CONTROL 27, 31 (2019).
311. See, e.g., John E. Schneider, Robert J. Reid, N. Andrew Peterson, John B. Lowe, & Joseph
Hughey, Tobacco Outlet Density and Demographics at the Tract Level of Analysis in Iowa:
Implications for Environmentally Based Prevention Initiatives, 6 PREVENTIVE SCI. 319, 322 (2005).
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licenses and the remaining 40 licenses considered at-large.312 Illinois’s enacted
2019 legislation prohibits location of a retail cannabis dispensary within 1,500
feet of the property line of any pre-existing dispensary.313
In contrast, some states address density from the perspective of minimum
rather than maximum outlets. Another New Jersey bill would require a
“sufficient number of [retailers] to meet the market demands of the state, and
giving regard to geographical and population distribution.”314 A separate New
Jersey bill would require a minimum one retail store per county, amounting to
twenty-one in the state, but would allow local governments to set maximums to
account for population distribution and consumer access.315 A West Virginia
bill would set a minimum of one retail cannabis store for every ten retail liquor
stores, though regulators could reduce this if there are an insufficient number
of qualified applicants.316
5. Day and Time Operating Restrictions
Evidence from alcohol control indicates that limits on the days and hours
during which alcohol can be sold are an effective intervention to reduce
excessive consumption and related harms.317 Studies that support the
effectiveness of these approaches typically assess the effects of removing
existing restrictions, demonstrating an association between such a change and
Studies on
increased consumption and motor vehicle-related harms.318
imposing new limits are lacking. However, a systematic review of studies on
day and time operating restrictions (as well as outlet density) found that most
studies support the existence of an effect on one or more key outcomes (overall
alcohol consumption, drinking patterns, and damage from alcohol).319 A
precautionary approach to cannabis based on existing alcohol control evidence
is warranted given the similar intoxicating potential of cannabis use.

312. S.B. 2702, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 9(a)(14) (N.J. 2018).
313. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 15-70(n)(15) (Ill. 2019).
314. A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 16(a)(14) (N.J. 2018).
315. A.B. 3819, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8(a)(14) (N.J. 2018).
316. H.B. 2376, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. §11-16A-15(c)(5)(A) (W. Va. 2019).
317. Task Force on Community Preventive Services, Recommendations on Maintaining Limits
on Days and Hours of Sale of Alcoholic Beverages to Prevent Excessive Alcohol Consumption and
Related Harms, 39 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 605, 605 (2010).
318. Id.
319. Svetlana Popova, Norman Giesbrecht, Dennis Bekmuradov, & Jayadeep Patra, Hours and
Days of Sale and Density of Alcohol Outlets: Impacts on Alcohol Consumption and Damage: A
Systematic Review, 44 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 500, 501, 512–14 (2009).
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State proposals in general do not address cannabis establishment operating
hours, leaving them to implementing regulations or local rules.320 However, at
least three bills address operating hours at the statutory level. Bills in New
Hampshire and West Virginia would leave specific operating hour restrictions
to implementing regulations, but stipulate that the regulations not allow retailers
to operate before 6:00 a.m. or after 11:45 p.m.321 Illinois’s enacted 2019
legislation limits dispensary operating hours to between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00
p.m.322
C. Youth, Environmental Exposure, and Denormalization
1. Minimum Purchase Age
All U.S. states have adopted a legal drinking age of 21, though many did
not do so until pressured by the federal government in the 1980s.323 A growing
number of jurisdictions had also raised their minimum legal age for tobacco
purchase to 21 before the federal government adopted a national minimum age
of 21 for tobacco in December 2019.324 All existing state adult use cannabis
laws have similarly established 21 as the minimum purchase and possession
320. See, e.g., H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. (Minn. 2019); S.F. 619, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess.
(Minn. 2019); H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2019); S.B. 54, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2019);
H.B. 2371, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2019); H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Va. 2019); S.B. 487, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2018); H.B. 1581, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw.
2019); H.B. 902, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019); S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2019);
H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.H. 2019); S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); A.B. 4497,
218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); S.B. 1509, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 2009, 2019
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 1617, 2019–20 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 1527,
2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017);
S.B. 3040, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2019); H.B.
3129, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2019); W. Va. H.B. 2376.
321. H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (318-F:9(I)(n)) (N.H. 2019); W. Va. H.B. 2376 § 1116A-15(c)(10).
322. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 15-70(j) (Ill. 2019).
323. In 1984, Congress passed the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C. § 158
(2012), which threatened to withhold a portion of federal highway funding for states that did not
establish 21 as the minimum legal age for purchase and public possession of alcohol. The Supreme
Court subsequently upheld the Act’s constitutionality in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
324. At least 540 localities and 19 states had adopted 21 as the minimum legal age for tobacco
purchases before the change in federal law. CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, “STATES AND
LOCALITIES THAT HAVE RAISED THE MINIMUM LEGAL SALE AGE FOR TOBACCO PRODUCTS TO 21,”
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/content/what_we_do/state_local_issues/sales_21/states_local
ities_MLSA_21.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R2T-2QM5] (listing state and local changes to minimum
tobacco age laws); Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, H.R. 1865, 116th Cong. § 603(a)(1)
(2019) (raising minimum age of sale of tobacco products from 18 to 21 years).
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age.325 Notably, Canada has adopted a minimum age of 18,326 consistent with
the country’s minimum alcohol purchase age.327 As with alcohol, provinces
can adopt their own higher age minimums for cannabis.328
Based on existing public health evidence, a minimum age of 21 is the most
appropriate standard for cannabis. Like alcohol, cannabis has risks associated
with intoxicated driving.329 Raising the minimum age for alcohol was
associated with a reduction in motor vehicle accidents,330 and similar public
health protection is appropriate for cannabis. Raising the minimum age for
alcohol was also associated with decreased alcohol consumption among those
ages 18–20 and 21–25.331 Based on existing scientific evidence, the potential
negative effects of cannabis use on brain development332 (which continues up
to approximately age 25) strongly support efforts to reduce consumption by
325. ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.020 (2019); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1(a) (2017);
COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(e); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-B. § 1501(1) (2017); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 94G, § 2(b) (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.27955(1) (2018); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 453D.110 (2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.316(1)(a) (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4230a
(2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.4013(5) (2015).
326. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16 § 8 (Can.).
327. Each province or territory sets its own minimum drinking age. The minimum drinking age
is 18 in three provinces and 19 in the other ten. Policy and Regulation (Alcohol): Legal Drinking Age
in Canada, CAN. CTR. ON SUBSTANCE USE AND ADDICTION, https://www.ccsa.ca/policy-andregulations-alcohol [https://perma.cc/2YTN-SPQM].
328. As of July 2019, two provinces (Alberta and Quebec) have adopted 18 as the minimum age,
and all others have adopted 19. Cannabis in the Provinces and Territories, HEALTH CAN.,
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-medication/cannabis/lawsregulations/provinces-territories.html [https://perma.cc/5AX2-SYY4].
329. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 227–30; Rebecca L. Hartman &
Marilyn A. Huestis, Cannabis Effects on Driving Skills, 59 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 478 (2013); R.
Andrew Sewell, James Poling, & Mehmet Sofuoglu, The Effect of Cannabis Compared with Alcohol
on Driving, 18 AM. J. ADDICTION 185 (2009).
330. Adoption of the national minimum age of 21 for alcohol in the United States was associated
with a 16% median decrease in motor vehicle crashes, as well as decreased alcohol consumption among
those aged 18 to 20 and those aged 21 to 25. Age 21 Minimum Legal Drinking Age, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/fact-sheets/minimum-legal-drinking-age.htm
[https://perma.cc/B8H2-94QV].
331. Id.
332. Kirsten Weir, Marijuana and the Developing Brain, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N 48 (2015).
Considerable development in this area of research is likely as data become available from the ongoing
Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development (ABCD) Study, a landmark 10-year longitudinal study of
nearly 12,000 participants supported by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) that will include study
of the effects of cannabis use, among myriad other factors. See generally NAT’L INST. ON DRUG
ABUSE, LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT (ABCD STUDY)
(2019),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/adolescent-brain/longitudinal-study-adolescentbrain-cognitive-development-abcd-study [https://perma.cc/GL9K-AK4J].
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young adults. Assuming similar policy effects on cannabis consumption as for
alcohol, a minimum age of at least 21 is prudent and would also align regulatory
frameworks for cannabis, alcohol, and tobacco.
In nearly all cases, proposed legislative adult use bills set 21 as the legal
age for purchase and possession333 (as does Illinois’s enacted 2019
legislation334). The sole exceptions are two bills in Hawaii that would set the
age at 18.335 However, both of these bills are primarily aimed at
decriminalization, rather than the establishment of a legal adult use cannabis
market in the state.336 Additionally, a New Jersey bill would allow cannabis
delivery staff to be as young as 18,337 though the bill would authorize sales only
to those over 21.338
2. Flavors and Other Additives
Flavors have documented impacts on attracting young smokers to
traditional tobacco products339 and e-cigarettes.340 Flavors disguise the
333. E.g., S.B. 686, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Haw. 2019) (“personal use”); H.B. 902, 101st
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5 (Ill. 2019); S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 2, 3 (Ky. 2019); H.B. 632,
2019 Leg, Reg. Sess. § 1 (art. XX(1)(A)) (Md. 2019); H.B. 420, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. art. 1, § 2, subdiv.
2 (Minn. 2019); S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 22 (N.M. 2019); A.B. 1509, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. § 65 (N.Y. 2019); H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 907(b) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 3108, 2019 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. § 19-37-2 (W. Va. 2019).
334. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 1-10, 10-5(a) (Ill. 2019).
335. H.B. 1515, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Haw. 2019); S.B. 779, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Haw.
2019).
336. Haw. H.B. 1515 § 1; Haw. S.B. 779 § 1.
337. S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 27(h)(4), 29(c) (N.J. 2018).
338. Id. § 6.
339. Carrie M. Carpenter, Geoffrey Ferris Wayne, John L. Pauly, Howard K. Koh, & Gregory
N. Connolly, New Cigarette Brands with Flavors that Appeal to Youth: Tobacco Marketing Strategies,
24 HEALTH AFF. 1601 (2005); U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE
AMONG YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2012),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK99237/ [https://perma.cc/WLG7-SMPM]; Andrea C.
Villanti, Amanda L. Johnson, Bridget K. Ambrose, K. Michael Cummings, Cassandra A. Stanton,
Shyanika W. Rose, Shari P. Feirman, Cindy Tworek, Allison M. Glasser, Jennifer L. Pearson, Amy M.
Cohn, Kevin P Conway, Raymond S. Niaura, Maansi Bansal-Travers, & Andrew Hyland, Flavored
Tobacco Product Use in Youth and Adults: Findings From the First Wave of the PATH Study (2013–
2014), 53 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 139 (2017).
340. Bridget K. Ambrose, Hannah R. Day, Brian Rostron, Kevin P. Conway, Nicolette Borek,
Andrew Hyland, & Andrea C. Villanti, Flavored Tobacco Product Use Among US Youth Aged 12–17
Years, 2013–2014, 314 JAMA 1871 (2015); Grace Kong, Meghan E. Morean, Dana A. Cavallo, Deepa
R. Camenga, & Suchitra Krishnan-Sarin, Reasons for Electronic Cigarette Experimentation and
Discontinuation Among Adolescents and Young Adults, 17 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 847 (2015);
Emily A. McDonald & Pamela M. Ling, One of Several ‘Toys’ for Smoking: Young Adult Experiences
with Electronic Cigarettes in New York City, 24 TOBACCO CONTROL 588 (2015).
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unpleasant taste of smoke, and some have even more far-reaching effects.
Menthol, for example, contributes to nicotine dependence through behavioral
reinforcement341 and increases nicotine exposure by encouraging breath
holding.342 Following a Congressional directive in the Family Smoking and
Tobacco Prevention Control Act, in 2009 FDA banned characterizing flavors
in cigarettes.343 This prohibition controversially failed to include menthol
cigarettes or flavored non-cigarette tobacco (e.g., cigars) but still succeeded in
reducing the probability of being a smoker and number of cigarettes smoked
among adolescents.344 Congress also directed FDA to address menthol,345 but
as of March 2020, FDA has not taken any regulatory action. Local jurisdictions
are now leading efforts to prohibit other flavored tobacco products, including
menthol and electronic tobacco products (e.g., JUUL®) that have rapidly
increased in popularity among youth.346
In alcohol policy, “control jurisdictions” (those that operate monopolies
over some aspect of distribution) have banned or restricted a variety of products
due to flavoring that appeals to youth, among other reasons.347 The FDA has
also acted to prohibit alcohol manufacturers from adding caffeine to their
products, deeming it an “unsafe food additive” in the context of alcoholic malt
beverages.348

341. Karen Ahijevych & Bridgette E. Garrett, The Role of Menthol in Cigarettes as a Reinforcer
of Smoking Behavior, 12 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. S110 (2010).
342. Samuel Garten & R. Victor Falkner, Role of Mentholated Cigarettes in Increased Nicotine
Dependence and Greater Risk of Tobacco-attributable Disease, 38 PREVENTIVE MED. 793 (2004).
343. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111–31, 123 Stat. 1776,
1799 (2009).
344. Charles J. Courtemanche, Makayla K. Palmer, & Michael F. Pesko, Influence of the
Flavored Cigarette Ban on Adolescent Tobacco Use, 52 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. e139 (2017).
345. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111–31, 123 Stat. 1776,
1804 (2009).
346. Madison Park & Ron Selig, San Francisco Bans Sales of Flavored Tobacco Products, CNN
(June
6,
2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/06/health/san-francisco-flavored-cigarettesproposition-e/index.html [https://perma.cc/WLG7-SMPM]; Associated Press, Nation’s First ECigarette Ban Proposed in San Francisco, CBS NEWS (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/san-francisco-e-cigarettes-temporary-ban-proposed-vaping-juul/
[https://perma.cc/GFG2-P5YW].
347. Elyse R. Grossman, Jane Binakonsky, & David Jernigan, The Use of Regulatory Power by
U.S. State and Local Alcohol Control Agencies to Ban Problematic Products, 53 SUBSTANCE USE &
MISUSE 1229 (2018).
348. Caffeinated
Alcoholic
Beverages,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/food/ingredientspackaginglabeling/foodadditivesingredients/ucm190366.htm
[https://perma.cc/4EY8-SNSR].
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Two Vermont bills would prohibit including nicotine or alcoholic
beverages in cannabis products offered for sale.349 A Virginia bill would
prohibit additives in edible products that are toxic or harmful to humans or are
specifically designed to make the product more addictive or to appeal to persons
under 21.350 A New Hampshire bill would similarly require the newly created
regulatory agency responsible for cannabis in the state to promulgate
regulations that include “a prohibition on any vaporization device that includes
toxic or addictive additives,”351 and would also explicitly prohibit nicotine as
an additive.352 A Kentucky bill would also charge the regulatory agency with
restricting additives “that are toxic or increase the likelihood of addiction.”353
None of the proposed bills explicitly prohibits flavoring agents, though
implementing regulations could address this and other shortcomings.
In most states, detailed determinations on questions such as which additives
are considered toxic, addictive, or attractive to youth would be answered by
applicable regulatory agencies consistent with the state’s administrative
rulemaking procedures. For example, in California’s adult use framework, the
state Department of Public Health oversees manufactured cannabis products
and regulates what additives are permitted.354 Among other elements, the
Department prohibits manufacturing cannabis products containing alcoholic
beverages and those with additives that “increase potency, toxicity, or addictive
potential,” including nicotine and caffeine.355 Illinois’s enacted 2019
349. H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 881(a)(3)(F)(ii) (Vt. 2019); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg.
Sess. § 9 (tit. 7, § 881(a)(3)(F)(ii)) (Vt. 2019).
350. H.B. 2371, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3.2-4151(A)(5) (Va. 2019). The bill does not
define who would make such determinations but would presumably leave this to regulation under the
Board of Agriculture and Consumer Services, which would have authority to adopt additional health
and safety regulations. Id. § 3.2-4151(B); see id. § 3.2-4122 (powers and duties of the Board).
351. H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6 (318-F:9(I)(t)) (N.H. 2019). This section also authorizes
restrictions on “types of vaporizers that are particularly likely to be utilized by minors without
detection,” id., likely a response to the growing popularity of easily concealed nicotine vaporizers such
as JUUL®.
352. Id. § 6 (318-F:9(I)(p)(3)).
353. S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11(3)(i) (Ky. 2019).
354. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17. § 40300 (2018).
355. Id. § 40300(a)–(b). However, following a public comment period, the Department of Public
Health rejected recommendations, including from the authors of this Article, to include naturally
occurring caffeine (e.g., coffee), as well as menthol and other characterizing flavors, among prohibited
additives. CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, DPH-17-010: CANNABIS MANUFACTURING LICENSING,
RESPONSE TO COMMENTS RECEIVED DURING THE 45-DAY COMMENT PERIOD, (Jan 16, 2019),
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CEH/DFDCS/MCSB/CDPH%20Document%20Library/DPH170
10_45DayResponses.pdf [https://perma.cc/JTL6-XKN8]; see also DANIEL G. ORENSTEIN, DANIEL G.
ORENSTEIN, CANDICE M. BOWLING, & STANTON A. GLANTZ, COMMENT ON PROPOSED
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legislation similarly vests the Department of Public Health with authority to
adopt and enforce rules for the manufacture and processing of infused products,
but does not specifically address additives.356
3. Advertising and Marketing
Restrictions on tobacco advertising and marketing efforts are among the
most universally recommended policy interventions in tobacco control, as
reflected in WHO FCTC Article 13’s call for a “comprehensive ban on
advertising, promotion and sponsorship” as consistent with applicable
constitutional principles.357 A total ban is likely inconsistent with U.S. law, and
indeed the caveat for national constitutional principles was in part shaped by
opposition from the United States,358 which nevertheless remains one of only a
small number of WHO member states that has not ratified the treaty.359 The
U.S. Surgeon General concluded that tobacco advertising and promotional
activities are causally related to youth smoking initiation and continuation,360
and the WHO attributed one-third of youth tobacco experimentation to
exposure to tobacco advertising.361 Alcohol advertising exposure is similarly
associated with youth initiation and with overconsumption.362
Restrictions on speech are disfavored under First Amendment
jurisprudence; however, government regulation of commercial speech to
protect consumer health and safety is a well-supported exercise of public health
authority when applied within appropriate parameters.363 Commercial speech
is speech proposing a commercial transaction, defined as a form of advertising
that identifies a specific product for the purpose of economic benefit.364 While
REGULATION:
DPH-17-010
(July
3,
2018),
https://tobacco.ucsf.edu/sites/tobacco.ucsf.edu/files/wysiwyg/Comment%20on%20DPH-17010%2C%20Cannabis%20Manufacturing%20Licensing.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TDH-7EM3].
356. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 55-5(e) (Ill. 2019).
357. WHO FCTC, supra note 83, at 11.
358. Sean Murphy, Adoption of Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
689, 689–90 (2003).
359. WHO Member States Not Party to FCTC, supra note 96.
360. U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 339.
361. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC (2013),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85380/1/9789241505871_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2W2QZZC].
362. David Jernigan, Jonathan Noel, Jane Landon, Nicole Thornton, & Tim Lobstein, Alcohol
Marketing and Youth Alcohol Consumption: A Systematic Review of Longitudinal Studies Published
Since 2008, 112 ADDICTION 7 (2017).
363. GOSTIN, supra note 221, at 347, 352–53.
364. Id. at 345.
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commercial speech nominally receives less constitutional protection than other
forms of speech (and received none until 1975), these protections are still
significant.365 For commercial speech about a lawful product that is truthful
and not misleading, government must show that it has a substantial interest, that
the regulation of speech advances that interest, and that the regulation is no
more extensive than necessary to serve the government’s stated interest,366 a
familiar test originating in Central Hudson.367
Government has interests in regulating advertising that increases use of
harmful products, markets age-restricted products to youth, or misleads the
public.368 Government interest in controlling cannabis use to protect public
health is almost certainly substantial. State interests in protecting health, safety,
and welfare are almost always found to be substantial, including interests in
prevention of youth smoking, traffic safety, and temperance,369 all three of
which are closely related to cannabis use, as well. As a result, the key issues
for restrictions on cannabis advertising will be the extent to which the
regulations directly advance this interest and whether the restrictions are more
extensive than necessary.370
A Connecticut bill would prohibit “any type of marketing and advertising
of the sale of recreational marijuana,”371 although the constitutionality of such
a broad provision may be questionable.372 Other Connecticut bills would bar
365. Id. at 347.
366. Id. at 347–50.
367. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The split
between federal and state law on the legality of cannabis complicates application of commercial speech
protections to cannabis. Depending on state constitutional law, cannabis advertising may receive lesser
commercial speech protections because the drug is illegal under federal law and thus its advertising
arguably fails to satisfy a required element for protection under Central Hudson. Leslie Gielow Jacobs,
Regulating Marijuana Advertising and Marketing to Promote Public Health: Navigating the
Constitutional Minefield, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1081 (2017); see also ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ,
PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE, supra note 264, at 23–25. For purposes of this Article, we presume that
cannabis advertising has some level of commercial speech protection.
368. GOSTIN, supra note 221, at 345.
369. Id. at 350–52.
370. See id. at 352–55 (detailing commercial speech analysis in public health regulation).
371. H.B. 5595, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2017).
372. See, e.g., ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE, supra note 264, at 23–24.
If appropriately limited to regulation of sales conduct that is non-expressive, restrictions on commercial
speech may survive judicial scrutiny, though direct regulation of the conduct (e.g., price discounting
techniques) may accomplish the same objective with less risk of overstepping constitutional
boundaries. Jacobs, supra note 367, at 1104–06, 1132–33. Nevertheless, if adequately justified and
targeted to directly advance a substantial government interest, even restrictions on protected
commercial speech can withstand constitutional challenge. Id. at 1117–21.
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“mass-market campaigns that have a high likelihood of reaching children,”373 a
stricter standard than those setting audience composition ceilings (e.g.,
prohibiting advertising in publications or media where the percentage of
viewers under the legal age for purchase is reasonably expected to be above a
certain threshold374). Bills in Hawaii and New Hampshire would both similarly
prohibit “mass-market campaigns that have a high likelihood of reaching
minors,” and the New Hampshire bill would additionally prohibit promotional
products and product giveaways.375
A New Jersey bill would restrict advertising “in ways that target or are
designed to appeal to [persons under 21],” including depictions of persons
under 21 or the presence of objects suggesting the presence of a person under
21, such as toys or cartoon characters, and also restricts “any other depiction
designed in any manner to be especially appealing to a person under 21.”376
Multiple New Jersey bills would also impose restrictions on cannabis
advertising, including:
• Limiting retailers to a single sign of up to 1,600 square
inches (approximately 11 square feet) visible to the general
public;
• Prohibiting advertising “on television, radio or the Internet
between the hours of 6:00am and 10:00pm;”377
• Requiring “reliable evidence that no more than 20 percent
of the audience . . . is reasonably expected to be under
[21]”;
• Prohibiting marketing using location-based devices (e.g.,
cell phones) except under limited circumstances;
• Prohibiting sponsorship of charitable, sports, musical,
artistic, cultural, social, or other similar events absent
“reliable evidence” that no more than 20% of the audience
is expected to be under 21; and

373. H.B. 5458, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 13(10) (Conn. 2018); S.B. 487, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess.
§ 19(a)(9) (Conn. 2018).
374. See, e.g., A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 16(9)(c) (N.J. 2018) (allowing cannabis
advertising only if the licensee “has reliable evidence that at least 71.6 percent of the audience for the
advertisement is reasonably expected to be 21 years of age or older”); H.B. 250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess.
§ 7 (tit. 7, § 864(b)) (Vt. 2019) (limiting cannabis advertising “unless the licensee can show that no
more than 30 percent of the audience is reasonably expected to be under 21 years of age”).
375. H.B. 1581, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2-11(12) (Haw. 2019); H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st Sess.
§ 6 (318-F:9(I(l)) (N.H. 2019).
376. A.B. 3581, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 9(a)(7)(a)(iv) (N.J. 2018) (emphasis added).
377. It is unclear how such time restrictions could be imposed on web-based advertising.
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Prohibiting advertising within 200 feet of schools,
recreation centers, parks, childcare centers, playgrounds,
public pools, libraries, or on public transit vehicles, transit
shelters, or on or in public owned and operated property.378
A New Mexico bill would explicitly prohibit cannabis product advertising
via billboard, radio, television, or other broadcast media.379 Anticipating
possible constitutional challenge, the bill also provides that this prohibition
would cease to be in effect in the event of federal cannabis legalization.380 The
bill would also prohibit advertising that:
• is false, deceptive or misleading, including unproven
health benefit claims;
• depicts consumption by persons under 21;
• is designed using cartoon characters;
• mimics other product brands;
• is within 300 feet of a school, church, or daycare center;
• is in public transit vehicles or stations or on publicly owned
or operated property; or
• is an unsolicited internet pop-up.381
Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation similarly prohibits advertising that:
• is false or misleading;
• promotes overconsumption;
• depicts actual consumption;
• depicts consumption by a person under 21;
• “makes any health, medicinal, or therapeutic claims”;
• includes “cannabis leaf or bud” imagery;
• includes images “designed or likely to appeal to minors,
including cartoons, toys, animals, or children, or any other
likeness to images, characters or phrases that is designed
in any manner to be appealing to or encourage
consumption” by persons under 21;
• is within 1,000 feet of schools grounds or a playground,
recreation center, child care center, public park, public
library, or game arcade not restricted to adults;
•

378. N.J. A.B. 3581 § 9(a)(9); A.B. 3819, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. 8(a)(9) (N.J. 2018).
379. H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 21(A)(1)(a) (N.M. 2019).
380. N.M. H.B. 356 § 21(B); see also Jacobs, supra note 367, at 1097–98 (noting that
commercial speech protections in some state constitutions are similar to those of the U.S. Constitution);
but see ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE, supra note 264, at 16 (noting that
commercial speech analysis under state law may differ from federal law and that federal protections
may not apply due to cannabis’ federal illegality).
381. N.M. H.B. 356 § 21(A)(1).
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• is on or in public transit vehicles or shelters;
• is on or in publicly owned or operated property.382
The Illinois legislation also prohibits promotions incorporating cannabis
giveaways or any games or competitions related to cannabis consumption.383
4. Public Use and On-Site Consumption
Decades of research have firmly established the link between tobacco
smoke and cancer, inflammation, fetal harm, impaired immune function, and
other serious health harms to nearly every organ of the human body.384
Secondhand exposure similarly causes a variety of harms with no risk-free level
of exposure.385 The similarity of tobacco smoke and cannabis smoke386 is
therefore cause for concern. Moreover, there is already substantial evidence for
a relationship between cannabis use and negative respiratory effects,387 as well
as evidence for associations with cardiovascular disease, respiratory disease,
neurological disease, and cancer.388
The establishment of comprehensive smokefree laws in states and localities
over the past several decades is an important public health achievement that
protects the health of employees in enclosed workplaces as well as countless
members of the community in public places. Similar restriction on the public
382. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 55-20(a)–(b) (Ill. 2019).
383. Id. § 55-20(d).
384. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
INVOLUNTARY EXPOSURE TO TOBACCO SMOKE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 3–8 (2006),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK44324/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK44324.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NB99-YZ99].
385. Id.
386. Moir, Rickert, Levasseur, Larose, Maertens, White, & Desjardins, supra note 89, at 494.
387. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 16, 181–96.
388. Id. at 15–16, 19; Xiaoyin Wang, Ronak Derakhshandeh, Jiangtao Liu, Shilpa Narayan,
Pooneh Nabavizadeh, Stephenie Le, Olivia M. Danforth, Kranthi Pinnamaneni, Hilda J. Rodriguez,
Emmy Luu, Richard E. Sievers, Suzaynn F. Schick, Stanton A. Glantz, & Matthew L. Springer, One
Minute of Marijuana Secondhand Smoke Exposure Substantially Impairs Vascular Endothelial
Function, 5 J. AM. HEART ASS’N 1, 8–9 (2016); Pal Pacher, Sabine Steffens, György Haskó, & Thomas
H. Schindler, Cardiovascular Effects of Marijuana and Synthetic Cannabinoids: The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly, 15 NATURE REVS. 151, 153–54 (2018); Kelly P. Owen, Mark E. Sutter, & Timothy E.
Albertson, Marijuana: Respiratory Tract Effects, 46 CLINICAL REV. ALLERGY IMMUNOLOGY 65, 66,
76 (2014); Madeline H. Meier, Avshalom Caspi, Antony Ambler, HonaLee Harrington, Renate Houts,
Richard S. E. Keefe, Kay McDonald, Aimee Ward, Richie Poulton, & Terrie E. Moffit, Persistent
Cannabis Users Show Neuropsychological Decline from Childhood to Midlife, 109 PROCEEDINGS
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. E2657, E2657 (2012); RAJPAL S. TOMAR, JAY BEAUMONT, & JENNIFER C.
Y. HSIEH, CAL. ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, EVIDENCE ON THE CARCINOGENICITY OF MARIJUANA
SMOKE
1,
46
(2009),
https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/crnr/finalmjsmokehid.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6N73-QPJY].

ORENSTEIN_GLANTZ_03JUN20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1380

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

6/3/2020 9:24 AM

[103:1313

use of cannabis and cannabis products is appropriate to avoid undermining
public health progress by allowing smoking (of any type) in public locations or
re-normalizing smoking behavior generally.389
Social equity considerations that attach to public smoking bans when
applied to cannabis must be addressed,390 but it is typically much easier to
liberalize a restrictive policy than to ratchet up restrictions on behavior. The
long public health battle to reduce secondhand smoke exposure in bars,
restaurants, and other public locations is a key example of the latter.391 At
minimum, an effective public health strategy to cannabis regulation should
include addition of cannabis smoke and aerosol or vapor to existing smokefree
laws covering tobacco products to prevent erosion of progress reducing
environmental tobacco exposure.392
All ten states that legalized adult use prior to 2019 have prohibited public
use.393 They have also frequently added cannabis to existing smokefree laws.394
However, some states have explicitly authorized on-site consumption
exemptions to indoor smoking restrictions395 or allowed localities to do so.396
Such exemptions threaten to undermine other smokefree laws if the tobacco
industry attempts to leverage them to create additional smoking spaces in an
389. See Stanton A. Glantz, Bonnie Halpern-Felsher, & Matthew L. Springer, Marijuana,
Secondhand Smoke, and Social Acceptability, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 13 (2018) (discussing social
norm change with respect to tobacco and cannabis use).
390. See, e.g., ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE, supra note 264, at 35–36.
391. See STANTON A. GLANTZ & EDITH D. BALBACH, TOBACCO WAR: INSIDE THE CALIFORNIA
BATTLES 1–18 (2000); see, e.g., Andrew Hyland, Joaquin Barnoya, & Juan E. Corral, Smoke-free Air
Policies: Past, Present and Future, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 154, 155 (2012).
392. See AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS, MODEL ORDINANCE PROHIBITING SMOKING
IN ALL WORKPLACES AND PUBLIC PLACES (100% SMOKEFREE) 3–4, 7 (2018),
https://nonsmokersrights.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/modelordinance.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D2LB4SW]; ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE, supra note 264, at 35–36.
393. ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.38.020(4), 17.38.040 (2019); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11362.3(a)(1) (2017); COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(d); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-B, §
1501(2)(A) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94G, § 13(c) (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.27954(e)
(2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453D.400 (2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.381 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 4230a(a)(2)(A) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.445 (2015).
394. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.3(a)(2); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-B, §
1501(2)(B) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94G, § 13(c) (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 4230a(a)(2)(A).
395. E.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 306.200(a) (2019); see also Memorandum from April
Simpson, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, to Debbie Morgan, Department of Commerce,
Community
and
Economic
Development
(Mar.
12,
2019),
https://aws.state.ak.us/OnlinePublicNotices/Notices/Attachment.aspx?id=116574
[https://perma.cc/E95U-X549].
396. E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26200(g) (2020).
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effort to renormalize smoking behavior. Jurisdictions adopting this approach
should explicitly prohibit tobacco use in such locations by law and consider
other limitations to reduce secondhand cannabis smoke exposure for
employees, such as restricting consumption areas to outdoor locations or
requiring strict physical separation from employee work areas. However, only
completely smokefree environments fully protect nonsmokers.397
As in existing adult use states, proposed bills (and Illinois’s enacted 2019
legislation) uniformly prohibit public consumption of cannabis, though there
are some distinguishing features, as presented in Table 5.
A Hawaii bill would apply any restrictions on tobacco products and
smoking to non-medical cannabis.398 Multiple New York bills would similarly
prohibit cannabis smoking in public and any location where smoking tobacco
is prohibited by law.399 A New Mexico bill would prohibit smoking cannabis
in public places but would not include electronic devices creating an aerosol or
vapor400 in the definition of “smoking.”401 Two New Jersey bills would prohibit
smoking cannabis in any location where tobacco smoking is prohibited, as well
as any indoor public place even if tobacco smoking is permitted.402 They would
also prohibit cannabis smoking within the campuses and facilities of public and
private higher education institutions.403

397. See, e.g., Ventilation Does Not Effectively Protect Nonsmokers from Secondhand Smoke,
CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/secondhand_smoke/protection/ventilation/in
dex.htm [https://perma.cc/LD79-GFDU] (listing conclusions from reports by the U.S. Surgeon
General, WHO, and ASHRAE). We have recommended in other work that legalizing jurisdictions
initially prohibit on-site consumption areas, on the basis that it is easier to liberalize policy later when
evidence on the impacts of cannabis smoke is better established than to regulate such spaces out of
existence once in operation, as well as concern that existing tobacco restrictions could suffer. See
ORENSTEIN & GLANTZ, PUBLIC HEALTH LANGUAGE, supra note 264, at 32–36.
398. S.B. 686, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (329-B(f)) (Haw. 2019).
399. A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 25 (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527, 2019–20 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. § 25 (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 3040, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.Y. 2017).
400. Technically what is produced is an aerosol, a mixture of gasses and particles. See Thomasz
R. Sosnowski & Marcin Odziomek, Particle Size Dynamics: Toward a Better Understanding of
Electronic Cigarette Aerosol Interactions With the Respiratory System, 9 FRONTIERS IN PHYSIOLOGY
1, 1 (2018) (describing components of emitted aerosols from electronic cigarettes). However, the
products are commonly referred to as producing “vapor,” and this is reflected in the language of many
existing and proposed state laws on public use. Id.
401. H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 31(C) (N.M. 2019).
402. A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 4(c), 73 (N.J. 2018).
403. Id. §§ 4(c), 73; S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 4(c), 73 (N.J. 2018).
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A Minnesota bill would add not only smoked cannabis but all lighted and
vapor cannabis products to the state’s clean indoor air act.404 Taking advantage
of an opportunity to revise this law, the bill would also add electronic nicotine
devices (ENDS) to existing indoor smoking prohibitions (e.g., at public
schools).405
A Connecticut bill would prohibit all cannabis consumption (including
smoking, vaping, and other forms) in all places where tobacco smoking is
prohibited and in any public place.406
Illinois’s enacted 2019 legislation prohibits “smoking” cannabis where
smoking is prohibited by the state’s clean indoor air law without explicitly
including vapor products,407 but also more generally prohibits “using” cannabis
(thus any form of cannabis) in any public place,408 which is broadly defined and
applies to most non-residential locations.409 The legislation also specifically
prohibits using cannabis “knowingly in close physical proximity to anyone
under 21 years of age who is not a registered medical cannabis patient” in the
state.410
Several state bills would make exceptions to smokefree laws for on-site
consumption areas, but restrictions on such locations vary. Some bills would
allow on-site cannabis consumption,411 others would either allow or require
consumers to bring their own cannabis.412 Some would require consumption
areas to be part of a licensed retailer or medical dispensary,413 others would
allow or require independent licensure,414 and some would allow on-site
404. H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess., art. 3 § 1, subdiv. 4 (Minn. 2019).
405. Minn. H.F. 420, art. 3 § 1, subdiv. 4, art. 3 § 8, subdivs. 1–2.
406. S.B. 487, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 21 (Conn. 2018).
407. H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §10-35(a)(4) (Ill. 2019).
408. Id. § 10-35(a)(3)(F).
409. Id. § 10-35(a).
410. Id. § 10-35(a)(3)(G).
411. E.g., S.B. 1527, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 31 (170(5)) (N.Y. 2019) (allowing only retail
licensees to be licensed for on-site consumption); A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 72(a)(2) (N.J.
2018) (specifying that consumption areas must be separate from but on the same premises as a cannabis
retailer or dispensary).
412. E.g., N.J. A.B. 4497 § 72(a)(2) (“cannabis consumption area” may allow consumption of
cannabis items “either obtained from the retailer or center, or brought by a person to the consumption
area”); H.F. 465, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. § 16 (subdiv. 1(b)(3)–(4)) (Minn. 2019) (sale or exchange of
cannabis on premises prohibited).
413. E.g., H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 6(H) (N.M. 2019), N.Y. S.B. 1527 § 31 (170(5)).
414. For example, a Connecticut bill would allow “marijuana lounges,” which would be
“licensed to sell marijuana or marijuana products to consumers solely for on-site consumption.” H.B.
5458, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(11) (Conn. 2018) (emphasis added). This would be similar to many
alcohol licenses for bars and restaurants.

ORENSTEIN_GLANTZ_03JUN20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

CANNABIS LEGALIZATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES

6/3/2020 9:24 AM

1383

consumption only in conjunction with a producer license415 (similar to a tasting
room at an alcohol production facility). Some would allow consumers to leave
with unused cannabis or cannabis products416 but may require the product to be
repackaged.417 Frequently, bills authorizing on-site consumption would not
permit alcohol, tobacco, or nicotine sales or consumption at the same
location.418 The effects of various restrictions are undetermined, but they are
likely to impact the number and location of on-site consumption areas. For
example, if on-site sales are prohibited, this would limit profit-making potential
and likely result in fewer licensed venues. The number and location of on-site
consumption areas, in turn, will likely influence the extent to which they
contribute to cannabis use normalization or erosion of smokefree restrictions in
an area.

415. S.B. 577, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 4(B) (N.M. 2019). This is in part because the bill creates a
state monopoly on retailer licensure.
416. E.g., S.B. 2703, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 72(k)(1) (N.J. 2018).
417. E.g., S.B. 2702, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 42(l)(1) (N.J. 2018).
418. E.g., A.B. 4497, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 72(i)(2) (N.J. 2018); N.J. S.B. 2703 § 72(i)(2);
H.F. 465, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. § 16(c)(2) (Minn. 2019) (alcohol); H.B. 2371, 2019 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. § 3.2-4142(B)(4) (Va. 2019) (allowing cannabis retailers to sell any other product otherwise
permitted by law other than tobacco or alcohol).
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TABLE 5: PUBLIC USE PROVISIONS IN PROPOSED BILLS419
Type

Prohibits All
Public Cannabis
Consumption

Prohibits Public
Cannabis
“Smoking”

State

Bills

Arizona

S.C. Res. 1022 § 1 (4-404)

Connecticut

H.B. 5595

Illinois [enacted]

H.B. 1438 § 10-35(a)(3)(F)

Minnesota

H.F. 420 art. 1, § 2, subdiv. 7, art. 4, § 8,
subdiv. 2(a)(6)(ii));
S.F. 619, art. 1, § 2, subdiv. 7, art. 4, § 8,
subdiv. 2(a)(6)(ii)

Missouri

H.B. 551 § A (195.2153(2))

New Jersey

A.B. 3819 § 3(c);
S.B. 2702 § 4(c)

New Mexico

S.B. 577 § 23(B)

West Virginia

H.B. 2331 § 16A-17-3(2)

Kentucky

S.B. 80 § 4

New Hampshire

H.B. 481 § 6 (318-F:4)

New Mexico

H.B. 356 § 31(A)

419. S.C. Res. 1022, 54th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 1 (4-404) (Ariz. 2019); H.B. 5595, 2019 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2019); H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 10-35(a)(3)(F), 1035(a)(4) 55-25(3) (as authorized and regulated by localities) (Ill. 2019); H.F. 420, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess.
art. 1, § 2, subdiv. 7, art. 4, § 8, subdiv. 2(a)(6)(ii) (Minn. 2019); S.F. 619, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. art. 1,
§ 2, subdiv. 7, art. 4, § 8, subdiv. 2(a)(6)(ii) (Minn. 2019); H.B. 551, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. § A (195.2153(2)) (Mo. 2019); A.B. 3819, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(c) (N.J. 2018); N.J. S.B.
2702 §§ 3 (“public place”), 4(c); N.M. S.B. 577 §§ 4(B), 23(B); H.B. 2331, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. §
16A-17-3(2) (W. Va. 2019); S.B. 80, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ky. 2019); H.B. 481, 166th Leg., 1st
Sess. § 6 (318-F:4) (N.H. 2019); H.B. 356, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. § 31(A) (N.M. 2019); A.B. 1617, 2019–
20 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 25 (N.Y. 2019); A.B. 3506, 2017–18 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 25
(N.Y. 2017); S.B. 1527, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 25, 31 (art. 11, § 178) (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 3040,
2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 25, 31 (art. 11, § 178) (N.Y. 2017); S.B. 2895, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1
(21-28.10-8) (R.I. 2018); H.B. 2376, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11-16A-5(a) (W. Va. 2019); H.B. 3129,
2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5B-8-5(a) (W. Va. 2019); Conn. H.B. 5458 §§ 1(11), 5; H.B. 632, 2019 Leg,
Reg. Sess. § 1 (art. XX (1)(B)(3 )) (Md. 2019); Minn. H.F. 465 § 16 (subdiv. 1); N.J. A.B. 4497 §§ 3
(“public place”), 4(c); N.J. S.B. 2703 §§ 3, 4(c); S.B. 1509, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. art. 4, § 74 (N.Y.
2019); Va. H.B. 2371 art. 7 § 3.2-4160 (A)(3); H.B. 2373, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. art. 3 § 3.24151(Va. 2019); S.B. 686, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 329-B(f) (Haw. 2019); S.B. 487, 2018 Leg., Reg.
Sess. § 21(Conn. 2018); H.B. 196, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (tit. 7, §§ 831(5), 833) (Vt. 2019); H.B.
250, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (tit. 7, § 831(5); 833) (Vt. 2019); S.B. 54, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (tit.
7, §§ 831(5), 833) (Vt. 2019); A.B. 3581, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 3 (“public place”), 4(c) (N.J. 2018).
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Type

Prohibits Public
Cannabis
“Smoking” Cont.

Exempts
Licensed
Consumption
Areas

Applies Existing
Tobacco
Consumption
Restrictions

Applies Existing
Alcohol
Consumption
Restrictions

1385

State

Bills

New York

A.B. 1617 § 25;
A.B. 3506 § 25;
S.B. 1527 § 25;
S.B. 3040 § 25

Rhode Island

S.B. 2895 § 1 (21-28.10-8)

West Virginia

H.B. 2376 § 11-16A-5(a);
H.B. 3129 § 5B-8-5(a)

Connecticut

H.B. 5458 §§ 1(11), 5

Illinois [enacted]

H.B. 1438 § 55-25(3) (as authorized and
regulated by localities)

Maryland

H.B. 632 § 1, art. XX (1)(B)(3)

Minnesota

H.F. 465 § 16(subdiv. 1)

New Jersey

A.B. 4497 §§ 3, 4(c);
S.B. 2703 §§ 3, 4(c)

New Mexico

H.B. 356 § 31(A);
S.B. 577 § 4(B)

New York

S.B. 1509 art. 4, § 74;
S.B. 1527 § 31 (art. 11, § 178);
S.B. 3040 § 31 (art. 11, § 174);

Virginia

H.B. 2371 art. 7 § 3.2-4160 (A)(3);
H.B. 2373 art. 3 § 3.2-4151

Hawaii

S.B. 686 § 329-B(f)

Connecticut

S.B. 487 § 21

Illinois [enacted]

H.B. 1438 § 10-35(a)(4)

New Jersey

S.B. 2703 § 4(c);
A.B. 4497 § 4(c)

New York

A.B. 1617 § 25;
A.B. 3506 § 25;
S.B. 1527 § 25;
S.B. 3040 § 25

Vermont

H.B. 196 § 2 (tit. 7, §§ 831(5), 833);
H.B. 250 § 2 (tit. 7, § 831(5); 833);
S.B. 54 § 2 (tit. 7, §§ 831(5), 833);

New Jersey

A.B. 3581 §§ 3 (“public place”), 4(c);
S.B. 2702 §§ 3 (“public place”), 4(c);
A.B. 4497 §§ 3 (“public place”), 4(c)
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. Legalization is Dynamic, and States are Poised to Act
Cannabis policy is evolving quickly. Medical legalization spread from a
single state in 1996 to thirty-three states and D.C. in 2018.420 Recreational
legalization was non-existent until 2012 and in 2018 included ten states and
D.C. Given the recent electoral success of legalization campaigns, legalization
in additional states is highly likely, though the precise form legalization may
take remains up for debate.421
Despite the dramatic pace of change in this policy area over the last several
years, there remains the potential for considerable additional change at the state
level. As of July 2019, there were twenty-three states that allow citizens to
place an issue on the ballot via initiative (not including legislative referenda).422
Of these, fourteen did not have adult use cannabis laws, five did not have
comprehensive medical legalization laws, and three lacked even limited
The absence of
medical legalization for CBD/low-THC products423
legalization laws in many of these states in combination with recent legal
changes in other states and overall public opinion trends creates a policy
vacuum on the issue. In the absence of legislative action, ballot initiatives are
likely to fill this space.

420. Marijuana Deep Dive, supra note 10.
421. Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass, supra note 20, at 90–92.
422. INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., SIGNATURE, GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION AND SINGLE
SUBJECT
(SS)
REQUIREMENTS
FOR
INITIATIVE
PETITIONS
(2018),
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/docs/Almanac-Signature-and-SS-and-GD-Requirements.pdf
[https://perma.cc/45QY-CQ78]. This total does not include an unusual and restrictive process in
Illinois.
Id.;
see
also
Illinois,
INITIATIVE
&
REFERENDUM
INST.
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/states/state.cfm?id=9 [https://perma.cc/P22S-G2EG].
423. Marijuana Deep Dive, supra note 10; see State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 49;
see also infra Table 6.
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TABLE 6: CANNABIS LEGALIZATION IN STATES WITH INITIATIVE PROCESS424
State

Limited Medical

Medical

Recreational

Alaska

—

Yes (1998)

Yes (2014)

Arizona

—

Yes (2010)

No425

Arkansas

—

Yes (2016)

No

California

—

Yes (1996)

Yes (2016)

Colorado

—

Yes (2000)

Yes (2012)

Florida

Yes (2014)

Yes (2016)

No

No

No

Idaho

No

426

Maine

—

Yes (1999)

Yes (2016)

Massachusetts

—

Yes (2012)

Yes (2016)

Michigan

—

Yes (2008)

Yes (2018)

Mississippi

Yes (2014)

No

No

Missouri

Yes (2014)

Yes (2018)

No

Montana

—

Yes (2004)

No

Nebraska

No

No

No

Nevada

—

Yes (2000)

Yes (2016)

North Dakota

—

Yes (2016)

No427

Ohio

—

Yes (2016)

No

Oklahoma

—

Yes (2018)

No

Oregon

—

Yes (1998)

Yes (2014)

South Dakota

No

No

No

424. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 49 (listing medical and adult use laws in all
U.S. states and territories).
425. An adult use legalization initiative appeared on Arizona’s 2016 ballot but was narrowly
defeated, 51.3%–48.7%. Arizona Marijuana Legalization, Proposition 205 (2016), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Arizona_Marijuana_Legalization,_Proposition_205_(2016)
[https://perma.cc/RF9X-6KEE].
426. The governor vetoed a legislative bill to allow limited medical access in 2015. State
Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 49.
427. An adult use legalization initiative appeared on North Dakota’s November 2018 ballot, but
was unsuccessful. North Dakota Measure 3, Marijuana Legalization and Automatic Expungement
Initiative
(2018),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/North_Dakota_Measure_3,_Marijuana_Legalization_and_Automatic_Expung
ement_Initiative_(2018) [https://perma.cc/CMV3-5NLS].
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State

Limited Medical

Medical

Recreational

Utah

Yes (2014)

Yes (2018)

No

Washington

—

Yes (1998)

Yes (2012)

Wyoming

Yes (2015)

No

No

States Without:

3 / 23

5 / 23

13 / 23

Based on electoral results between 2012 and 2018 and various public
opinion polls,428 voters are highly supportive of medical legalization and
moderately supportive of recreational legalization as general principles.429
Depending on how much faith one has in the electorate to be discerning in
evaluating ballot questions, it may be fair to ask whether, at this current high
water mark for legalization support, voters will approve any legalization
initiative that appears at face value to accomplish these goals. For now, at least,
it appears that they will not. For example, Ohio’s 2015 Initiative 3 would have
legalized both medical and recreational cannabis.430 According to an April
2015 state poll, 84% of Ohio voters supported medical legalization, and 52%
supported adult use legalization.431 Yet the initiative failed by a wide margin,
capturing only 36% of the vote, the lowest of any legalization ballot measure
of any type in any state since at least 2004.432 The Ohio measure was unusually
constructed, giving oligopolistic control of the proposed cannabis market to a
small cadre of interconnected corporate investors who provided nearly all of
the initiative’s funding support, an arrangement that appears to have contributed
heavily to its defeat.433
428. See generally Press Release, Quinnipiac University Poll (April 6, 2015),
https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/sw/ps04062015_Spg72ho.pdf/
[https://perma.cc/Q2XB-L4R7];
Medical
Marijuana:
Votes
and
Polls,
2000–Present,
PROCON.ORG,
https://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.background-resource.php?resourceID=000149
[https://perma.cc/34C3-9Z4P]; State Polls, NAT’L ORG. FOR THE REFORM OF MARIJUANA LAWS
(NORML), https://norml.org/library/state-polls-legalization [https://perma.cc/3HPM-B4K9].
429. See Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass, supra note 20, at 77, 105–06 (detailing
election results for cannabis legalization ballot initiatives).
430. Ohio Marijuana Legalization Initiative, Issue 3 (2015), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative,_Issue_3_(2015)
[https://perma.cc/3B3G-HFXQ].
431. Quinnipiac University Poll, supra note 428.
432. Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of Grass, supra note 20, at 105–06.
433. David A. Graham, Why Did Ohio’s Marijuana-Legalization Push Fail?, ATLANTIC (Nov.
3, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/where-did-ohios-marijuana-legalizersgo-wrong/414061/ [https://perma.cc/T3SA-9BZC]; see also Orenstein & Glantz, The Grassroots of
Grass, supra note 20, at 79, 89.
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B. Advantages of Legislative Legalization
There are potential public health advantages to legislative legalization,
whether medical or recreational.434 First, legislatively enacted laws are
considerably easier to change than voter-enacted laws. With relatively few
limits, legislatures are free to later change statutes they have enacted.435 This
allows a legislature to adjust course to correct for, among other issues, drafting
errors or ambiguities, incorrect assumptions (e.g., tax forecast436), changing
market dynamics, improved scientific understanding of the health effects of
cannabis consumption, and the observed impacts of different policy models in
other jurisdictions.
In contrast, several states’ laws afford voter-enacted laws substantial
protection from legislative changes. For example, unless specifically
authorized in the initiative language, California law prohibits the legislature
from amending initiatives without returning to the people for a vote.437 Arizona
law prohibits the state legislature from amending laws passed by initiative or
referendum with less than a three-fourths supermajority, and even with such a
majority, the legislature may only make amendments that further the purpose

434. A legislative approach may also be advantageous for advocates, as Caulkins Coulson,
Farber, & Vesely explained following the defeat of California’s 2010 recreational initiative
(Proposition 19) and before Colorado and Washington began the modern wave of recreational
legalization: “Focusing on propositions may be short-sighted: To date, propositions have come closer
to achieving marijuana legalization than has legislation. However, inasmuch as marijuana legalization
has never been tried in the modern era and there are many complicated choices and details, it seems
improbable that the initial design will get it right; likely it will take some trial and error and incremental
adjustment to get the scheme worked out . . . . However, propositions are harder to adjust than are
regimes established by legislation . . . . If pursuing a proposition, leave the specifics up to the policy
makers: Some people who voted ‘no’ on Proposition 19 opposed its specifics, not legalization in the
abstract. To win these swing voters, proponents should consider propositions that defer the details to
state legislatures or other state-level policy makers.” Caulkins, Coulson, Farber, & Vesely, supra note
116, at 19–20 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted).
435. The principle of legislative entrenchment generally bars a legislature from binding a future
legislature, for example by requiring a larger legislative majority to change a statute. Compare Eric
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1666
(2002) (arguing that prevailing doctrine against legislative entrenchment should be discarded and that
legislatures should be able to bind future legislatures within the boundaries of other constitutional
limitations), with John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A
Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1777–78 (2003) (arguing that the
prohibition on legislative entrenchment is correct as a matter of law and of good policy).
436. See, e.g., Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, supra note 76, at 79 (discussing both
Colorado’s massive overestimation of projected first year cannabis tax revenue and Washington’s
comparable underestimation).
437. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c).
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of the law.438 To fundamentally alter or repeal the law, the legislature must
submit the change to the voters via referendum.439 Several other states require
legislative supermajorities to amend citizen initiatives or require a specified
period of time to pass before the legislature can amend.440
State efforts to regulate around voter-enacted marijuana initiatives may also
face substantial legal challenge. For example, a Colorado regulation that would
have required marijuana-focused publications to be kept behind store counters
in order to reduce access by minors was struck down by a federal court after
both the responsible regulatory agency and state attorney general’s office
conceded its unconstitutionality.441 However, the construction of some state
initiatives, such as those in Washington and Colorado, has allowed legislatures
to more easily make changes.442
The difficulties legislatures face in altering voter initiatives exist by design
because initiatives are a vehicle for bypassing or overruling an unresponsive or
resistant legislature.443 However, the inflexibility of initiatives can have broad
and sometimes unintended consequences, especially when the initiative is
exceedingly specific.444 Rigid legal frameworks imposed by initiative can
restrict options for correcting errors, mitigating undesirable results, and
reacting to changing circumstances,445 precisely the type of nuanced, careful,
438. ARIZ. CONST. art IV, pt. 1 § 1(6)(C).
439. Id. § 1(6)(B)–(C).
440. See
generally
Legislative
Alteration,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Legislative_alteration [https://perma.cc/X2D7-6PFP].
441. Trans-High Corp. v. Colorado, 58 F.Supp.3d 1177, 1179–80 (D. Colo. 2013) (mem.).
442. Kleiman, supra note 291. The Colorado legislature used this authority to, among other
things, address poorly labeled or easily overconsumed edibles. Id. In contrast, Arizona’s 2016
proposal (which ultimately failed by a narrow margin) would have altered the state constitution and
been exceedingly difficult to change, while the flexibility of California’s legalization initiative was
between these two types. Id. However, lingering outgrowth of California’s earlier adoption of medical
legalization may limit legislative options in some respects. For example, the state’s medical
legalization initiative did not specify a limit on the amount of cannabis a qualified patient could possess
or purchase. The legislature subsequently imposed such a limit, but the state supreme court invalidated
this restriction. People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 190, 214 (Ca. Sup. Ct. 2010).
443. John Dinan, State Constitutional Initiative Processes and Governance in the Twenty-first
Century, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 61, 84–85 (2016) (citing ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX:
INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION 291–92, 298 (1999); see
also Daniel G. Orenstein, Voter Madness? Voter Intent and the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act, 47
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 391, 391–92 (2015) (arguing that the language of Arizona’s medical cannabis law should
be interpreted broadly in part because the initiative enacting the law was a direct response to prior state
legislative resistance).
444. Dinan, supra note 443, at 84–88. These concerns are particularly acute when the initiative
alters a state constitution. Id.
445. Id. at 84–85.
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and responsive policymaking tools frequently cited as necessary for cannabis
policy in light of limited and fast-changing scientific evidence.446
Second, legislative legalization allows public health experts and advocates
to play a more direct role in policy development (if they chose to participate).
Voter initiatives are entirely the creations of the advocates who draft them.
While they may adopt a variety of perspectives, they have neither the
obligations to the public nor the resources of state legislatures. Legislatures
have the authority, ability, and responsibility to involve a variety of
perspectives in their decision-making. Among other powers, legislatures can
actively involve public health experts through, among other avenues, expert
testimony and grant-making to generate analysis.
Third, legislative legalization better leverages the benefits of the
“laboratories of democracy.”447 A small number of advocacy groups are
responsible for most state legalization initiatives to date.448 As a result, states’
approaches have been highly similar. Whether via an enduring state-oriented
approach449 or eventual federal legalization, greater variety in state policy will
help demonstrate the effects of various policy decisions and aid future decisionmaking. The findings discussed in Part III illustrate that not only are public
health principles gaining some traction in legislative legalization proposals that
has been largely absent in ballot initiatives, but also that state legislatures will
address problems in different ways, ultimately providing critical evidence to
aid development of future best practice recommendations.
C. The Window for State Legislative Action is Open, But Limited
Public health advocates have the opportunity to appropriate the momentum
of the legalization movement and the underlying shift in public opinion to affect
the positive impacts of legalization (e.g., market regulation) while potentially
avoiding or at least blunting the negative effects of unfettered cannabis
commercialization. Rather than presenting voters or legislators the binary
choice between prohibition and laissez-faire legalization, public health-oriented

446. Kleiman, supra note 291; CAULKINS, KILMER, KLEIMAN, MACCOUN, MIDGETTE,
OGLESBY, PACULA, & REUTER, supra note 116, at 151–53.
447. Berch, supra note 259, at 872.
448. See RUSCHE, supra note 57.
449. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper, & Sam Kamin, Cooperative
Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 74–102 (2015) (arguing in favor of a
system of “cooperative federalism” in which the federal government permits states with policies
meeting specific benchmarks to opt out of CSA provisions relating to cannabis and exert exclusive
control in this area under state law).
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legalization provides a more nuanced and beneficial middle path grounded in
historical lessons and hard-learned best practices.
Some of the public health approaches outlined may seem unachievable in
the current policy environment. However, public health policies often progress
slowly but ultimately yield largescale changes. Tobacco control is a leading
example. In 1965, almost 42% of U.S. adults smoked cigarettes; in 2016 it was
less than 16%.450 In the 1970s, only the boldest advocates for nonsmokers’
rights sought even to require non-smoking sections in restaurants and other
public places, and their early efforts received limited support from health
organizations.451 Tobacco companies used cartoon characters in their
marketing until the practice was proscribed by the 1998 Master Settlement
Agreement.452 U.S. law did not prohibit smoking on airplanes until 1990 (and
until 2000 this prohibition included only domestic flights),453 after over twenty
years of advocacy to overcome opposition from the tobacco industry and its
allies.454 The history of tobacco control illustrates that the political and legal
status quo does not dictate the potential for future public health policy success
(and also that the road to such success is long and perilous, especially against
powerful and entrenched industries).
450. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TABLE 47. CURRENT CIGARETTE SMOKING
AMONG ADULTS AED 18 AND OVER, BY SEX, RACE, AND AGE: UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS
1965–2016, at 1, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2017/047.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y6X-XSHM].
Prevalence for specific populations was even higher. In 1965, over 50% of adult men and nearly 60%
of adult African American men smoked cigarettes. Id. In 2016, those rates had dropped to 17.7% and
20.3%, respectively. Id.
451. See GLANTZ & BALBACH, supra note 391, at 1–18 (discussing early tobacco control efforts
relating to California’s failed Proposition 5 in 1978).
452. PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR., THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW
(2019),
https://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/MSA-Overview-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QK7X-2CKY]. Prior to the Master Settlement Agreement, in which major tobacco
companies agreed to accept various restrictions on their business practices, the Federal Trade
Commission had also filed a complaint alleging that R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company’s “Joe Camel”
campaign, featuring an anthropomorphic camel cartoon character, violated federal law by targeting
children and adolescents. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Joe Camel Advertising Campaign
Violates Federal Law, FTC Says (May 28, 1997), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/1997/05/joe-camel-advertising-campaign-violates-federal-law-ftc-says
[https://perma.cc/D9YY-YQ5U].
453. Press Release, Matthew L. Myers, President, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, As U.S.
Celebrates 25 Years of Smoke-Free Airlines, It’s Time to Make All Workplaces and Public Places
Smoke-Free (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press-releases/2015_02_23_planes
[https://perma.cc/6LQG-8EGT].
454. See Peggy A. Lopipero & Lisa A. Bero, Tobacco Interests or the Public Interest: 20 Years
of Industry Strategies to Undermine Airline Smoking Restrictions, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL 323, 324
(2006).
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Ballot initiatives are born of frustration with perceived legislative inaction,
obstinacy, or misalignment of interests. In the case of cannabis, the myriad
failures and extensive collateral damage of the War on Drugs makes such
frustration understandable. Still, the speedy adoption of legalization via
initiative has outpaced scientific understanding of cannabis and its effects on
health, leading to a difficult policy crossroads with no ideal resolution. The
best available path forward is the one that most readily allows for course
correction and minimizes unintended negative effects. A public health
approach to cannabis legalization, adopted legislatively, is such a path for states
unless and until a change in federal law, but the window for doing so will not
remain open indefinitely.
Policymakers’ reticence to adopt comprehensive cannabis legalization may
be prudent in light of the current state of cannabis science. However, changing
public opinion has forced the issue. In states with a ballot initiative process,
legalization advocates will bring their case directly to voters, 455 and they are
very likely to succeed. In states where this process is not available, there is a
separate but related risk. As state cannabis markets around the country (and in
other countries) mature and larger corporate entities enter456 or emerge,457 the
ability of the nascent legal cannabis industry to influence lawmakers will grow.
The borders of legalizing jurisdictions will not contain this influence. If the
cannabis industry gains sway in state legislatures (or Congress), policy will
likely favor industry interests at the expense of public health. To protect public
health, the best approach is to enshrine a public health approach in legalization
from the outset, rather than to fight these battles defensively.
D. The Stakes for Public Health are High
The cannabis industry is not, at present, comparable to either the tobacco
or alcohol industries. However, both tobacco and alcohol companies, among
others, have begun to obtain or at least explore entry into the cannabis market.458
These efforts have, to date, been fairly small in relation to the size and
455. See e.g., Ferner, supra note 72.
456. See Gelles, supra note 15 (discussing corporate entries in Canadian cannabis market);
Barry, Hiilamo, & Glantz, supra note 16, at 209 (presenting evidence of longstanding tobacco industry
influence in legal cannabis market).
457. See Debra Borchardt, The Cannabis Industry’s Top 12 U.S. Multi-State Operators, GREEN
MARKET REPORT (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.greenmarketreport.com/the-cannabis-industrys-top12-u-s-multi-state-operators/ [https://perma.cc/M2VM-4XBT] (compiling license and valuation data
for largest multi-state cannabis operations).
458. Candice M. Bowling, Amy Y. Hafez, & Stanton A. Glantz, Public Health and Medicine’s
Response to Cannabis Commercialization in the United States: A Commentary, J. PSYCHOACTIVE
DRUGS, May 19, 2020.
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positioning of the industries as a whole, likely due to continuing illegality in
most countries, including the United States at the federal level and are likely to
change as legalization progresses.
Many public health best practices developed post hoc to address the
malfeasance of powerful global industries (e.g., tobacco) that engaged in
copious and well-documented bad behavior. As of now, that description does
not apply to the cannabis industry. One may argue that policies designed to
curtail the past abuses of one industry and prevent repetition are not necessarily
applicable to an industry that has yet to engage in such abuses. However, a key
lesson from the history of tobacco and alcohol control is that once industries
achieve prominence and power, controlling their behavior becomes
exponentially more difficult. In regulating cannabis, the opportunity exists to
structure legal frameworks to create guardrails that prevent or minimalize
damaging industry behavior, rather than ameliorate its effects after the fact.
The state of evidence regarding the health harms of cannabis is far from
ideal. While cannabis shares some effects with alcohol and some routes of
administration with tobacco, the three are separate and distinct substances with
unique characteristics. For example, tobacco, in all forms, is known to be
carcinogenic.459 Cannabis smoke is thought to have similar effects because the
two forms of smoke are nearly identical, save for the presence or absence of
nicotine and cannabinoids.460 However, while existing evidence is strongly
suggestive, carcinogenicity of cannabis has yet to be conclusively
demonstrated,461 and non-smoked forms of cannabis (e.g., edibles) likely have
different health risks than inhaled cannabis. Yet carcinogenicity is not the only
harm tobacco smoke poses. Smoking causes myriad other negative health
impacts, particularly on the cardiovascular and respiratory systems, and there

459. TOBACCO AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT, supra note 272, at 20.
460. TOMAR, BEAUMOUNT, & HIESH, supra note 388, at 77; Moir, Rickert, Levasseur, Larose,
Maertens, White, & Desjardins, supra note 89, at 494–95.
461. Cannabis smoke (as “marijuana smoke”) does appear on California’s Proposition 65 list of
chemicals known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity based on an extensive review of
existing evidence. CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CHEMICALS KNOWN TO THE STATE TO CAUSE
CANCER OR REPRODUCTIVE TOXICITY 13 (2017), https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/proposition65/p65single01272017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ANB-LJMA]; see generally TOMAR, BEAUMOUNT, &
HIESH, supra note 388. However, the National Academies, using different inclusion criteria, found
moderate evidence of no association between cannabis smoking and incidence of lung, head, or neck
cancers, only limited evidence of association between current, frequent, or chronic cannabis smoking
and a subtype of testicular cancer, and insufficient evidence to support or refute association between
cannabis smoking and several other cancers. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1,
at 141–58.
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is evidence that cannabis smoke has a similar risk profile,462 which is to be
expected given their similarity of composition. Several other potential negative
health effects associated with cannabis use (e.g., motor vehicle accidents,
pediatric overdose injuries, impaired cognition, development of schizophrenia
or other psychoses, abuse of other substances)463 are likely unrelated to mode
of use.
The relative absence of evidence on cannabis’s potential health harms as
compared to those of tobacco and alcohol may simply be the product of the
overall dearth of research on cannabis, largely due to legal restrictions in place
for the past several decades.464 The most comprehensive summary of the
possible health effects of cannabis as of 2017, both positive and negative,
comes from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine.465
While that report does draw important substantive conclusions,466 its major
recommendations all address the need for additional research.467 Additionally,
the report notes that all cannabis provided to investigators in the United States
comes from the National Institutes on Drug Abuse, which sources cannabis
solely from a single site at the University of Mississippi and does not commonly
provide forms of cannabis products other than standard dried flower (i.e., no
edibles, concentrates, etc.).468 Even this flower is not typical of products
commonly on the market in 2020. As a result, the absence of clear evidence of
health harms from non-smoked cannabis products may be due to the absence of
research, rather than the absence of effects in reality. Cannabis available for
research also often fails to reflect the strains, potency, or other characteristics
of products available on the market (licit or illicit),469 again indicating that
absence of evidence for any particular effect or association should not be
understood to be evidence of absence. The impacts of cannabis use will become
clearer with time and additional research, but responsible regulation of cannabis
cannot wait.

462. Wang, Derakshandeh, Liu, Narayan, Nabavizadeh, Le, Danforth, Pinnamaneni, Rodriguez,
Luu, Sievers, Schick, Glantz, & Springer, supra note 388, at 8.
463. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 17–21. Of note, not all such
associations are necessarily causal in nature.
464. Bowling, Hafez, & Glantz, supra note 458, at 3.
465. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., supra note 1, at 13–22.
466. See id.
467. See id. at 9–12.
468. Id. at 382–83.
469. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite the long history of human cannabis use, evidence of potential health
harms from the substance is still developing, though there is already more than
enough to be cause for concern. Nevertheless, the failures of the War on Drugs
and the potential benefits of legalization as an alternative have contributed to
strong policy momentum in favor of adult use cannabis legalization. To date,
legalization has primarily arisen from ballot initiatives, but legislatures are
better situated to craft legalization frameworks that protect public health, and
many state legislative proposals to legalize cannabis contain public health best
practice elements absent from existing adult use frameworks.
Large parts of existing state adult use frameworks created through ballot
initiatives were based on existing medical cannabis and alcohol laws, neither of
which embodies public health best practices. A public health approach to
cannabis prioritizes public health over other policy goals, including industry
success and tax revenue. While exact parameters differ, there is significant
consensus among government entities, non-governmental health organizations,
influential international agreements, and health policy scholars on many of the
most important elements of a public health approach to regulating substances
like alcohol, tobacco, and cannabis.
This Article outlines a public health rubric for adult use cannabis
legalization that embodies sixteen core elements common across existing
public health scholarship and recommendations. Broadly, these elements span
three categories: market and regulatory structures; consumer-facing product
and retailer regulation; and youth, environmental exposure, and
denormalization. Applying this rubric to active cannabis legalization bills
active as of February 2019 revealed that state legislative proposals adopt a wide
variety of approaches, but many incorporate at least some public health best
practices.
As to market and regulatory structure, several state bills would vest
significant power in a state health or public health authority, and one would
create a state monopoly on cannabis sales. A number of bills would merge
authority over medical and adult use regulatory systems. Only a small number
would explicitly bar industry participation in official regulatory bodies, but
most would preserve local authority to limit or prohibit operation of cannabis
businesses. Several bills would designate significant revenue to cannabisrelated health and safety purposes, and most would enshrine meaningful
enforcement mechanisms in state law to promote oversight and compliance.
In consumer-facing product and retailer regulation, many state bills
appeared to leave comprehensive packaging and labeling provisions to future
consideration via regulation, but a small number would require minimalist
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packaging approaching a plain packaging standard. The few bills that specify
warning label content would address only specific populations like children and
pregnant women, but one enacted bill requires limited but direct general
warnings about possible health hazards of cannabis use. Some bills would
prohibit direct consumer access to cannabis products or access via vending
machines, drive-through windows, and internet-based sales platforms; a small
number would also restrict cannabis outlet density, and a few would limit
operating days and times.
Regarding youth, environmental exposure, and denormalization, almost all
of the proposed bills would adopt a minimum legal age of 21, and many would
prohibit some harmful additives, notably nicotine and alcohol. Several bills
would ban cannabis advertising that targets, appeals to, or is likely to reach
persons under 21, and one would bar cannabis advertising entirely in several
types of media. Most bills would prohibit cannabis consumption, or at least
cannabis smoking, in public places where tobacco use is prohibited.
Legislatures are considering a broader array of cannabis control options
than ballot initiative approaches have offered to date. In many cases, legislative
proposals incorporate several public health best practices based on tobacco and
alcohol control. While few, if any, of the legislative proposals analyzed appear
ideal from a public health perspective, they nevertheless have advantages over
ballot initiatives, including that legislative actions are considerably easier to
refine and change over time as evidence accumulates and the consequences of
different policy options become known.
Absent legislative action, legalization advocates will continue to use ballot
initiatives to achieve their policy goals, and the nascent legal cannabis industry
will continue to cultivate legislative influence. Once industry-friendly policies
become entrenched in law, they will be difficult to change. Legislatures should
proactively adopt legalization measures to preempt weaker advocate-driven
initiatives and future industry-influenced legislation. Legislative legalization
may not be ideal based on the state of existing evidence, but it is the best
available path forward in a situation where the status quo is demonstrably
harmful, and the other path potentially allows the repetition of past mistakes in
tobacco and alcohol regulation. Legalization carries both opportunities and
risks for public health, but inaction is not a viable option.
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APPENDIX
We developed a set of active proposed legislation using WestLaw in
February 2019 with the following search string: advanced: (marijuana
marihuana cannabis) /50 (“adult use” “personal use” recreational legalize
legalization). We limited results to past twelve months and excluded
jurisdictions with existing adult use laws (Alaska, California, Colorado, District
of Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, and
Washington).
This search yielded 234 results. We then rejected duplicates and those that
did not address any form of legalization or only modified an existing program
based on review of available summary or abstract, yielding ninety-three results.
Application of inclusion criteria yielded a final set of fifty-two bills in eighteen
states for full review, as presented in Table A1, below. In July 2019, we revised
the analysis to include Illinois’s successful H.B. 1438 as enacted. We did not
include revised or amended versions of other (unsuccessful) bills in this update.
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TABLE A1: LIST OF REVIEWED LEGISLATION
State

Year

Bill #

Arizona

2019

S.C. Res. 1022

Connecticut

2018

H.B. 5458

Connecticut

2019

H.B. 5595

Connecticut

2019

H.B. 6863

Connecticut

2018

S.B. 487

Connecticut

2019

S.B. 496

Connecticut

2019

S.B. 744

Hawaii

2019

H.B. 1515

Hawaii

2019

H.B. 1581

Hawaii

2019

H.B. 291

Hawaii

2019

S.B. 442

Hawaii

2019

H.B. 708

Hawaii

2019

S.B. 686

Illinois

2019

H.B. 2477

Illinois

2019

H.B. 902

Illinois

2019

H.B. 1438 [enacted]

Indiana

2019

H.B. 1685

Kentucky

2019

S.B. 80

Maryland

2019

H.B. 632

Minnesota

2019

H.F. 265

Minnesota

2019

H.F. 420

Minnesota

2017

H.F. 4541

Minnesota

2019

H.F. 465

Minnesota

2019

S.F. 619

Mississippi

2019

S.B. 2349

Missouri

2019

H.B. 157

Missouri

2019

H.B 551

New Hampshire

2019

H.B. 481

New Hampshire

2019

H.B. 722

New Jersey

2018

A.B. 3581

New Jersey

2018

A.B. 3819

New Jersey

2018

A.B. 4497

New Jersey

2018

S.B. 2702
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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
State

Year

Bill #

New Jersey

2018

S.B. 2703

New Mexico

2019

H.B. 356

New Mexico

2019

S.B. 577

New York

2019

A.B. 1617

New York

2019

A.B. 2009

New York

2017

A.B. 3506

New York

2019

S.B. 1509

New York

2019

S.B. 1527

New York

2017

S.B. 3040

Rhode Island

2017

S.B. 2895

Vermont

2019

H.B. 196

Vermont

2019

H.B. 250

Vermont

2019

S.B. 54

Virginia

2018

H.B. 2371

Virginia

2018

H.B. 2373

West Virginia

2019

H.B. 2331

West Virginia

2019

H.B. 2376

West Virginia

2019

H.B. 3108

West Virginia

2019

H.B. 3129

